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ABSTRACT 
Aristotle's Ideals of Friendship and Virtue 
by 
Anthony Edward Carreras 
Aristotle's eudaimonism commits him to holding that the virtuous agent chooses 
everything ultimately for the sake of his own eudaimonia. But within this eudaimonist 
framework, Aristotle claims that the agent must value his friend for the friend's sake, and 
that he must choose virtuous actions for themselves. How can we make sense of these 
claims wi thin Aristotle's eudaimonist framework? 
I argue that Aristotle holds that there is a necessary, conceptual connection 
between valuing a friend for the friend's sake and valuing a friend for the sake of one's 
own happiness, and likewise for virtue. In friendship, this view of Aristotle's is 
buttressed by his potent but inchoate view that true friends are a "single soul", a fact not 
recognized by most commentators. I develop this view at length and show that Aristotle 
thinks that through a friendship, the character and well-being of each friend is essentially 
shaped by, and defined by reference to, the other. This both explains and justifies friends 
in perceiving their relationship as a unit and being motivated by what I call "We-
Attitudes". To the extent that friends are a single soul, it is not the case that I value my 
friend for my sake or that he values me for his sake. Rather, it is the single soul that 
values itself for its own sake. 
Concerning virtue, I argue that Aristotle holds that to choose a virtuous action for 
its own sake is to choose it for those features of it that make it a virtuous action. Since it 
is an essential feature of any virtuous action that it actualizes the agent's capacity for 
virtue - which is that in which eudaimonia primarily consists - it must be chosen for this 
feature of it. Anticipating the worry that Aristotle's virtuous agent does not have a proper 
regard for others, I show that there are at least some virtuous actions whose essential 
features refer plainly to the well-being of others. Therefore, these actions are chosen both 
for these features and for their eudaimonic features, without one set of features being 
valued for the sake of the other set. 
For Edward 
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I 
Introduction 
1. The Problem of Motivation 
In her famous 1958 polemic, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote that "anyone who has 
read Aristotle's Ethics and has also read modem moral philosophy must have been struck 
by the great contrasts between them."! If by 'modem moral philosophy' one means the 
theories handed down to us from Kant and Mill, then Anscombe is right - there are 
indeed great contrasts. The greatest contrast, in my view, lies in the fact that for Aristotle 
(and for Greek ethicists generally), there is a deep connection for an individual agent 
between being ethical and being happy. Moral virtue (fJ81KTJ apETTi), according to 
Aristotle, is that which makes for a good functioning human being (NE 1.7 l098a8-l5; 
1.13 l102b14-1103a4), and happiness (eudaimonia) is good functioning (NE 1.7 
l097b22-1098a21). So deep is this connection, Aristotle thought, that those who were 
not ethical could not attain happiness. Indeed, the vicious "hate and flee from life 
because of their badness and, destroy themselves" (NE IXA 1166bI3-l4). Moreover, 
"since bad people have nothing lovable about them, they lack any friendly feelings 
toward themselves" (NE IX.4 Il66b 18-19). Such is the price of vice. In contrast, "the 
prize and goal of virtue appears to be the best good, something divine and blessed" (NE 
I. 9 1099b 16-17). Thus, the virtuous person "wishes to spend time with himself, since he 
acts on his own with pleasure: since his memories of past deeds are enjoyable" (NE IX.4 
! Anscombe (1958, 1). 
2 
1166a23-25). And not only does the virtuous person consistently do the right thing, but 
he does it with pleasure. 2 
It is no doubt an attractive picture that Aristotle paints of the ethical life. If he's 
right about how good this life is, then we all have good reason, it seems, to be ethical. It 
is this aspect of Aristotle's ethics that leads to the main problem to be addressed in this 
dissertation. I call it 'The Problem of Motivation', since it arises from the fact that 
Aristotle ascribes what appear to be conflicting motives to the virtuous agent.3 No doubt 
Aristotle thinks that any human being is better off - is happier - if he lives the ethical life 
of virtue than if not. What motivates the virtuous to be virtuous, Aristotle thinks, is the 
quest for their own eudaimonia (NE 1.7 1097bl-5).4 And yet we are also told that 
virtuous actions must be chosen for themselves (81' mh6:), and that those who do not 
choose virtuous actions for themselves do not count as virtuous (NE 11.4 1105a32). 
In strikingly similar fashion, in his account of philia, Aristotle claims that we 
must value our friendsfor themselves (81' m1Tovs) (NE VIII.3 1156blO-11 1157b3) while 
also claiming that the virtuous agent cares for his friend for a plethora of self-regarding 
reasons.5 We may sum those reasons up simply with the claim that the agent cares for his 
2 NE 1.8 l099a15-25. Indeed, he must do it with pleasure in order to be truly virtuous. 
3 It is of course worth noting that Aristotle does not seem to recognize a conflict with respect to these two 
motives, which I shall have more to say about in section 1.3 shortly after expounding the nature of the 
problem. For now suffice to say that I mean that from our point of view, we would recognize these motives 
as potentially being in tension with one another. 
4 "Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves, since we 
would choose each of them even if it had no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of 
happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy." I will have more to say about this passage as 
we move forward. 
5 Some of those reasons are: 1) He sees his friend as his "other self', which may imply that he cares for his 
friend just to the extent that he sees himself in his friend (NE IX.4 l166al-34); 2) He loves his own being 
and activity, and sees his friend as an extension of his own activity (NE IX.7 1168a2-6); 3) He is a self-
3 
friend for the sake of his own happiness - a claim to which Aristotle's eudaimonism must 
in some sense commit him. After all, "anyone who is to be happy will need friends who 
are good" (NE IX.9 1170b18). No one, Aristotle thinks, would choose to live without 
friends "even ifhe had every other good thing" (NE VIlLI 1155a6). 
So, according to Aristotle, the virtuous agent chooses X both for its own sake and 
for the sake ofY, where: 
Case 1: X = virtue 
Y = one's own happiness 
Case 2: X = the good of one's friend 
Y = one's own happiness 
Now, why is this a problem? In short, each case generates two prima facie difficulties, 
one conceptual and one moral. It is important to keep these two difficulties separate. 
The two difficulties are explained in the following two sections. Then, in section 1.3, I 
explain in greater detail the sense in which the problem of motivation is Aristotle's 
problem. In section 1.4, I shall state my aim in treating that problem. 
1.1. The Conceptual Difficulty 
The most natural meaning of 'choosing Xfor itself is 'to choose X independently 
of how X contributes to one's own happiness.'6 The conceptual difficulty, therefore, is 
that to choose somethingfor itself thereby precludes choosing it for any other reason. If 
this is right, it rules out the possibility of choosing some virtuous action both for itself 
lover (cp(AavTos) who seeks the noble (TO KaMv), the greatest good, wanting it for himself (NE IX.8 
l169a22-30). In addition, Aristotle tells us that by loving our friends, we love what is good for ourselves 
(NE VIII.5 l157b33-35), and that "each person wishes good things to himself most of all" (NE VIII.7 
l159a12). 
6 I will have more to say about this shortly in section 1.5. This is how many commentators understand the 
locution "for itself'. See e.g. Cooper (1980,334) and Kraut (1989, ch.2). 
4 
and for the sake of one's own happiness, and likewise for choosing to benefit and value 
one's friend. Now, this may seem very unlikely, since it is generally quite possible to 
choose some action for multiple reasons. We do so frequently. But the worry here, 
again, is that choosing something/or itself carries with it special restrictions. The reason 
for this is as follows: If X is desired for its own sake, then X is an ultimate aim, and so 
the desire for X is an independent desire. But if X is desired for the sake of something 
else, X is not an ultimate aim, and so the desire for X depends on the desire for something 
else. To say that X is desired both for its own sake and for the sake of Y would imply 
that X both is and is not an ultimate aim, and that the desire for X is both a dependent and 
independent desire. 7 
1.2. The Moral Difficulty 
By contrast, the moral difficulty is that self-regarding motives spoil other-
regarding motives and make for, in one way or another, a morally deficient agent. An 
example of this view is found in Kant. Kant contrasts acting from the motive of duty 
with acting from immediate inclination, and claims that only agents who act solely from 
duty have moral worth. The following passage from the Gro'!Jndwork is telling: 
On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides everyone 
has an immediate inclination to do so. But on this account the often 
anxious care that most people take of it still has no inner worth and their 
maxim has no moral content [my emphasis]. They look after their lives in 
conformity with duty but not from duty. On the other hand, if adversity 
and hopeless grief have quite taken away the taste for life; if an 
unfortunate man, strong of soul and more indignant about his fate than 
despondent or defected, wishes for death and yet preserves his life without 
loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has a 
moral import. (G 398) 
7 This is how Prichard (1967,250-1) puts the point. 
5 
What Kant appears to be saying in this passage is that the very presence of immediate 
inclination precludes an action from having moral worth, and that it is only when 
inclination is not present at all that an action comes to have moral worth. 8 What Kant 
does not state explicitly here but is still implied is that an agent can be motivated by 
considerations of duty and by immediate inclination, and when this happens, the motive 
from immediate inclination morally undermines the motive from considerations of duty. 
Now, we might think that Kant's view is simply too strong and unreasonable and 
therefore not be moved by it. We might not want to endorse the view that agents who act 
from self-regarding motives are thereby prevented from having moral worth, even if they 
also act from other-regarding motives. That thesis seems too strong. But I think there is 
something right about Kant's view, and that it at least supports the following weaker but 
important thesis: Agents who are motivated by moral reasons alone are morally better 
than agents who are motivated by moral reasons + self-regarding reasons. So an agent 
who acts from both self-regarding and other-regarding motives might still have some 
degree of moral worth, but he still shows a defect. Bringing the discussion back to 
Aristotle - eudaimonia consists in the actualization of our essential human capacities. 
Developing and acting in accordance with the virtues of character actualizes those 
capacities. So, take the virtue of generosity (eAev6epIOTT]S), and compare the following 
two agents, David and Jason. Suppose that they both have an opportunity to give a 
healthy sum of money to a local charity that will use the money to better the lives of 
children in serious need. Suppose David sees this opportunity and gives the money, 
8 I am aware that attributing this view to Kant is controversial. Many scholars have tried to interpret Kant 
in a way that does not require this interpretation. See Hensen (1979) for a thorough discussion of the 
interpretative options and for an argument for why the interpretation I attribute here to Kant is the correct 
one. 
6 
having no other thought than: "This is the virtuous thing to do," while Jason gives the 
money and also has that thought, but in addition has the thought: "This is a chance to 
actualize my essential human capacities and achieve eudaimonia." At least primajacie, 
David is the morally better agent in this case.9 
The same intuition is generated in the case of friendship. Take Jimmy and Cedric, 
who are both friends with Charles. Charles is struggling mightily in his Ph.D. program in 
Classics and needs tremendous help in learning Latin. Both Jimmy and Cedric happen to 
be an experts in Latin, and so they both offer to lend a helping hand to Charles, which 
entails a great amount of sacrificed time on the parts of Jimmy and Cedric. When Jimmy 
decides to help Charles, he has only the thought, "Charles is my friend and needs the 
help." But when Cedric decides to help Charles, although he has the same thought that 
Jimmy has, he also has the thought, "This is something beneficial for me to do from the 
stand-point of my own well-being, for Charles adds value to my life in a lot of ways." 
Prima jacie, Jimmy is a better friend than Charles. 
1.3. The Problem of Motivation as Aristotle's Problem 
The fact that Aristotle ascribes both motives to the agent, then, is problematic. By 
"problematic", I mean that from our modem philosophical point of view, Aristotle is 
stuck with the problem of motivation. Now, it is striking that in neither the case of virtue 
nor the case of friendship does Aristotle seem to acknowledge the problem of motivation 
as I have formulated it. But it is clear that he does think that the virtuous agent values 
9 This is something with which even a consequentialist can agree. A consequentialist may deny that the 
value of actions is a function of how they are chosen, but he may agree (as Mill does) that the value of the 
agent is a function of his motives, i.e. how he chooses his actions. 
7 
both virtue and the well-being of his friend from both self-regarding and other-regarding 
motives. Consider the following passage: 
Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose 
because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had 
no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of hap~iness, 
supposing that through them we shall be happy (NE 1.7, l097bl-5).1 
With respect to the problem of motivation in the case of virtue as I have formulated it, 
Aristotle does not directly address it much more than he does in this passage. He simply 
grants that the agent has both motives. In the case of friendship, he never explicitly raises 
the question of how loving one's friend on account of the kind of self-regarding reasons 
he mentions can be consistent with loving one's friend for the friend's sake. This should 
give us some pause, and it deserves further comment. What should we infer from the fact 
that Aristotle does not explicitly acknowledge this problem? 
We might infer that Aristotle did not care about the problem and that it is 
therefore a misguided effort to try to solve it on his behalf. To attempt to do so would be 
to impose our own modem preoccupations on his philosophy and make us guilty of 
anachronism. But I think that this inference is itself mistaken for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, there is good reason to think that Aristotle must have been cognizant of the 
problem. Plato, after all, raises the very problem itself in the Lysis. Socrates presents a 
view of human motivation according to which to love or feel affection for any object is to 
see that object as a source of something one thinks worth having. But in order to feel this 
way, one must be lacking in or needing something, and to that extent in an undesirable 
state. But the proper object of love must be desired purely for its own sake (Lysis 219d-
221d). And so the dilemma: how can the proper object of love be desired purely for its 
10 Though this is put here in terms of having an attitude toward virtue generally, it gets cashed out in terms 
of choosing virtuous actions for themselves. See NE IIA 1105a27-1105bl. 
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own sake while nonetheless it appears that the agent must want something for himself in 
desiring it?l1 If Plato was aware of this problem, it is likely that Aristotle was aware of it 
too. 
We also find in the Nicomachean Ethics itself passages in which Aristotle claims 
that there are certain motives that are inconsistent with the motive to value something for 
its own sake. For instance, when we are motivated to act courageously from anger or 
from the pleasure of retaliation, we're not really being courageous (NE 111.8 1117a7-9; 
see also NE IV.l 1120a28-29 for similar remarks about generosity). Aristotle does not 
mention how the motive to advance one's own eudaimonia factors into the equation, but 
his disdain for other motives surely raises the very question of how that motive factors. 
In the case of friendship, Aristotle derides pleasure and utility friendships precisely 
because the motivation in such friendships is tainted by self-interest (NE VIII.3 1156alO-
16). Yet he has no problem claiming that in character friendship it is perfectly natural to 
love a friend on account of the friend being an extension of one's own activity (NE IX.7 
1168a2-6), which is straightforwardly a self-interested motive. Again, this raises the 
question of how Aristotle understands the status of this motive in relation to the motive to 
love a friend for the friend's sake. 
Of course, as I have recognized, Aristotle does not explicitly take up the problem. 
Now, readers of Aristotle know that he has a knack for spotting tensions and resolving 
them. The Nicomachean Ethics itself is filled with a plethora of these aporiai, and 
spotting and resolving them is an integral part of Aristotle's philosophical method. This 
is why I think it is very much worth asking: Why does Aristotle show little to no 
11 Socrates flatly acknowledges this tension, and though he tries somewhat to resolve it at the end of the 
dialogue, the dialogue ends in aporia (22le-223b). 
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awareness of this problem? Why, exactly, does Aristotle seem to so comfortably 
countenance certain self-regarding motives when it comes to acting virtuously and when 
it comes to valuing a friend? One option might be to explain this by appealing to certain 
cultural specific norms of Aristotle's time. As a Greek eudaimonist, Aristotle just 
doesn't quite see the split between morality and self-interest in the way that modem 
moral philosophers do. That claim itself is one to which I am sympathetic. But if that's 
the right explanation, it just raises the question of what it could mean, in a eudaimonist 
framework, to value virtuous actions and friends/or themselves. And so another option is 
to examine Aristotle's account of friendship and his account of virtue of character, in 
conjunction with his eudaimonism, and see what philosophical resources he has at his 
disposal that may explain how he thought these two motives go together, both 
conceptually and morally. 
1.4. Aim of the Dissertation 
My aim in this dissertation, then, is to determine how Aristotle understands the 
relation between the self-regarding and other-regarding motives when they coexist in the 
virtuous agent, and to determine whether and how, for both the case of friendship and of 
virtue and happiness, Aristotle may avoid the conceptual and moral difficulties. The 
moral difficulty deserves further comment. It is here worth noting that the scholarship is 
divided pretty evenly on whether Aristotle's account has the morally troubling feature 
implied by the moral difficulty. There are some scholars who think that the right way to 
interpret Aristotle is that the agent is not at all motivated by his own eudaimonia, and 
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chooses virtuous actions and the well-being of friends only for themselves. 12 On the 
other hand, there are other scholars who claim that, although Aristotle's accounts of 
friendship and of virtue may not be militantly egoistic, they are still ultimately selfish. 
He can't quite make good on the claim that the agent values these things for their own 
sakes because the agent's ultimate concern is with his own eudaimonia. 13 
To be clear - I do not hold the view that we should avoid as much as possible 
interpreting Aristotle's account in such a way that casts it as morally objectionable from a 
modem point of view. However, I plan to show that Aristotle's accounts of friendship 
and virtue do not have the morally troubling features they are often thought to have, but I 
plan to do this in a way that shows that both sets of scholars in the previous paragraph are 
mistaken. Aristotle's accounts of friendship and of virtue tum out to be more interesting 
than has been thought. 
The remainder of this chapter lays out the framework of possible solutions that 
will be taken up in subsequent chapters, and outlines the view for which I will ultimately 
argue. Chapters II and III address the case of friendship. Chapter IV addresses the case 
of virtue and happiness. But before laying out the framework of possible solutions, a 
brief discursion into what it means to choose something for itself is in order. 
1.5. Valuing Something For its Own Sake 
12 E.g. Annas (1977 and 1988), Whiting (2002 and 2006). 
13 E.g. Ross (1923, 208; 231-32), Milgram (1987), Gottlieb (1996). 
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Throughout this dissertation, the phrases "for its own sake" and "for itself' will be 
used interchangeably, just as Aristotle uses them interchangeably.14 What does it mean 
to value and choose something for its own sake - for itself? I said above that it at least 
means to choose something independently of how it contributes to one's own happiness, 
and that this is how many commentators understand it. I want to say a little bit more 
about it here. As I take up the possible solutions to the problem of motivation, I begin 
with the assumption that when Aristotle says that we value X for its own sake, he means 
the following two things: 
1) X is valued and chosen independently of how X contributes to one's 
own happiness. 
2) X is taken as something that, by itself, provides a reason to promote it. 
So, when Aristotle says that we wish for and act for the good of a friend for the sake of 
that friend (or "for himself', as Aristotle also says), I begin with the assumption that he 
means that we a) value our friend independently of how he contributes to our own 
happiness, and b) take the good of our friend as something that by itself provides a reason 
to promote it. IS Likewise in Chapter IV with the case of virtue and happiness: When 
Aristotle says that we choose virtuous actions for themselves, I begin with the assumption 
that he means that we a) value virtuous actions independently of how they contribute to 
our own happiness, and b) take the fact that some action is a virtuous action as a fact that 
by itself provides a reason to perform that action. 
This I take to be the standard way of understanding what it means to choose X for 
itself or for its own sake. It is, in fact, the way of understanding it assumed by those who 
14 More will be said in Chapter II about Aristotle's interchangeable use of these phrases. 
IS In making this assumption, I follow Cooper (1980,334), Kraut (1989, ch.2), et al. Cf. Velleman (1999, 
354-362). 
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endorse the first two possible solutions to be examined: Unintentional Self-Love, and 
Overdetermination. But as I criticize these solutions in subsequent chapters, we shall see 
that this sense of choosing something for itself is inadequate and cannot be what Aristotle 
means. Henceforth, I will refer to this sense of choosing something for itself as "the 
standard" sense, or meaning. 
2. The Possible Solutions 
Below I discuss the possible solutions to the problem for each case and which 
solution I believe should be attributed to Aristotle. In essence, there are three possible 
solutions that promise to resolve both the conceptual and moral difficulties. The first 
solution claims that Aristotle's view is that the virtuous agent is not motivated at all by 
his own happiness. The second solution appeals to motivational overdetermination and 
counterfactuals. The third solution claims that the two motives converge into a single 
motive, such that something is chosen for its own sake just in so far as it is chosen for the 
sake of an independent end. 
2.1. Unintentional Self-Love 
The first solution, which I call 'unintentional self-love', solves the problem by 
denying that Aristotle's virtuous agent aims at his own happiness.16 If this is true, then 
quite clearly there are no conceptual or moral difficulties with which to contend. This 
strategy has been employed in some subtly different ways, with the following interpretive 
claims having been advanced: 
16 This view is defended by Julia Annas (1977 and 1988) and Jennifer Whiting (2006). 
1) Whenever Aristotle seems to endorse self-regarding motives, he's 
merely saying that some people tend to be motivated in that way as a 
matter of psychological fact. He is not (they claim) endorsing those 
motives, and his view is that the genuine, virtuous friend, aims at the 
good of his friend for the friend's sake and for no other reason.17 
2) According to Aristotle, one's own eudaimonia can only be achieved if 
one is not consciously aiming at it; it can only be achieved if one 
chooses the well-being of friends, and virtuous actions, for their own 
sakes and for no other reason.18 And so, for this reason, self-love 
(according to Aristotle) causes the agent to eventually develop a 
disposition to value virtue and friends purely for their own sakes. In 
this way self-love is said to explain what the agent does without 
motivating the agent. 
3) Because by helping a friend and by being virtuous the agent does 
attain something good for himself, he can be said to act for the sake of 
his own happiness from an outside perspective. It is only in this third-
person-persfective sense that he acts for the sake of his own 
happiness. 1 
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Each of these claims has been made in both the case of friendship and the case of virtue 
and happiness. 
This is the first possible solution that will be taken up in Chapter II with respect to 
friendship, and in Chapter IV with respect to virtue and happiness. I argue that this 
solution to the problem, in both cases, cannot withstand close textual scrutiny and 
therefore must not be attributed to Aristotle. Certain passages clearly imply that the 
17 Annas (1988, 2) and Whiting (2006,292). 
18 Whiting (2002). This is similar to the sophisticated consequentialist position according to which 
someone will do a better job of maximizing utility ifhe develops dispositions to not try to maximize utility. 
See also Homiak (1981,640 & 650) and Kraut (1989,137-138). 
19 Annas (1988) and Whiting (2002 and 2006). Someone who should be mentioned in this context is 
Broadie (1991, 31-2). She argues that eudaimonia functions as a side constraint on virtuous activity. She 
thinks that the agent, the vast majority of the time, does not deliberate with a view to a "grand end" like 
eudaimonia on the grounds that such a thing would be extremely unlikely. Eudaimonia only enters the 
deliberative process of the agent, she thinks, when a possible course of action is seen to be obviously at 
odds with the promotion of eudaimonia. See Kraut (1995) for a rebuttal of Broadie's view. 
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agent aims at (i.e. is motivated by) his own happiness in both the case of friendship and 
of virtue. 
2.2. Overdetermination 
This solution appeals to counterfactuals and claims that actions on behalf of one's 
friend and virtuous actions are, according to Aristotle, motivationally overdetermined. 
That is, these actions are caused by more than one motive, two motives in this case, and 
the solution views those motives as arising from two independent reasons for action. 
Virtue and friendship have value in themselves, and they also have value for the sake of 
one's own eudaimonia, and these two kinds of value are independent of each other. 20 
Another way of putting this is simply that the overdetermination solution assumes the 
standard meaning of what it is to value something for itself. 
Here is a formal grid for understanding how the overdetermination solution 
works. First, our two motives are: 
Ml) The motive to choose X for itself (where X equals either virtue or the 
good of one's friend). 
M2) The motive to choose X for the sake ofY (where Y equals one's own 
happiness). 
Here are the possible scenarios regarding the counterfactuals. 
1) Both M1 and M2 motivate in the actual case, while MI would be 
sufficient for action in the absence of M2 (but M2 would be 
insufficient for action in the absence ofM1).21 
20 Defenders of this view include Gottlieb (2009, 140-142) and Kraut (1989, 137-139), though neither goes 
into great detail about the counterfactuals. 
21 Kenny (1965-6,28) argues that what Aristotle means by the claim that virtue is chosen both for its own 
sake and for the sake of happiness is that it is desired on some occasions just for the sake of happiness, and 
on other occasions just for its own sake. So he thinks that sometimes the agent acts purely from Ml, and 
sometimes purely from M2. I think this view ought to be avoided for at least the following reasons: 
2) Both Ml and M2 motivate in the actual case, while M2 would be 
sufficient for action in the absence of MI (but Ml would be 
insufficient for action in the absence ofM2). 
3) Both MI and M2 motivate in the actual case, while either Ml or M2 
would be sufficient for action in the absence of the other. 
4) Both Ml and M2 motivate in the actual case, while either Ml or M2 
alone, in the absence of the other, would be insufficient for action. 
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In subsequent chapters, I shall argue that each of each of 1-4 is able to resolve the 
conceptual difficulty, but that only 1) and 3) stand a chance of resolving the moral 
difficulty. But whether any of 1-4 can be attributed to Aristotle is a different question. 
Aristotle does himself say at NE 1 097b 1-5 that we would choose virtue even if nothing 
followed from it, which would seem to suggest that he has something like 
overdetermination in mind?2 I argue, however, that both in the case of friendship and in 
the case of virtue and happiness, the overdetermination solution cannot be squared with 
Aristotle's text and ought not to be attributed to him in any of its forms. In order for the 
overdetermination solution to work, I argue, it has to be the case that there are some 
occasions on which Aristotle thinks that the agent chooses virtue or the good of his friend 
even though he has nothing to gain eudaimonically by doing so. I argue that textual 
evidence shows that Aristotle does not envision any cases like this, and that it is his view 
that when one acts virtuously or on behalf of one's friend, it is impossible not to derive 
some eudaimonic benefit from it.23 Counterfactuals, therefore, tum out to be rather 
Aristotle claims that choosing the virtuous action for its own sake is necessary for being virtuous. He 
therefore could not mean to say that the virtuous often do not choose virtuous actions for their own sakes. 
22 Gottlieb (2009, 140) relies heavily on this claim and argues that we should take it "at face value". 
23 This is consistent with it being Aristotle's view that there are some cases such that refraining from 
performing some virtuous action might be more in one's self-interest than performing it. This may be true 
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uninformative for Aristotle. And the fact that he does not envision any cases like the 
ones just mentioned strongly suggests that he thinks that the two motives converge, as per 
the third solution. 
Before discussing the third solution, I must emphasize that both Unintentional 
Self-Love and Overdetermination assume the standard meaning of choosing something 
for itself. They both consider the value that virtue and friends have in themselves to be 
value that they have independently of how they contribute to the agent's eudaimonia. 
2.3. The Constitutive Solution 
According to the third solution, which I call "The Constitutive Solution", X is 
chosen both for itself and for the sake of Y in so far as X is chosen as an essential 
constituent part of Y. Those who defend this solution argue that, according to Aristotle, 
in friendship based on character my friend's good becomes a constituent of my own 
good.24 They go on to argue that valuing a friend as a constituent of one's own good, 
contrasted with valuing a friend as a means, is consistent with valuing a friend for his 
own sake. 
This solution is promising for both cases, for it adequately countenances what I 
argue is a key Aristotelian thesis: To value X for itself, or for its own sake, is to value X 
for those features of X that make X what it is. To put it simply - to value X for itself is to 
of some extreme cases of self-sacrifice that Aristotle discusses. My claim is that even in those cases of 
self-sacrifice, there is a eudaimonic benefit for the agent who sacrifices himself and that he makes the 
sacrifice partly on this basis. Although it could even be Aristotle's view that in the cases of extreme self-
sacrifice in which one gives up his life for a friend or for the polis, the agent does what is all-options-
considered best for himself. This may be implied by Aristotle's remark at NE IX.8 I 169a22 when he 
explains why the agent makes such sacrifices: "For he would choose to enjoy himself intensely for a brief 
while rather than slightly for a long time." He also tells us at 1169a18 that "every nous chooses what is 
best for itself." 
24 So, Brink (1997,132; 145-8), Milgram (1987, 375), Politis (1993, 158), and Irwin (1988,391-7). 
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value X for what X is essentially. This is importantly different from the standard 
meaning of valuing something for itself. Consider this analogy: On Aristotle's view, a 
hand would not be a hand if detached from a body. Since a hand is essentially part of a 
body, since what it is to be a hand is to be a part of a body, to care for one's hand for 
itself -for what it is - is just to care for it insofar as it is a part of a body. So to aim at the 
good of one's hand is, ipso facto, to aim at the good of one's body (not merely from a 
third person perspective). While a person could care for his hand under some other guise 
(someone with a strange sort of hand-fetish might care for his hand qua beautiful 
aesthetic appendage), in Aristotle's language, such a person would not be caring for his 
hand insofar as it is a hand. Such a person would therefore not be caring for his hand for 
itself - for what it is. What the hand analogy shows is that the only way to care for a 
hand for its own sake, for what it essentially is, is to care for it insofar as it is a part of a 
body, for that is what the hand essentially is. And so, the only way to value a friend for 
himself is to value him as an essential constituent part of one's own eudaimonia, and the 
only way to value virtue for itself is to value it as an essential constituent part of one's 
own eudaimonia. 
I argue that both in the case of friendship and in the case of virtue and happiness, 
the constitutive view is Aristotle's view, as it is well supported textually and certainly 
more so than the previous two solutions. But in the case of friendship, the way in which 
the constitutive solution explains how the motives converge commits Aristotle to what 
appears to be a morally objectionable view about what friends are, or at least to what the 
well-being of a friend is. The hand analogy seems ill-equipped to deal properly with 
friendship - for while my friend's eudaimonia may happen to be a part of my own, 
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presumably this is not what my friend's eudaimonia is essentially. Even if his good were 
detached from its constitutive relation to mine, he would still be who he is, presumably; 
he would still be a separate being unto himself. It would not be like the hand case, where 
the hand literally loses its essence - literally ceases to be - once it is detached from the 
body. On the constitutive solution, it seems, friends do not have a proper regard for each 
other insofar as they do not recognize that each of them has a "separate good". 
But as important as those reservations are, Aristotle's view is that they are 
misguided. It is his view, in fact, that in the ideal kind of friendship, friends and their 
respective well-beings are essentially intertwined in the way that the constitutive solution 
requires. Once we see how Aristotle develops this view, we see why there is nothing 
morally objectionable about it. Or, at the very least, we see why he himself thought that 
the moral objection could be overcome. Aristotle claims that true friends are a single 
soul (\11a \lNXr\).25 This view is inchoate in NE IX.7, and comes to fruition in IX.9 and 
IX. 12. IX.7 grounds the thesis that friends essentially are what they have shaped each 
other to be?6 IX.9 grounds the thesis that to be aware of oneself is to be aware of one's 
friend (ovvalo8avE08at) and vice versa. In Chapter III, I develop Aristotle's view that 
friends are a single soul. 27 This solves the problem of motivation by telling a compelling 
25 He speaks of friends as a single soul in the Eudemian Ethics 1240a36-l240b9, and at NE IX.8 l168b7. 
As well, Diogenes Laertius reports of Aristotle that: "To the query, 'What is a friend?' his reply was, 'A 
single soul dwelling in two bodies'" (D.L. 5.20). This is a provocative idea, and one bound to strike us 
modem readers as obscure and metaphorical at best, plainly false at worst. After all, friendship by 
definition is between two distinct individuals. Yet the idea is one that Aristotle endorses. Diogenes' 
testimony shows something important, for it shows that Aristotle did not lose sight of the obvious -
namely, that friends are numerically distinct ('two bodies '). Yet he doesn't think that this precludes there 
being the unity of friends that he envisages. 
26 The argument of l168al-10 supports this claim. 
27 In order for this view to be convincing, I have to show that it is robust enough to solve the problem of 
motivation, but weak enough to countenance numerical distinctness between friends. Surely any view that 
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story about how, through a friendship, the character and well-being of each friend is 
essentially shaped by, and defined by reference to, the other. It therefore can be thought 
of as providing a much needed foundation for the constitutive solution. However, it also 
goes beyond the constitutive solution. To the extent that friends are a unity, the unity 
prevents a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding motives with respect to 
the friends themselves in relation to each other. To the extent that friends are a single 
soul, it is not the case that I act on behalf of my friend, or that he acts on behalf of me. 
Rather, it is the single soul that acts on behalf of itself. 
In Chapter IV I examine the case of virtue and happiness. I argue that the 
constitutive solution solves the problem, and with greater ease than in the case of 
friendship. Just as in the case of friendship, the unintentional self-love and 
overdetermination solutions are found to be inadequate, as is the standard meaning of 
choosing something for itself. I argue that, for Aristotle, to choose a virtuous action/or 
itself is to choose it for those features of it that make it a virtuous action. And an 
essential feature of any virtuous action is that it actualizes the agent's capacity for virtue, 
which is that in which his eudaimonia primarily consists. For Aristotle, n81Ktl apETf)just 
is, essentially, what makes for a good functioning human being, and good functioning is 
eudaimonia (NE I. 7 1098a3-15). To speak of virtue as detached from this role is to speak 
not of virtue, but of something else. The hand analogy carries over perfectly. And so an 
agent who chooses virtue for its own sake and as a constituent part of his own happiness 
is not guilty of any sort of conceptual confusion, for virtue is chosen for its own sake 
denies numerical distinctness between two individual human beings cannot be accepted. But there is, I 
claim, an important kind of distinctness between friends that Aristotle's view does deny_ 
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exactly insofar as it is chosen as something essentially constitutive of his own 
happiness.28 
However, a question remains regarding whether the constitutive solution creates a 
morally unattractive picture of the agent. This is because some of the virtues of character 
(but not all) would appear to aim at benefiting others, virtues like generosity, justice, and 
courage. The constitutive solution might make it seem that the agent benefits others 
purely as a way of actualizing his own capacities for virtue. I argue, however, that the 
constitutive solution need not have this implication. This is because some virtuous 
actions have essential features that refer plainly to the good of other people, like just 
actions for instance. Therefore, the agent may choose to perform, say, a just action both 
because it actualizes his capacity for virtue and because it benefits others in the right 
way, without thinking that benefiting others is just a way of actualizing his own 
capacities.29 And in so choosing to perform it, he chooses it for itself. But as I argue for 
this, I also want to stress that the agent is always entitled to have - indeed ought to have -
the self-regarding motive as well, for a virtuous action by nature is an action that 
actualizes his essentially human capacities and so benefits him eudaimonically. 
My approach will be to first deal with the problem of motivation as it arises in 
friendship, and then with the problem of choosing virtue both for itself and for the sake of 
happiness. In Chapter II, I will apply the three possible solutions to the case of friendship 
and show why they all fail, or leave us with a morally unattractive agent (as in the 
constitutive solution). In Chapter III, I will argue that Aristotle solves the problem of 
28 Therefore, to say that the agent chooses virtue for its own sake or that he chooses it for the sake of his 
own eudaimonia are just two ways of describing the same choice (or the same action). 
29 In the eyes of some, this will not get the agent entirely off the hook. This will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter IV section 5.2. 
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motivation in the case of friendship with his view that friends are a single soul. In 
Chapter N, I will address the problem concerning virtue and happiness, once again go 
through each of the three possible solutions, and argue that the constitutive solution 
succeeds. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter V by summing up the findings and 
discussing how they might lead to future research. 
3. Caveats and Clarifications 
Before continuing to the next chapter, there are some points that need to be 
addressed briefly in order to clear away any possible confusion moving forward. In 
order, they are: 1) Distinguishing the problem of motivation from other closely related 
but different problems that will not be addressed in the dissertation; 2) Whether Aristotle 
endorses 'the eudaimonist axiom'; 3) Whether Aristotle thinks that eudaimonia is 
contemplation alone, or a whole of which contemplation is merely a part; and 4) 
Aristotle's claim that the virtuous agent acts for the sake ofthe noble (TOU KaAou EVEKa). 
3.1. Different But Closely Related Problems 
The problem of motivation bears similarity to other perennial problems of 
interpreting Aristotle, so it will be useful to identify those problems and distinguish them 
from the problem of motivation in order to avoid confusion. The first problem we ought 
to identify is that of convincing the moral skeptic that it pays to be good?O If the ethical 
life is as good as Aristotle claims it to be, we might think that he has a solution to this 
30 For a full and rich treatment of whether Aristotle has a solution to this problem, see Lannstrom (2006, 1-
4 and 71-97). 
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problem.31 And related to this, we might look to Aristotle for an answer to the question 
of whether ethics can in some deep sense be justified; whether there is a good answer to 
the question 'Why be moral?' Some, like H.A. Prichard who famously accused moral 
philosophy of resting on a mistake, think that the very question is nonsensical. 32 Thomas 
Nagel, for instance, has claimed that any justification of ethics "must rest on empirical 
assumptions about the influences to which people are susceptible. The justification will 
have neither validity nor persuasive force if those assumptions are not true of the 
individual to whom it is addressed.,,33 Some philosophers have tried to bring Aristotle's 
ethics to bear on this debate, and show that the 'Why be moral?' question is a real and 
important question, and that Aristotle does have a good answer to it. He justifies his 
ethics by deriving it from certain psychological and metaphysical facts about human 
nature. Psychologically, we all seek happiness. Metaphysically, there is a human 
31 Henry Sidgwick concludes in The Method of Ethics that "a harmony between the maxim of Prudence 
and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made 
completely rational" (1874, 499). Aristotelian virtues like generosity, friendliness, and justice, seem to be 
oriented toward the good of other people, and so toward benevolence. If Aristotle can show that having 
these virtues makes one flourish, then perhaps he can make morality "completely rational" as Sidgwick 
requires. Surely Aristotle must have been aware of this problem, as it figures most prominently in Plato's 
Republic. Here I tend to agree with those who think that Aristotle was not very much concerned with 
convincing someone like Thrasymachus, given how he restricts his audience to those who have had the 
benefit of a proper upbringing. Such individuals, because they are already oriented toward the good, are 
the only ones, in Aristotle's view, with the capacity to gain anything from listening to lectures on ethics. 
Argument, according to Aristotle, will have no effect on those who are already oriented toward what is base 
(NE 1.3 I 095a2-11; 1.4 1 095b5-1 0; X.9 11 79b24-30). See McDowell (1995). Insofar as he does have a 
solution to the problem, it is strikingly similar to Plato's - a solution according to which 1) Eudaimonia is a 
matter of having a well-ordered and functioning soul; 2) Vice necessarily makes for a malfunctioned and 
corrupt soul; and 3) The cultivation of an ethical life of virtue is necessary for having a well-ordered and 
good functioning soul. The function argument of NE 1.7 1097b22-1098a21 seems to proceed in this way. 
32 Prichard (1912). 
33 Nagel (1978, 3-4). 
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function. We ought to be virtuous because, given the human entelechy, being virtuous is 
how we realize our uniquely human capacities and achieve happiness.34 
Related to the previous theme, some have raised the question of whether 
Aristotle's ethics is egoistic in some fundamental sense, which it would seem to be if 
achieving one's own eudaimonia is one's ultimate ethical goal. Much ink has been 
spilled over this question, with some lamenting Aristotle's egoism, others applauding it, 
and others proudly proclaiming that there is no need to read him as an egoist of any 
kind.35 And still there are others who, while not going as far as to declare Aristotle a full-
fledged ethical egoist, look to his ethics for an alternative to modem ethics because of the 
place that it gives to self-interest. As one philosopher puts it, ''what is interesting about 
eudaimonism, I have always thought, is that it plausibly represents a sophisticated kind of 
self-concern as the core of morality. ,,36 
None of these debates will be substantively addressed in this work. The main 
problem of this dissertation concerns the motivational structure of the virtuous agent, and 
in no way hinges on whether Aristotle can prove that the ethical life is necessary for 
achieving happiness, or on whether or not he is trying to justify ethics in some deep 
34 So, Ross (1959, 184), Williams (1976, 56-59, 61), Irwin (1988, 468). Other philosophers think that 
Aristotle is not trying to derive normativity from facts in this way. For example: Annas (1993, 137), Kraut 
(1989, 353 n34), Nussbaum (1992, 227), Simpson (1992, 507). Annas and Nussbaum contend that the 
facts about human nature with which Aristotle begins are themselves normative, Kraut thinks that Aristotle 
derives his conception of human nature from his conception of the human good, and Simpson contends that 
the notion of virtue is conceptually and explanatorily prior to the notion of eudaimonia. On Simpson's 
view, Aristotle's point is not that we should accept his account of virtue because it wi11lead to eudaimonia, 
but that we should accept his account of eudaimonia because of the pride of place it gives to virtue. 
35 For those who criticize Aristotle for being an egoist, see Field (1921, 109), Hardie (1968, 331), Allan 
(1952, 138), Ross (1923, 208; 231-32). For those who think that Aristotle is an egoist and applaud it, see 
Gottlieb (1996). She thinks that his egoism is sufficiently sophisticated to overcome various objections. 
For those who think it is a misinterpretation to read Aristotle as an egoist of any sort, see Annas (1993), 
Kraut (1989, ch. 2), Whiting (2006), McKerlie (1998), and Morrison (2001). 
36 Schmidtz (1997, 109). Others in this vein include Rogers (1997), Hampton (1997), Brink (1997), and 
Badhwar (1993). 
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sense. It also does not depend on whether or not Aristotle should be considered an egoist 
of any kind.37 What is required for my problem is that Aristotle holds that being virtuous 
in some way leads to being happy, and that the virtuous agent believes this. These claims 
I take to be rather uncontroversial, and they are consistent with any of the positions one 
might take with respect to the aforementioned debates. 
3.2. The Eudaimonist Axiom 
So far I have been assuming the relatively standard interpretation of Aristotle's 
eudaimonism, according to which Aristotle is committed to what Gregory Vlastos calls 
"the eudaimonist axiom".38 This axiom states that all of one's actions are chosen, or 
ought to be chosen, for the sake of eudaimonia, where the eudaimonia in question is 
one's own. The problem of motivation seems to assume the eudaimonist axiom to a large 
extent, for there would not be much of a problem if Aristotle did not think that one should 
aim at one's own happiness. Some have questioned whether Aristotle marks out the 
agent's own happiness as the ultimate goal of all of his actions.39 To borrow some 
helpful terminology from Politis 1998, the question is whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is 
37 However, the problem of motivation is obviously related to this problem and to issues concerning 
egoism and altruism. To the extent that Aristotle thinks that we seek our own happiness, he might seem to 
be endorsing egoism of some kind, and to the extent that he thinks we seek the good of others (like friends), 
he might seem to be endorsing altruism. See Kraut (1989, ch.2) for a good discussion of egoism in 
Aristotle's ethics. Kraut distinguishes between several different kinds of egoism and argues that Aristotle 
does not endorse any of them. For the most part, throughout this dissertation, I will deliberately avoid 
using the terms 'egoism' and 'altruism'. They are loaded terms, and terms that are used too frequently in 
too many different ways. For the most part, I use the terms 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' in lieu of 
'egoistic' and 'altruistic'. In any case, I am not trying to prove that Aristotle is or is not an ethical or 
rational egoist. 
38 Vlastos (1991, 203). 
39 See Morrison (2001); McKerlie (1998). They both interpret NE 1.2 to mean that the ultimate goal of 
one's actions ought to be the eudaimonia of the polis. 
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agent-relative or agent-neutral, where agent-relative eudaimonism is the view that one's 
own happiness is the ultimate end of action, and agent-neutral eudaimonism is the view 
that somebody' s happiness, whether oneself or another person, is the ultimate end of 
action.4o If Aristotle's eudaimonism is agent-neutral and he thinks that the ultimate goal 
of one's actions should be the eudaimonia of someone else, or the general eudaimonia, or 
the eudaimonia of the polis, one might think that the problem of motivation is no longer a 
problem. 
But the problem of motivation arises whether or not Aristotle endorses the 
eudaimonist axiom - whether or not his eudaimonism is agent-relative or agent-neutral. 
For even if he does not endorse the axiom and if his eudaimonism is agent-neutral, it 
hardly follows that Aristotle thinks that none of our virtuous actions aim at our own 
happiness.41 All that is required for the problem of motivation to arise is that it be true 
that Aristotle thinks that there are times when the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions 
both for their own sakes and for the sake of his own happiness. However, whether we 
40 Politis (1998, 369-373) makes a convincing case that Aristotle's eudaimonism should be understood 
agent-relatively. 
41 When he says that we choose virtue for the sake of happiness, "supposing that through it we shall be 
happy" (NE 1.7 1097b5), the 'we' is naturally read as marking out individuals aiming at their own 
happiness. The Eudemian Ethics is even more explicit: "First then about these things we must enjoin 
everyone that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the 
good life to aim at (whether honor or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he will then 
do all his acts, since not to have one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly" (EE I.2 
1214b7-11). In addition, there is a passage in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics that seldom receives 
discussion in this context that directly bears on the issue of whether the agent aims at his own eudaimonia. 
I am referring to VI.5, where Aristotle discusses practical wisdom (<pPOVllOlS), the one intellectual virtue 
that is deeply connected to the virtues of character in that it enables the agent to discern the mean in a given 
situation. Wilkes (1978, 341), to her credit, makes the passage in question front and center in her 
discussion of eudaimonia. Aristotle says that what characterizes the man of practical wisdom is that he is 
"able to deliberate finely about things that are good and advantageous for himself, not in some restricted 
area - about what sorts of things promote health, strength, for instance - but about what sorts of things 
promote living well generally" (NE Vl.5 1140a24-28; my emphasis; Here I slightly amend Irwin's 
translation. He uses 'prudence' for <Pp6VllOIS and 'beneficial' for oVIl<pepovTa, while I prefer to use 
'practical wisdom' and 'advantageous'.) 
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should understand Aristotle's eudaimonism to be agent-neutral or agent-relative will 
become an important question in Chapter IV section 5 when we evaluate the moral 
implications of the constitutive solution. 
3.3. Eudaimonia and Contemplation 
Aristotle notoriously argues in Book X of the Ethics that eudaimonia consists in 
theoretical contemplation alone. At least, he seems to. This has divided scholars into 
two camps. As Irwin notes in his commentary42, we are forced to choose between two 
interpretations of Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia: 
i) An inclusive conception: The highest good, chosen only for its 
own sake, is composed of the non-instrumental goods that are 
chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of the highest 
good. To choose them for the sake of happiness is not to choose 
them purely as instrumental means, since the 'for the sake of 
relation, as Aristotle understands it, includes the relation of part to 
whole. Aristotle develops the conception he introduced in 1:2 
when he described the end of political science as including the 
ends of other sciences concerned with actions.43 
ii) An exclusive conception: Every good that is chosen both for itself 
and for the sake of the highest good is separate from (not a part of), 
and strictly instrumental to, the highest good, even though it is also 
chosen for its own sake, and hence not for the sake of happiness. 
The claim in 1:2 about the inclusive character of the end of political 
science simply means that political science "embraces" the ends of 
the other sciences by using them.44 
42 IlWin (1999,181-182). 
43 Nagel (1972) thinks Aristotle is indecisive on whether he endorses an inclusivist or exclusivist view. 
Ackrill (1980) argues in favor of the inclusivist conception and is its most famous and cited proponent. 
Other supporters of the inclusivist conception include Bostock (2000, 14), Cooper (1987), Crisp (1994), 
Devereaux (1981), Keyt (1983 and 1989), Roche (1988), White (1990), and Whiting (1986). 
44 Supporters of the exclusivist conception include: Kraut (1989), Kenny (1965-6), Lear (2004), and Van 
Cleemput (2006). Broadie (1991, 31-2) is a notable exception who takes neither position. She argues 
instead that eudaimonia functions as a side constraint on virtuous activity. 
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To say that the literature on this interpretive problem is vast would be an understatement. 
I mention it here because the constitutive solution applied to virtue and happiness, which 
I argue succeeds, clearly assumes inclusivism to a large extent. Since virtue is a part of 
happiness according to inclusivism, it is the sort of thing that can be chosen as such. But 
if the exclusive conception is right, then virtue is an instrumental means to contemplation 
and cannot be chosen as a constituent part of it. 4S Unfortunately I cannot enter 
substantively into this debate in this work. I assume throughout that Aristotle's 
conception of eudaimonia is inclusive so as to contain contemplation but as to not be 
identified solely with it, though I am aware that this is controversial. 
3.4. Acting For the Sake of the Noble 
Finally, the last point to address concerns Aristotle's remark that the virtuous act 
for the sake ofthe noble (TO KOAOV).46 Aristotle never gives a substantive account of the 
noble as he does for his many other key concepts. His claim that the virtuous act for the 
sake of the noble is scattered throughout the Ethics.47 The claim raises many interesting 
questions, and the most important for our purposes is: How is choosing a virtuous action 
4S All of the supporters of the exclusivist conception argue that virtue of character promotes the practice of 
contemplation in instrumental ways. All but one - Lear (2004). She argues that virtuous actions 
approximate contemplative activity and are chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of 
contemplation insofar as they so approximate. It is worth noting that Kraut, an exclusivist, argues that the 
virtuous agent has two independent reasons for choosing virtuous actions: 1) They are valuable in 
themselves apart from any contribution to eudaimonia. 2) They sustain the contemplative activities of the 
philosopher. It is worth noting this because exclusivism naturally favors some version of the 
overdetermination solution to the problem of motivation. 
46 This is a notoriously difficult word to translate. It literally means 'beautiful', but in some of the ethical 
contexts that Aristotle uses it, 'beautiful' is not always apt. 'Fine' and 'noble' are the most common in the 
literature, and I use 'noble' throughout. For a minority position, see Owens (1981, 265-69), who argues 
that 'right' is the best translation, and is in tum criticized by Taylor (2006, 89), Lannstrom (2006, 11-12), 
and Rogers (1993, 359-61). See also Allan (1971), Cooper (1999), Lear (2004, ch. 6), and Tuozzo (1995) 
for what Aristotle might mean by kalon in the Ethics. 
47 NE 1115b12, I 116b3, 1117b9, 1117b17, 1119bI5, 11120a23, 1 I 22b6-7. 
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for the sake of the noble related to choosing the action for its own sake and for the sake 
of eudaimonia? How does the noble figure in the problem of motivation? I will take this 
up again in Chapter IV, but for now the following points ought to be made. 
There are passages in which Aristotle treats choosing virtuous actions 51' O\JToOS 
and choosing them TOO KOA00 EVEKO as basically the same. Consider the fact that 
Aristotle claims that if virtuous actions are not chosen for themselves, then the person 
choosing them is not truly virtuous (NE 11.4 11OSa32). In addition, the doctrine of the 
mean in 11.6 states that virtue of character lies in a mean between a vice of excess and a 
vice of deficiency. To be in the mean state is to be disposed to have certain feelings "at 
the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in 
the right way," for this "is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to 
virtue" (NE 11.4 1106b21-2S). Now consider the following passages regarding the virtues 
of generosity and courage: 
If someone gives to the wrong people, or does not aim at the noble but 
gives for some other reason (aAACx 51Cx TIV' OAATJV oiT(ov), he will not be 
called generous, but some other sort of person. (NE IV. 1 1120a28-29) 
Human beings too, then, are distressed when angry, and take pleasure in 
retaliating; but people who fight from these motives are effective in 
fighting, not courageous, since they do not fight because of the noble, or 
as reason directs, but on account of passion (NE 111.8 1117a7-9). 
Actions in accord with virtue are noble and aim at the noble. Hence the 
generous person will also aim at the noble in his giving, and will give 
correctly; for he will give to the right people, in the right amounts, at the 
right time, and all the other things that are implied by correct giving. (NE 
IV.l 1120a24-27, my emphasis) 
These passages make clear that an action's status as virtuous is inextricably tied to its 
status as noble, and vice versa. That being the case, the motive from nobility need not be 
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thought of as fundamentally different from the motive to choose the virtuous action for 
itself. 
Surprisingly, there are also passages in which the motive to choose a virtuous 
action for the sake of the noble does not seem fundamentally different from the motive to 
choose a virtuous action for the sake of one's own eudaimonia. In NE IX.8 1169a17-b3, 
Aristotle speaks of the noble not just as a right making feature of actions, but also as an 
attractive force for the agent. He speaks of it as "the greatest good" that the agent 
chooses for himself. It is such a precious value that the agent will do things like sacrifice 
large amounts of money to friends for it, and perhaps even lay down his life for it in 
certain extraordinary circumstances. In doing so, he actually ends up better off. Now, 
when Aristotle speaks of the noble in this way, he's emphasizing the eudaimonic benefits 
of it, and the point is that the virtuous choose certain actions for such benefits. My point 
is that the noble does not signify a third motive, one distinct from the motive to choose 
virtuous actions for their own sakes and from the motive to choose them for the sake of 
eudaimonia. Rather, in certain passages, Aristotle uses the idea of the noble to describe 
the one motive, and in other passages he uses the idea of the noble to describe the other 
motive. 
At its core, then, this work attempts to answer the following two questions in the 
following order: 
1) Why, according to Aristotle, does the virtuous agent love and value his 
friend? 
2) Why, according to Aristotle, does the virtuous agent value virtuous 
actions? 
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Let us now dig deeper into Aristotle's text, beginning with the books of the Nicomachean 
Ethics on ph ilia. and let us take up the proposed solutions to the problem. 
II 
Friendship and Self-Love 
And it is through loving their friend that they love what is good for themselves, since a 
good person who becomes a friend becomes a good for the person to whom he is a friend; 
so each of them, then, loves what is good for himself. (NE VIII.5 1157b33-35) 
1. Introduction 
31 
In this chapter, we will take up the possible solutions to the problem of motivation 
in the case of friendship: Unintentional Self-Love, Overdetermination, and the 
Constitutive Solution. I will argue that the first two should not be attributed Aristotle. 
The constitutive solution, while better grounded textually than the previous solutions, is 
liable to an important objection, one that will be further addressed in Chapter III. Before 
we actually tackle the possible solutions, it will be best to first take a closer look at 
Aristotle's account of friendship and the passages that give rise to the problem. 
Aristotle distinguishes between three types of friendship: friendship of utility, 
friendship of pleasure, and - his revered paradigm - friendship based on character (NE 
VIII.2,3 & 4). What distinguishes each of these kinds of friendship is that on account of 
which (8\0) friends care for each other in each. We might put this point by saying that 
what distinguishes each of these friendships is determined by the answer to the question, 
'Why do you love your friend?' In friendships of utility, the answer is usefulness. In 
friendships of pleasure, the answer is pleasure. Aristotle explicitly makes this very point: 
So then, those who love each other on account of usefulness do not love 
each other in their own right, but rather in so far as something useful48 
comes to them from the other. So too those who love on account of 
pleasure: they love quick-witted people, not because the latter have a 
48 xpnOl\lOs. I depart from Pakaluk here, who uses "good" to translate this word. "Useful" is a much 
better rendering (thanks due to Professor Mackie for suggesting this). 
certain character, but rather because they are pleasant to them. Hence, 
those who love on account of usefulness, love on account of what is useful 
for themselves; and those who love on account of pleasure, love on 
account of what is pleasant to themselves - and not in so far as the 
beloved is [what he is] (ovx 15 6 q)lAOV~EV6S eOTlv), but rather in so far as 
he is useful or pleasant (NE VIII.3 1156a10-16). 
32 
The last remark of that passage is crucial. In a friendship of pleasure or utility, a friend is 
not loved for ''what he is", but for something else. This is why Aristotle calls these 
friendships "accidental": "Hence, these friendships are so by accident (KaTCx 
OV~l3El3TJK6S), because it is not as being the man that he is that the beloved is loved, but 
rather in so far as he provides something" (NE VIII.3 1156a16-18). This is precisely why 
these sorts of friendship are rather prone to dissolution (NE VIII.3 115618-24). 
The previous points anticipate what makes friendship based on character different 
from, and more special than, the other kinds of friendship. In a friendship based on 
character, a friend is loved on account of "what he is". This is the friendship of the 
virtuous. The passage in which Aristotle makes his central claims about friendship based 
on character is worth quoting in full: 
The friendship of good people alike in virtue is complete, since they 
similarly wish good things to each other as good, and they are good in 
their own right. And those who wish good things to their friends for their 
friends' sake (eKe(vc.uv EVEKa) are friends to the greatest degree, since it is 
on account of themselves (~i1' aVTovs) that they are so disposed, and not 
accidentally. Their friendship, then, lasts as long as they are good, and 
virtue is a stable thing. Moreover, each of them is good without 
qualification and good for his friend: for good people are both good 
without qualification and beneficial to one another. And they are pleasant 
in the same way: for good people are both pleasant without qualification 
and pleasant to each other (NE VIII.3 1156b6-15). 
What Aristotle makes clear in this passage is that, in friendships based on character, 
although friends are useful and pleasant to each other, that is not the reason for which 
they bestow love. Rather, they love each other independently of these self-regarding 
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things, and surely this is what he is emphasizing when he says that they love each other 
for themselves. When discussing friendships based on character, Aristotle uses the 
locutions eKe(Vc.lV EVEKO and St' ov-rovs (and their singular versions) interchangeably. To 
love someone for his sake just is to love him on account of himself, which just is to love 
him for what he is. And so, when Aristotle asks in VIII. 7 whether we would wish for our 
friends to have the greatest good, namely, to become gods, he says: "If, then, we were 
correct in saying that a friend wishes good things to his friend for his friend's sake 
(eKEivov EVEKO), the friend would need to remain the sort of thing he is (oT6S TrOT' eCITlv 
EKETvoS)" (l159a9-1O). 
Now, when Aristotle says that a friend loves his friend for what he is, he implies 
that what one is pertains to one's virtuous character. After all, a friend of pleasure could 
say, "I love my friend for what he is. He is pleasant." Aristotle would claim that being 
pleasant is an accidental quality, so the person making that claim would be guilty of 
equivocating. What we are pertains to our character. Good people in the best kind of 
friendship love each other for their sakes in the sense that they love each other because of 
their virtuous characters - they "wish good things to each other as good" (l156b7), and it 
is "in so far as they are good that they are friends" (l157b3).49 
In answer, then, to the question 'Why do you love your friend?' the friend on 
account of pleasure answers 'Because my friend provides something pleasant to me,' the 
friend on account of utility answers 'Because my friend provides something useful to 
49 This raises a number of interesting issues that, because they are tangential to my main goals, I won't be 
addressing. One is whether to love someone for his virtuous character really is to love him for himself. 
The thought here is that what the lover loves is actually just virtue as such, not the friend who has virtue. 
For discussions of this problem, see Vlastos (1973), Stem-Gillet (1995,73-75), and Whiting (1991). Stem-
Gillet argues, plausibly I think, that the history of shared activity that lies at the foundation of a friendship 
makes it so that friends are not replaceable by others who happen to be identical in virtue. Another 
interesting issue raised here is whether people with bad characters can have character-based friendships. 
Aristotle thinks that they cannot (NE VIII.4 1157a16-21). 
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me' while the friend on account of character answers 'Because of what my friend , 
essentially is - a virtuous person.' There is a clear contrast between friendship of 
pleasure and utility and character friendship. In the former types of friendship, I value 
my friend ultimately for something I wish to attain for myself. 50 Only in a friendship 
based on character do I love my friend for himself. And this feature, according to 
Aristotle, is the distinguishing feature of the best kind of friendship. Those who wish 
goods to their friends for their friends' sake are friends "to the greatest degree". 
Because of this feature, and because of the way in which Aristotle contrasts such 
friendship with the other kinds, it is commonly thought that friendship based on character 
is fundamentally disinterested; disinterested in the sense that what motivates a good 
friend to act on behalf of his friend is strictly the good of his friend and nothing more. 51 
Thus, Stem-Gillet writes: "In perfect friendship, he indicates, each partner makes the 
other the end of his activities as a friend, and any benefit that he himself stands to derive 
50 There is a debate in the literature relevant to these points that I'm going to largely stay away from, but 
wish to say something about here. Cooper (1977) famously argued that even in pleasure and utility 
friendships, friends wish goods to each other for their friends' sakes. He claims that in a friendship based 
on utility, for example, although what ultimately holds the friendship together is mutual usefulness, friends 
are not precluded from caring for each other in the way that good friends do without thought for that 
usefulness. This allows for ''unself-interested well wishing (evvoia) within the confines of an association 
primarily motivated by self-seeking." When Aristotle says that these friends love on account of (5Ia) 
utility, Cooper recommends that we read 51a as having efficient-causal rather than final-causal force. Irwin 
(1999, 274) disagrees and argues for the final-causal reading of 51a. Whiting (2006, 284-87), while 
sympathetic to Cooper, ultimately sides with Irwin, and here I must agree with her. She claims that the fact 
that Aristotle says that friendships based on pleasure and utility dissolve when the parties cease to find one 
another pleasant and useful supports Irwin's view. "For even if, as a result of the pleasure or utility I have 
received from my friend, I wish well to her, and seek occasion by occasion to benefit her without an eye to 
my own pleasure or utility, the fact that I would not continue to do so if I ceased to expect pleasure or 
utility from the relationship seems good reason to say that my primary goal is my pleasure or my utility" 
(2006, 287). The main point Aristotle is trying to make, Whiting notes, is that friends of pleasure and 
utility do not love their friends for what they essentially are, and this is the main point I wish to make as 
well. Cooper actually agrees with this point. He's only trying to show that friendships of pleasure and 
utility need not be loathsomely selfish, and in this respect I agree. 
51 See Rogers (1994b) for an excellent discussion of disinterestedness in friendship based on character. 
Others who agree with this general claim about friendship based on character being disinterested include 
Cooper (1977), Annas (1988), Whiting (2006), Kraut (1989, ch.2), and Irwin (1988,389-95). 
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from the association is incidental to his motivation" (1995, 65; my emphasis).52 The 
passages we have seen so far may seem to support this view. More importantly, the 
passages examined thus far would seem to support the standard meaning of valuing 
something for its own sake. Because Aristotle contrasts the valuing characteristic of true 
friends with the instrumental valuing of the other kinds of friendship, he may seem to 
think that "valuing a person for himself' means valuing him independently of what that 
person contributes to one's own good. He may seem to think that it means taking the 
good of the other person as something that by itself provides a reason to promote it. 
But those who think that character friendship is so disinterested must be alarmed 
by some other remarks that Aristotle makes, as when he tells us that by loving our 
friends, we love what is good for ourselves (NE VIII.5 1157b33-35), and that "each 
person wishes good things to himself most of all" (NE VIII.7 1159aI2). And these 
scattered remarks pale in comparison to the sustained discussions of self-love in Book IX. 
Several of the chapters in that book, notably 4, 7, 8, & 9, contain passages that must 
strike us as anathema to Aristotle's claim that we love our friends for themselves in 
friendships based on character. Consider the following claims made in each of those 
chapters: 
1) Friendship to others is derived from friendship to oneself, and we love 
our friends because they are our "other selves" (IX.4 1166al-34). 
2) We love our friends because we love our own existing and activity 
(IX.7 I 168a6-1O). 
52 What's interesting about Stem-Gillet is that she goes on to claim that "perfect friendship eschews 
justification in terms other than those of individual eudemonic autarky, or self-realization, and therefore 
cannot be justified in terms of the general good" (1995, 66). In spite of this justification, she wants to rid 
the virtuous agent of any motives having to do with it. As we shall shortly see, it is truly striking the 
lengths to which commentators go to try to make a reading like this plausible. 
3) The virtuous person should be a self-lover, is a friend most of all to 
himself and so should love himself most of all, and acts on behalf of 
his friend because by doing so he attains the noble (TO KoA6v) (IX.8 
1168b-1169b3). 
4) We need friends in order to gain self-knowledge (IX.9 1169b29-
1170a4). 
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All of these claims potentially threaten the disinterested reading, and also make us scratch 
our heads when we juxtapose them to Aristotle's claim that we must love our friends for 
themselves. They may all be summed up by saying that the virtuous agent cares for his 
friend for the sake of his own eudaimonia, a claim which the passages in Book IX 
strongly support. But now we are back to our original problem: Aristotle claims that the 
agent cares for his friend both for the friend's sake and for the sake of his own 
eudaimonia. S3 How are we to understand the relation between these two motives in a 
way that is both conceptually and morally unproblematic? Each of the three possible 
solutions discussed in the previous chapter has an answer to that question. 
According to the unintentional self-love solution, Aristotle's view is that the 
virtuous agent does not aim at his own happiness when valuing and benefiting his friend. 
So this solution effectively obliterates the self-regarding motive in order to solve the 
problem. According to the overdetermination solution, Aristotle's virtuous agent is 
overdetermined by both motives to love and benefit his friend. And according to the 
constitutive solution, Aristotle's view is that the two motives converge into a single 
motive, such that to choose the good of one's friend for itself just is to choose it for the 
sake of eudaimonia. In what follows, I argue that the first two solutions fail. In addition, 
the main reasons for why they fail strongly indicate that Aristotle does not accept the 
S3 Henceforth I will at times refer to the motive to care for a friend for his sake as the 'other-regarding 
motive', and the motive to care for a friend for the sake of one's own happiness as the 'self-regarding 
motive'. 
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standard meaning of valuing something for itself. The constitutive solution, which favors 
a different meaning, is a better option, although it too is not without problems - problems 
that will eventually be addressed in Chapter III. 
2. Unintentional Self-Love 
The best kind of friendship would seem to eschew selfishness of any kind, 
something Aristotle seems aware of with his requirement that we love our friends for 
their sakes. It is this thought that drives scholars who defend unintentional self-love. 54 
Whenever it seems that Aristotle claims that we love our friends for the sake of our own 
eudaimonia, these scholars effectively explain the claim away. According to this view, 
Aristotle's ultimate position is that while it is true that we do advance our own 
eudaimonia when we love and benefit our friends, advancing our own eudaimonia is not 
our motive and aim.55 Rather, our motive and aim is just to act for our friends' sakes. If 
unintentional self-love is true, then we need not worry about the conceptual and moral 
difficulties generated by the problem of motivation. If Aristotle's view is that when we 
value and benefit our friends we are not motivated by self-regarding reasons at all, then 
there is no problem. 
54 I take the views of Annas (1977 & 1988) and Whiting (2006) to be paradigm cases of this strategy, and 
focus mostly on them. Other supporters of something like this view include Cooper (1977), Homiak (1981, 
640), Nussbaum (1986, 355), and McKerlie (1998, 546). See also Stem-Gillet (1995, 65): "In perfect 
friendship, he [Aristotle] indicates, each partner makes the other the end of his activities as a friend, and 
any benefit that he himself stands to derive from the association is incidental to his motivation." 
55 A representative quote from Whiting: "The idea that I should wish-well-to-another-for-her-sake qua 
form of my own self-realization - or because doing so is a component of my eudaimonia - is not only 
morally but also conceptually problematic. For to the extent that I do what I do qua form of self-
realization, it seems that I fail to do itfor itself. And I take Aristotle's requirement that we choose virtuous 
actions for themselves, along with his requirement that we wish our friends well for their sakes, to be 
incompatible with the view that our primary reason for engaging in such activities is that doing so is a form 
of self-realization" (Whiting 2006, 197). 
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Of course, the main obstacle this strategy faces are the many passages in which 
Aristotle seems to say or imply that the virtuous agent cares for his friend for self-
regarding reasons. In response to those passages, one or another of the following 
interpretative claims have been advanced by those who defend unintentional self-love: 
Cl) Whenever Aristotle seems to endorse self-regarding motives, he's 
merely saying that some people tend to be motivated in that way as a 
matter of psychological fact. He is not (they claim) endorsing those 
motives, and his view is that the genuine, virtuous friend, aims at the 
good of his friend for the friend's sake and for no other reason. 56 
C2) According to Aristotle, one's own eudaimonia can only be achieved if 
one is not consciously aiming at it; it can only be achieved if one 
chooses the well-being of friends, and virtuous actions, for their own 
sakes and for no other reason. 57 And so, for this reason, self-love 
(according to Aristotle) causes the agent to eventually develop a 
disposition to value virtue and friends purely for their own sakes. In 
this way self-love is said to explain what the agent does without 
motivating the agent. 
C3) Because by helping a friend and by generally being virtuous the agent 
does attain something good for himself, he can be said to act for the 
sake of his own happiness from an outside perspective. It is only in 
this third-person-perspective sense that he acts for the sake of his own 
happiness. 58 
A word on each of these claims is in order before moving forward. The main problem 
that C 1) faces is that there are times when Aristotle seems to say that the virtuous person 
acts from self-regarding motives. Clearly Aristotle would not ascribe a motive to the 
virtuous person but at the same time not endorse that motive. So for these passages, 
commentators who defend unintentional self-love either try to argue that Aristotle is not 
56 Annas (1988, 2) and Whiting (2006, 292). 
57 Whiting (2002). This is similar to the sophisticated consequentialist position according to which 
someone will do a better job of maximizing utility ifhe develops dispositions to not try to maximize utility. 
See also Homiak (1981,640 & 650) and Kraut (1989, 137-138). 
58 Annas (1988) and Whiting (2002 and 2006). 
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claiming whatsoever that any agent is motivated by self-love to benefit his friends, or 
they opt for one of C2) or C3). C2) is the claim that Aristotle thinks that the only way to 
achieve one's own eudaimonia is to not aim at it. C3) only need be entertained if any of 
Cl-2 is true. It is a claim commentators who defend unintentional self-love have resorted 
to in an effort to reconcile their interpretation with Aristotle's eudaimonism. 
Let us now examine the passages from Book IX in which Aristotle seems to 
endorse the self-regarding motive. I will argue that in those passages he is, in fact, 
committed to the claim that the virtuous agent aims at his own eudaimonia when he 
values and acts on behalf of his friend. The claims of the unintentional self-love strategy 
cannot be squared with those passages. 
2.1. From Friendship to Oneself to Friendship to Others 
"The characteristics of friendship seem to have come (eATjAv8evol) from those 
directed at oneself," says Aristotle at the start of IX.4. Precisely what he means by this, 
and exactly what philosophical work he intends this claim to do, is what we must 
determine, for it is a provocative but unclear claim. As for those characteristics - a friend 
is taken to be (1) someone who wishes and does good things, or what appear to be good 
things, to his friend for the friend's own sake; or (2) one who wishes that his friend exist 
and live for his own sake ... (3) Others take a friend to be one who spends time with his 
friend, and (4) makes the same choices as his friend; or (5) one who shares in the sorrows 
and joys of his friend (NE IX.4, 1166a4-9). And immediately after listing these 
characteristics, Aristotle makes the point that "each of these belongs to a good person in 
relation to himself' and explains the sense in which this is true. Desiring the same things 
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with his entire soul, the good person wishes good things for himself and acts for himself 
(for the sake of his nous, since this is what a person truly is). He also wishes to live and 
loves his own existence, "since existing is good for any good person, and each wishes 
good things for himself." Such a person also delights in spending time alone with 
himself, and shares especially in his own sorrows and joys, "since the same thing is 
painful or pleasant for him at all times, and not different things at different times, since he 
is without regrets, so to speak" (NE IX.4, 1166al14-29). 
After noting how the features of friendship are found in the virtuous person's 
relation to himself, Aristotle concludes: 
Hence, because each of these belongs to a good person in relation to 
himself, and he is related to his friend as he is to himself - for a friend is 
another self (eaTI yap 6 <plAOS O:AAOS miTos) - friendship is thought to be 
one or other of these, and friends those to whom these things belong (NE 
IX.4 1166a30-4). 
This marks the end of the first half of IX.4. The topic then changes, as Aristotle goes on 
to discuss whether the vicious person can be a friend to himself. The first half of IX.4 
culminates in the above passage. How are we to understand it? Aristotle may be 
endorsing one of the following three theses:59 
(i) The characteristics of friendship shown towards others are psychologically 
derived from those shown toward oneself. 
(ii) The characteristics used to define friendship have been taken from those 
displayed by a person in relation to himself. 
(iii) The relationship of friend to friend (in character-friendship) is similar to 
that of a good person in relation to himself. 
59 I take the following from Pakaluk (1998, 165). 
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(i) is a causal or psychological claim, according to which the psychological origins of 
friendship grow out of a temporally prior self-love. 60 (ii) is a logical remark about the 
dependence of definitions according to which we should define friendship in a way that 
depends upon a correct account of self-love. (iii) is the observation of a similarity 
between friendship and self-love. It is the claim that friendship and self-love are 
isomorphic.61 
(iii) has by far been the more favored thesis by commentators.62 Kraut, for 
instance, claims that "friendship towards others 'comes from' self-love in the sense that 
the latter provides the paradigm case of the attitudes characteristic of the former.,,63 
Annas, as well, thinks that (iii) is the only thesis for which Aristotle intends to argue, and 
she thinks that (i) is explicitly ruled out: 
Clearly Aristotle is not here deriving friendship from self-love, or giving 
us an argument with self-love in the premises and friendship to another in 
the conclusion. If he were, then the crucial point, that a friend is another 
self, would be simply begging the question. Rather, Aristotle is explaining 
friendship in terms of relations that are clearest in the case of self-love, but 
without reducing the former to the latter in any way (Annas 1988, 1-2). 
On Annas' interpretation, friendship involves wanting something for X purely for X's 
sake, where X is another person. Aristotle points out that the most basic, paradigm case 
of wanting something for X purely for X's sake is found in one's own case. The 
importance of the idea that a friend is 'another self, according to Annas, is that "I can, in 
60 See Pangle (2003, 228 n2). 
61 See Pakaluk (1998, 166). 
62 I won't have anything to say about whether IX.4 contains an argument for (ii), as nothing particularly 
crucial hinges on that for my purposes. What is important is that IX.4 contains an argument for (i). Theses 
(i) - (iii) are not mutually exclusive. IX.4 could contain arguments for all three without being inconsistent 
in any respect. 
63 Kraut (1989, 132). See also Pangle (2003, 228 n2), Kahn (1981, 22-23), and McKerlie (1991, 90-91). 
Pakaluk (1998,166) also claims that the argument ofIX.4 only supports (iii). 
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fact, come to regard my friend in the way I regard myself. This need import no 
absurdities about thinking of his pains as if they were my pains;64 what is meant in the 
context is clearly regarding his desires, and their fulfillment, as I do my desires and their 
fulfillment - that is, attaching as much importance to them, making as great efforts to 
fulfill them, and so on" (1977, 542).65 On Annas' view, to regard my friend as my other 
self is to regard his welfare as I do my own, not as my own. She acknowledges that 
Aristotle does not argue for this claim. Rather, he "regards it as simply a fact to be taken 
for granted that people can in fact come to like others and regard their interests as they do 
their own" (1977, 543). Nonetheless, she claims, a philosophical analysis is required 
which gives this fact its proper place, and Aristotle has provided such an analysis (she 
thinks) with his analogy to self-love, i.e. by establishing self-love as a paradigm case of 
wanting X for X's sake. But the key point on this account is that self-love is one case of 
wanting good things for someone for his sake, and friendship is another case of the same 
kind of wanting. There is no further connection between the two. 
This interpretation of IXA is crucial for those who adopt the unintentional self-
love strategy for the following reason: If to regard my friend as my other self is just to 
extend the same care to him as I extend to myself, then my motivation for helping him 
need not make any reference to me or my own interests. Whereas if to regard him as my 
other self is to think of him as me in some way, I might rightly be accused of some sort of 
64 On the contrary - "For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in 
pain but feel actually the same pain-for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst-if this were possible, 
and if not, as nearly the same as may be" (EE 1240a36-9). 
65 Cf. McKerlie (1998, 546): "Aristotle does not claim that because of the friendship the friend's good has 
become part of my own good, or that the friendship has created a good that is shared between us. He says 
that in this kind of friendship I have concern for the friend's good that is like the concern I have for my 
own good. My good and the friend's good remain distinct. Aristotle does not assume that my ultimate 
concern is with my own good and then try to show that at some deep level in friendship self-concern can 
expand to include another person." 
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narcissism. If Aristotle endorses thesis (i), then he is saying that what motivates me to 
care for my friend is the fact that I care for myself. What we must note about the 
argument of IX.4 is that Aristotle is clearly talking about the virtuous agent, and not just 
any agent. This is important, because it means that Cl) of the unintentional self-love 
strategy cannot be utilized. So those who adopt the unintentional self-love strategy need 
to interpret IX.4 in such a way that Aristotle is not claiming that self-love motivates the 
agent to value his friend. And this is precisely what they try to do. 
But the interpretation favored by Annas and others, according to which Aristotle 
only argues for thesis (iii), cannot withstand close textual scrutiny. In fact, Aristotle does 
argue for (i). He begins with a list of certain features at least some of which he believes 
to be characteristic of friendship. The main question of the first half of IX.4 is: What 
makes these features the correct ones? What make these features the correct ones are (1) 
the fact that the virtuous person has them in relation to himself, and (2) the fact that he is 
related to his friend just as he is related to himself (since his friend is his other self). So, 
take the first characteristic of friendship: wishing goods to another for that person's sake. 
Imagine John and Sally, and assume they are both virtuous and friends. In order to be a 
friend to Sally, John must wish good things to her for her sake. What makes this true? 
What justifies this requirement? What makes this true - what justifies this requirement -
is that John wishes good things to himself, and is related to Sally just as he is related to 
himself, since Sally is his other self. Aristotle is not merely saying that friendship with 
others is like friendship with oneself. He is saying that, but he is also deriving friendship 
with others from friendship with oneself. John is a friend to Sally because he is a friend 
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to himself and Sally is his other self. The idea is that we are able to extend a certain kind 
of concern to our friends because we regard them as something of ourselves. 
A close look at the Greek of 1166a29-34 shows that (i) is the thesis for which 
Aristotle argues: 
T4) Bf) TIp OS av-rov EKaoTa To\JTCUV VlTClPXE1V T4) ElTlE1KEl, TIPOS Be TOV 
CPlAOV eXEIV c1lOTIEp TIp OS av-rov (eOTI ~ 0 CPlAOS aAAOS aUTOS), Kai Ti 
cplAia TO\JTc..JV ETval TI BOKEl, Kai CPlAOI oTs TaOS' VlTClpKE1. 
Hence, because each of these belongs to a good person in relation to 
himself, and he is related to his friend as he is to himself - for a friend is 
another self - friendship is thought to be one or other of these, and friends 
those to whom these things belong. 
Two points must be made. The first is that the T4) at the very beginning indicates that 
VlTCIPXEIV and eXEIV are articular infinitives, and that the use of the dative case must be a 
dative of means. So, an awkwardly literal translation might go, "By means of each of 
these characteristics belonging to the good person in relation to himself, and by means of 
relating to his friend just as he relates to himself (since a friend is another self), it is 
thought that friendship is some of these characteristics, and friends those to whom these 
characteristics belong." This strongly suggests that a causal claim is being made here.66 
The second point that must be made concerns the use of gar in eOTI yap 0 cpiAOS 
aAAOS aUTOS. Gar is used to introduce a reason, which is why I think that the other-self 
claim is doing a great deal of explanatory work, work for which Annas' interpretation 
cannot properly account. Pace Annas, there is an argument here with self-love in the 
premises and friendship in the conclusion, and it looks like this: 
66 It is interesting that when Annas treats this passage, she quotes only lines 30-32, ignoring the force of 
the articular infinitives. She has: "Each of these seems to belong to the good person by virtue of his 
relation to himself, and he relates to his friend as he does to himself, for the friend is another self' (1988, 
I). Put simply in that way, it does look like a mere analogy. 
1. Each of the features of friendship belongs to the good person in relation 
to himself. (Tc';> Sf) TTPOS atlTov EKaOTa TOVTCJJV &rraPXElv Tc';> ETTlEIKEi) 
2. The good person is related to his friend just as he is related to himself. 
(TTpOS Se TOV <p(AOV eXEIV wcmEP TTPOS aVT6v) 
2a. (Premise in support of 2). A friend is another self. (eOTI ~ 0 
<p(AOS CXAAOS miT6s) 
3. Conclusion: The features of friendship under consideration are the 
correct ones, and those to whom these features belong are friends. (Ka\ n 
<plAia TOVTCJJV ETval TI SOKEi, Ka\ CPIAol oTs TaOS' &rrapKEI) 
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In short, the Greek suggests that there is an argument being made here with self-love in 
the premises and friendship in the conclusion, and that the other-self claim is a premise 
that explains why the second main premise is true. If Aristotle only asserts thesis (iii) in 
IX.4, then the other-self claim must be understood to be only another way of saying that 
the good person is related to his friend just as he is related to himself, rather than 
explaining that relation. The other-self claim merely states the possibility that I can come 
to have the same relation to my friend as I do to myself, if Aristotle only asserts (iii). But 
as it has been shown, the other-self claim is doing more than this.67 While Aristotle does 
consider it a fact that the concern that the virtuous agent has for his friend is just like the 
concern he has for himself, his claim that a friend is an "other self' is not just another 
way of stating this fact. Rather, Aristotle uses the "other self' claim to explain this fact. 
There is a connection between self-love and friendship, and that there is such a 
connection is indicated by the other-self claim. John loves himself, and because Sally is 
his other self, he loves Sally. This may be problematic for other reasons, but it is at least 
somewhat informative. Annas can only say: John loves himself, and he loves Sally. That 
67 Cf. Benson (1990,55). 
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Sally is his other self does not explain why he loves her, but is only another way of 
saying that he loves her.68 
To sum up: Aristotle argues for thesis (i) in IX.4, and so CI) cannot be utilized by 
those who defend unintentional self-love. As for C2): IX.4 has the implication that an 
agent is caused to value his friend by the fact that his friend is his other self. C2) claims 
that this leads the agent to develop a disposition to value his friend only for the friend's 
sake and furthermore that this is the only way to advance one's own eudaimonia (i.e. to 
value one's friend only for the friend's sake). IX.4 simply contains no evidence that 
Aristotle thinks that C2) is true. For that matter, it also does not contain any evidence in 
support of C3). But that alone does not spell defeat for unintentional self-love, for other 
passages may be more telling - which brings us to IX.7. 
2.2. Benefactors and Beneficiaries 
In IX.7, Aristotle seeks to explain the seemingly odd fact that benefactors love 
their beneficiaries more than their beneficiaries love them. Some seek to explain this 
phenomenon by likening benefactors and beneficiaries to creditors and debtors: " ... when 
loans are made, debtors wish that their creditors did not exist, but lenders go so far as to 
provide for the safety of people indebted to them, so too benefactors wish their 
beneficiaries to exist with the intent of gleaning favors, whereas the latter have no 
concern with making repayment" (NE 1167b21-25). 
But Aristotle rejects the creditor-debtor paradigm as an explanation of the 
phenomenon. The cause, he says, would seem to be "more natural" (<pVCJlKC:lTEPOV). The 
68 It should also be noted that Aristotle thinks that self-love is required for loving someone else. This is 
why the vicious person cannot be a friend to anyone else - because he does not love himself (NE IX.4 
1166bl-30). But the Annas-reading cannot account for this. 
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more appropriate paradigm is that of a craftsman and his work. If his work were to come 
alive, Aristotle claims, it would not love its maker as much as its maker loves it. "This is 
the sort of thing, then, that the case of benefactors is in fact like: that which has been 
treated well is their work; thus they cherish this more than the work does its maker" (NE 
1168a3-5). And the explanation of this is as follows: 
1) Existing is, for everyone, worth choosing and lovable. 
2) It is by our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting. 
3) The work is, somehow, its maker in actuality. (EvepyeJ~ Be 0 TTOlr;oas 
TO epyov eOTl TTUlS') 
Hence, he is fond of his work - for the reason that (Bl6Tl) he loves 
existing. And this is natural, because what he is potentially, his work 
reveals in actuality (NE IX.7 1168a5-8). 
This argument has important implications for friendship. The main point it makes is that 
a friend loves and benefits his friend because he loves his own existence and activity. 
Friends serve to actualize each other.69 
Now, it seems to me that to read this argument as not calling our attention to what 
motivates the agent is misguided, for Aristotle is doing just that - he's telling us why 
benefactors love their beneficiaries. The reason turns out to be the same as the reason 
why makers love their work, which is - that they love their own being and activity. It is 
passages like this that give rise to the main tension that we are trying to resolve; passages 
like this that, for instance, make Pakaluk wonder "how love for a friend on account of his 
being one's own activity would be compatible with loving him 'in his own right' and 'on 
69 This seems to be in good keeping with Aristotle's claim that reciprocity is a key feature of friendship. 
The metaphor of the maker and his work really is an intriguing one when extended to friendship. For 
friends are each at once both the maker and the made, that which is shaped and that which does the 
shaping, that which is actualized and that which does the actualizing. Aristotle does not make this explicit 
himself, but I take it to be a natural extension of his theory. This is something I will discuss at length in 
Chapter III. 
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account of himself' (as in VIII.3)" (1998, 187). It is for IX.7 in particular that the 
defenders of USL rely heavily on C 1). Whiting, for instance, claims that Aristotle here is 
merely appealing to facts about what people, as a matter of psychological fact, tend to 
love and cherish, but is not using these facts to justify how the virtuous ought to be 
motivated.70 
In order to successfully make this point about IX. 7, Whiting directs our attention 
to VIII.12, where Aristotle notes that parents are more fond of their children than their 
children fond of them because parents regard their children as something of themselves 
(116IbI8-29). Noting the similarity to IX. 7, Whiting claims: "Those who take 
Aristotle's conception of the friend as an 'other-self' as endorsing bias toward those 
similar to oneself rests on the mistaken view that he takes similarity as such not simply to 
explain but also to justify partiality toward those similar to oneself. But part of his point 
in recommending the character-friendship ideal is to reject such egocentric views" (2006, 
291). 
Whiting's endorsement ofCI) makes for a very awkward reading ofIX.7. On her 
reading, we would have to understand Aristotle to be saying something like: "People tend 
to love their friends because they love their own actuality, but this is not the way the 
virtuous agent ought to behave. He ought to love his friend independently of loving his 
own actuality." This is clearly not how IX.7 proceeds. Aristotle says simply that 
benefactors love their beneficiaries because they regard them as their own actualities, and 
that to regard them as such is natural. If Whiting's reading were correct, we would 
expect Aristotle to express some sort of indignation toward the fact that the many are 
70 Whiting (2006, 288-290). 
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disposed to value their friends in this deficient sort of way, and we would expect him to 
praise the virtuous person for valuing his friends in the right way. Nothing at all like this 
happens in IX. 7. There is simply nothing in the text to indicate clearly that Aristotle is 
appealing merely to what people, as a matter of psychological fact, tend to love, while not 
endorsing those motivations for the virtuous agent. 71 In fact, there are further 
considerations that positively rule out C I) as a plausible reading. 
claims: 
Immediately after the argument in IX.7 we have just been discussing, Aristotle 
O:\la SE Kat TC;> \lEV evepyhu KaAOV TO KaTO: TIJV lTpa~lV, won xa(pelV 
EV c';) TOVTO, TC;> SE lTa66vTl ovSev KaAov EV TC;> SpaoavTl, aAA' e'llTep, 
oV\lcpepov: TOVTO S' TlTTOV tiSv Kat CPlAIlT6v. 
And at the same time, for the benefactor, what is in accordance with his 
action is noble; as a consequence, he takes pleasure in the person in whom 
this [is found]; but for the one treated well, there is nothing noble in the 
agent, but if anything, something advantageous; yet this is less pleasant 
and less lovable. (NE IX.7 1168alO-14) 
71 There is an extensive contemporary literature on the distinction between motivating and normative 
reasons, also sometimes called explanatory and justifying reasons. Seminal work in this area includes 
Nagel (1970), Williams (1981), and Parfit (1997). Explanatory or motivating reasons explain why agents 
do certain things, while normative or justifying reasons are those that exist independently of the agent's 
psychological states and justify his action. If Smith kills Jones, his motivating reason is may be that Jones 
slept with his wife. But there (presumably) is not a justifying reason for Smith to kill Jones. If there is 
famine in a third-world country, there exists a normative or justifying reason to alleviate it, though no one 
might be motivated to alleviate it. Whiting seems to be claiming that when Aristotle says that we love our 
friends for self-regarding reasons, he is only ascribing motivating reasons to certain agents. The justifying 
or normative reasons to benefit a friend are always other-regarding (for the friend's sake). It is not at all 
clear that Aristotle recognizes anything like this distinction, as he characteristically conflates the 
descriptive and normative levels often in the Ethics. But assuming he does recognize such a distinction, 
clearly it is his view that for the virtuous agent - the normative reasons are his motivating reasons. This 
makes Whiting's interpretation very hard to swallow, for we have to assume that whenever Aristotle 
ascribes self-regarding motives to the agent, he's not talking about the virtuous agent but someone else. 
While he may not make explicitly clear in the IX.7 passage that he is talking about the virtuous agent, he 
certainly does make clear in IX.4 and IX.8, as we shall see below. 
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It has been pointed out by Pakaluk that this passage both anticipates and underwrites 
Aristotle's claim in the very next chapter - IX.8 - that someone who benefits another 
actually gets the greater good (NE IX.8 1169a18-bl).72 
OA(YOV yap xpovov na8iival a<po8pa IlCXAAOV EAOIT' av tl lTOAVV 
nIlEpa ... Kat XPtlilaTa lTpOOiVT' av e<p' ~ lTAE(ova Atl'VovTal oi <p(AOI' 
y(vETal yap Tc;J IlEV <pIAU,) XPtlllaTa, aVTc;J 8E TO KaAOV' TO 8f] IlEi~ov 
aya80v EavTc;J alTOVEIlEI. 
For he would choose to enjoy himself intensely for a brief while rather 
than slightly for a long time; and to live nobly for a year, rather than as 
chance may have it for many years ... And he gives up money on condition 
that his friends receive more, since the friend gets money, but he gets what 
is noble; thus he assigns the greater good to himself (NE IX.8, 1169a18-
30). 
The two sets of passages make clear that Aristotle thinks that what motivates benefactors 
to aid their beneficiaries is a desire to attain the kalon - the greater good - for themselves. 
Aristotle clearly describes the good person as having certain preferences with respect to 
nobility and noble action in IX.8, and his use of verbs like EAOIT' and alToVEIlEI surely 
pick out the agent's intentions.73 And in IX.8, Aristotle is very clearly talking about the 
virtuous person. C 1), therefore, fails. We therefore cannot read him as merely pointing 
out, sans endorsement, that agents tend to help their friends for self-regarding reasons. 74 
As for C2) and C3): Since Cl) has failed, there is no reason to resort to C3) - the 
claim that the agent acts for the sake of his own happiness only from a third-person 
72 Pakaluk (1998, 183). 
73 Taylor (2006, 90) makes this point. 
74 Yet Annas still wants to say that "the agent's aim is just acting for the sake of others," and that "in doing 
this he is in fact getting some good for himself, but this is not part of his aim." The thesis ofIX.8, she 
claims, is "not a thesis about what our aims should be, but rather a thesis about the way our life should turn 
out to be, though not as a matter of our conscious aim" (1998, 12). On Annas' reading, we would have to 
understand Aristotle to be making the claim that, independently of what actually motivates the good person, 
the outcomes of his actions just happen to coincide with those preferences. 
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perspective by doing something that is good for himself without aiming to do something 
good for himself. The passages make clear that the agent acts for the sake of his own 
happiness from a first-person perspective. C2) is more complicated, and again I point out 
that nowhere whatsoever in the books on friendship does Aristotle claim that the only 
way to achieve one's own eudaimonia is to not aim at it. Nowhere does he say that the 
only way to achieve self-realization is to aim at the good of one's friend for its own sake 
and for no other reason. And of course, since we have seen that the passages imply that 
the virtuous agent consciously aims at his own happiness, C2) must be ruled out. But 
then why would anyone think that C2 is true? 
One defender of C2) is Whiting (2002). While it applies to friendship, it is 
intended to apply more generally to virtuous actions. I will therefore take up C2) again in 
Chapter IV in which I address the problem of motivation regarding virtue and happiness. 
But let us look at Whiting's argument as it applies to friendship: 
If eudaimonia consists in the actualization (or exercise) of our essential 
capacities, then the eudaimonist axiom might seem to require that we 
choose all things ultimately for the sake of actualizing (or exercising) 
these capacities. And this might seem to require that we choose to 
perform virtuous and friendly actions ultimately for the sake of actualizing 
our capacities for friendship and virtue. But this seems to conflict with 
Aristotle's requirements (a) that we choose to perform virtuous actions for 
themselves and (b) that we love our friends for themselves and not insofar 
as doing so coincides with or is instrumental to other ends we happen to 
have. These requirements suggest that the capacities for virtue and 
friendship are such that they cannot be actualized by someone aiming 
ultimately at their actualization. For their actualization requires the agent 
to aim ultimately at something other than their actualization" (Whiting 
2002, 282-83). 
Given that there is no positive textual evidence to support C2), this argument is difficult 
to swallow. It is true that aiming at one's own happiness seems, primajacie, to conflict 
with aiming at the good of one's friend for the friend's sake. But why should the 
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requirement that we aim at our friend's good for its own sake suggest that "the capacities 
for virtue and friendship are such that they cannot be actualized by someone aiming 
ultimately at their actualization"? The suggestion does not follow. By the very same 
token, the requirement suggests that the only way to aim at the good of one's friend for 
its own sake is to aim at it for the sake of one's own eudaimonia, as the constitutive 
solution claims. Or, the requirement might suggest that the virtuous agent's motivation is 
overdetermined in some way, as the overdetermination solution claims. There is no 
reason to attribute to Aristotle a view for which he never advocates. 
2.3. The Nagelian Interpretation 
Before laying unintentional self-love to rest, one last line of defense for it ought to 
be considered. We saw in IX.4 that Aristotle argued for the causal/psychological thesis 
(i), according to which friendship grows out of self-love and is a mode of self-love. 
Whiting at times seems to interpret this thesis in a way that is consistent with 
unintentional self-love. 
Aristotle's point seems to be that insofar as a genuinely virtuous person 
loves and values virtue simply as such, and so loves and values herself 
insofar as she is virtuous, the virtuous person will (as a matter of 
psychological fact) be disposed to love other virtuous persons on account 
of their virtues. So if, as IX.4 suggests, the virtuous agent's attitudes 
toward his friends derives from his attitudes toward himself, he will not 
love his friends because they are his "other selves" in the sense that they 
are simply like him: he will love them, as he loves himself, because they 
are good. Any likeness they bear to him is a mere sign of what really 
matters - namely, their respective goodness (Whiting 2006,291). 
The idea, I take it, is this: The virtuous agent loves himself insofar as he loves his 
virtuous character, for this is what he essentially is (1156b7-9). This amounts to his 
loving virtue as such, not necessarily his virtue, but just virtue. Because he is naturally 
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disposed to feel this way about virtue, he is naturally able to extend the same sort of 
concern to his friend insofar as his friend's virtue warrants this response. 
Whiting thinks that this idea is integral to how Aristotle goes about solving the 
aporia of IX.8 - whether one should love oneself, or someone else, most of all. She 
thinks that he resolves this puzzle by "rejecting the dichotomous assumption on which it 
turns": that one must either love oneself most of all or love someone else most of all. 
Once we accept his distinction between self-love properly construed and 
self-love as it is usually (but mistakenly) understood, we are supposed to 
see an important sense in which self-love properly construed is impartial: 
insofar as self-love properly construed involves the virtuous person's love 
for herself qua virtuous, and insofar as a genuinely virtuous agent will 
value virtue as such, the virtuous agent should love other virtuous agents 
in much the same way that she loves herself (i.e., qua virtuous) (2009, 
293). 
The claim here seems to be that another person's virtue provides one with an agent-
neutral reason to promote it (this is the sense in which self-love properly construed is 
"impartial"). Virtue is just this sort of thing, and the virtuous agent is disposed, as a 
matter of psychological fact, to respond to it. Why, then, should one promote another's 
welfare for his sake? Because reason demands it. Obviously this has close ties with 
Thomas Nagel's view that altruism is a rational requirement on action, and though 
Whiting does not claim to be attributing Nagel's view to Aristotle, it would appear that 
she has it in mind.75 Her (and Annas ') reading of the other-self claim would be congenial 
to that view. Remember, Whiting and Annas think that the claim that a friend is another 
self means just that I can come to have the same concern for my friend as I have for 
myself. One can easily see the Nagelian overtones of their interpretation - according to 
which I come to have that sort of concern for my friend because, when I reflect on the 
75 See Nagel (1978). 
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value of my own personal perspective, if I am rational, I discover that the reasons I have 
to promote my own welfare give me reasons also to promote another's welfare. I am just 
one person among many, and there are certain things -like freedom from pain, survival, 
and health - which are impersonally valuable, things that I have reason to promote 
independently of my own perspective. Virtue is without a doubt (goes the thought) one 
of those things.76 
This view also has an additional advantage, according to Whiting, for it can solve 
the aporia regarding friendship and self-sufficiency in IX.9.77 Why would the happy, 
self-sufficient person need friends? The very need seems to threaten his self-sufficiency. 
Yet Aristotle insists that the virtuous person does need friends (NE IX.9 1169b29-
1170b 19). The trick is to spell out this need in a way that does justice to the claim that 
the virtuous person is self-sufficient. But if, as Whiting claims, the virtuous person has a 
natural tendency to take the same sort of intrinsic interest in another's good as he takes in 
his own good, one could then argue that, "given this tendency, a virtuous person who 
aims to flourish not only will but should have virtuous friends in the sense that there is 
good reason for her to do so" (Whiting: 2006, 297). 
76 Engberg-Pedersen (1983, 40-S0) explicitly argues for a Nagelian interpretation ofIX.8, and is criticized 
by Stern-Gillet (199S, 106), Rogers (1993, 364 n1S), and Madigan (198S, 1-2) for offering an interpretation 
that blatantly lacks positive textual evidence. This is not surprising, as Engberg-Pedersen holds the odd 
and textually unfounded view that the "basic problem in Aristotle is that of how natural goods should be 
shared" (1983, 44-49). According to Engberg-Pedersen, reason, for Aristotle, is "universal and 
impersonal" and leads one to conclude that he is just "one among many others" and hence he "does not 
place any special value on the natural good which is his life due to the mere fact that it is his own life" 
(1983, 44; 49). Reason prescribes that acting according to this principle is part of one's own eudaimonia 
because reason states that the best state for an individual is identical to the best state of everyone else - the 
community. Acting for the sake of the noble means to comply with the rational insight that in the sharing 
of natural goods one's own claim is initially no stronger than that of any other (1983, 4S). I agree with the 
previously mentioned commentators that there is no basis for attributing to Aristotle the idea that the basic 
problem of IX.8 is how natural goods should be shared. 
77 This aporia will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
The eudaim6n agent should have excellent friends, but not because she 
needs to. She should have them in the same sense in which she should 
contemplate or engage in virtuous action. Each of these activities is an 
appropriate response to ways the world is ... Wishing another's good for 
her sake is an appropriate response to the recognized virtuous of another, 
a response that is (as a matter of psychological fact) characteristic of 
virtuous agents and that tends (as a matter of psychological fact) to lead-
with time, intimacy and mutual recognition - to character-friendship 
(2006, 297). 
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On this view, there is no tension between self-sufficiency and the need for friends 
because the virtuous agent will not seek friends because he needs them. He befriends 
some virtuous person because that is simply the appropriate response to the other's virtue. 
Whatever the merits of this view, it is certainly not Aristotle's. There is little 
evidence in IX.8 that the distinction between proper and base self-love is supposed to 
show that self-love properly construed is impartial. It is true that IX.8 is concerned with 
the difficulty of "whether one should love oneself most of all, or someone else" (NE IX.8, 
1168a28-29). However, it is not the case, as Whiting assumes, that Aristotle resolves this 
puzzle by rejecting this "dichotomous assumption on which it turns" (Whiting 2006, 
293). In fact, there is positive textual evidence against that assumption. Those who love 
themselves above all, Aristotle notes, are commonly criticized as being "self-lovers" 
(<p(AaVTOS). Good people, on the other hand, are thought by the many to be good 
because they act for the sake of others and put their own interests aside. 
And a bad person, it seems, does everything for his own sake, and the 
more wicked he is the more he is like that (hence people complain about 
him saying, for instance, that 'he does nothing without himself in mind'); 
whereas a good person acts on account of what is noble and for the sake of 
a friend, and thus he disregards his own interests (NE IX.9, 1168a31-36). 
What Aristotle is saying here is that the many believe that to be a good person is to have 
the disposition to care for others for purely other-regarding reasons. People who are 
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"self-lovers", or "selfish" we might say, are commonly thought to be vicious. They 
award themselves the biggest shares in money, honors, and bodily pleasures, and gratify 
most of all the non-rational part of the soul, and for this reason they are reproached (NE 
IX.8, 1168b16-23). The virtuous person who is always eager to behave justly, in stark 
contrast, would never be called a self-lover (NE IX.8, 1168b21-28). 
What happens in the very next passage is subtle and easy to miss, but it is crucial. 
In response to the common view of which he just spoke, Aristotle claims: "But their 
actions are at odds with these arguments, not surprisingly. For they say that one ought to 
love most of all the person who is most of all one's friend; but ... " (1168bl-2). I 
deliberately cut off the passage because I want to emphasize that what comes next is 
Aristotle's own view, not just some view up for consideration. The passage deserves to 
be quoted in full: 
But a friend is most of all someone who wishes, or someone to whom are 
wished, good things for that person's sake, even if no one will know; but 
these belong most of all to a person in relation to himself; and so all the 
remaining things by which a friend is defined, since we have said that it is 
from oneself that all the characteristics of friendship extend additionally to 
others. And all the proverbs agree, for instance, 'a single soul,78, 'friends' 
things are in common', 'friendship is equality', and 'the knee is closer 
than the shin' - since all of these would apply most of all to a person in 
relation to oneself. For he most of all is afriend to himself; so he should 
also love himselfmost of all (NE IX.8 1168b3-11; my emphasis). 
Aristotle expresses his own view in this passage, for it is the same view that he expressed 
in IX.4.79 From this point on, what Aristotle goes on to do is not to "reject the 
dichotomous assumption on which the problem turns", as Whiting claimed, but rather to 
78 Diogenes Laertius reports of Aristotle that: "To the query, 'What is a friend?' his reply was, 'A single 
soul dwelling in two bodies'" (D.L. 5.20). 
79 Whiting either does not see this or disagrees without explicitly saying so. Politis (1993, 156-59) is on 
board with me: "Aristotle comes down squarely on the side of self-love. We should love ourselves above 
everything else: 'He [man] is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best' (1169b9-10)." 
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explicate a sense of self-love that is not pejorative. The virtuous person hardly disregards 
his own interests. To the contrary, "such a person would seem to be more ofa self-lover; 
at any rate, he assigns to himself the noblest things and best goods, and he gratifies the 
supreme element in himself and complies with it in everything" (NE IX.8, 1168b29-32).80 
This is the point of IX.8 - that there is a sense in which self-love is good, so as to make 
the claim that the virtuous person ought to love himself most of all not sound 
wrongheaded. Aristotle's point is that the common picture of self-love is entirely 
erroneous.81 The point is not that self-love in the proper sense is impartial, and such a 
reading is belied in addition by the fact that Aristotle speaks as strongly as he does about 
the virtuous agent vying for the noblefor himself(NE IX.8 1169al-18). 
Furthermore, the idea that the good person loves and responds just to virtue as 
such, in the impartial way in which Whiting claims, is problematic. On this view, there 
would be no reason to favor some virtuous persons over others, which is what we 
80 Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of self-love: the proper kind, and the base kind. Part of what it is to be 
a self-lover in the proper sense is to value what is truly valuable. The vicious are wrong to think that the 
external goods that they pursue have as much value as they think they do. External goods do have value, 
but not as much value as the life of virtue. Gratifying the non-rational part of one's soul is not as valuable 
as gratifying one's reason, or nous. Aristotle takes gratifying one's nous to be the essential mark of a 
proper self-lover, and this is because one's nous is one's true self - what one "truly is" (ws TOVTOV 
EKaoTov OVTOs) (NE IX.8 1168b32-1169a3). (This will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter III.) There is a 
straightforward sense, then, in which what Aristotle marks out as proper self-love is more a kind of self-
love than what he marks out as base self-love: base self-lovers don't love their real self, since they love 
their appetites. Proper self-lovers love their nous, which is the true self, so they are more literally lovers of 
self. Even more striking and to the point is Aristotle's claim that the good person "does the very things he 
should do - because every mind chooses what is best for itself, and a good person submits to his mind" (NE 
IX.8, 1169aI7-18). The striking part of this passage is what Aristotle takes to be the reason why the good 
person does the right actions. The reason is that every mind chooses what is best for itself - music to the 
ears of the egoist. This is expressed by ggz: in the Greek: 0 8' ElTlEIKtlS, ex 8Ei, TaiiTa Kat npaTTEI' nos 
* voliS aipEiTal TO (3eATloTOV EavT4), 0 8' ElTlEIKtlS lTEI8apXEi T4) vt;>. 
81 Annas remarks that "Aristotle seems oddly determined to defend the thesis that the good person should 
be a lover of self, even at the cost of defending counter-intuitive theses and paradoxical reinterpretations of 
familiar beliefs" (1988, 12). It is unsurprising that a defender of unintentional self-love would find 
Aristotle's determination in this respect odd. 
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basically do when we have and maintain friendships.82 But more importantly, and 
closely related to the previous point, the entire quasi-Nagelian framework is deeply 
flawed when applied to Aristotle's account of ph ilia, for it causes us to forget just what 
Aristotle is talking about, namely - friendship. Aristotle's treatment of self-love occurs 
within his analysis of friendship, and he thinks that we have more reason to promote our 
friends' welfare than the welfare of strangers. In fact, he thinks that it is unjust to favor a 
stranger at the expense of a friend. The idea that virtue provides for anything like agent-
neutral reasons for actions is fundamentally at odds with the fact that Aristotle thinks that 
our friends stand in normatively special relations to us that non-friends do not stand in. 
Consider the following passage: 
Just actions also differ, since they are not the same for parents toward 
children and for brothers towards each other, nor among comrades or 
among citizens, and similarly with other sorts of friendship. Hence 
injustices committed against each of these sorts of friend are different as 
well; and they become greater by being more directed against friends: for 
example, it is more horrible to withhold payment from a comrade than 
from a fellow citizen; to fail to come to the aid of a brother than of a 
stranger; and to strike one's father than any other person. It is natural that 
justice too increases along with friendship, as they are found in the same 
persons and extend equally (NE VIII.9 1159b36-1160a8). 
Aristotle expresses the view here that we ought to be partial to our friends. The 
prescriptions of justice, he claims, carry more weight with respect to friends than with 
respect to non-friends. 
2.4. Conclusion: Why Unintentional Self-Love Fails 
82 It might even be the case that, on this view, there would be no reason not to go out and befriend every 
virtuous person alive. Now, one could say that this view of Whiting's is amenable to the idea that the 
history one has with one's friend makes that friend special in a way that other people are not. But I think 
that would be irrelevant. Whiting's thesis seems to be that one's virtue provides one with an agent-neutral 
reason to pursue it. Causal histories should not get in the way of that, for they are part of mere personal, 
subjective perspective. 
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To conclude our inquiry up to the present: The unintentional self-love strategy 
unjustifiably explains away passages in which Aristotle claims that the agent values and 
benefits his friend from self-regarding motives. None of CI-3 is true, as each cannot be 
squared with the passages we have examined. C I) - the most favored claim of USL - the 
claim that Aristotle only appeals to what agents, as a matter of psychological fact, tend to 
do, but does not endorse the motives of such agents, is particularly troubling. If true, 
Aristotle would, in effect, be making proscriptions of the following sort: "Our love for 
our friends comes from our love for ourselves, but don't let your love for yourself infect 
the love you have for your friend, if you want to be virtuous. Love him for his own sake 
alone;" "We love our friends because we love our own existing and activity, but don't 
love your friend on account of this, but independently of it, if you want to be virtuous;" 
"We love and assist our friends because we seek the noble (TO KOA6v), the greatest good, 
since assisting a friend in need is noble, and we want the noble for ourselves. But don't 
assist your friend because you seek the noble. Assist him purely for his own sake." The 
only thing motivating this awkward and implausible reading, it seems, is the fact that 
Aristotle says that we must love our friends for their sakes. Of course, I take seriously 
this claim. It is undoubtedly true that there is a tension to be resolved, but that does not 
mean that we should choose an implausible interpretation that resolves the tension by 
overwhelmingly favoring one side of it. Aristotle does not solve the problem of 
motivation by ridding the virtuous agent of the self-regarding motive. We must look to 
other solutions. 
3. Overdetermination 
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Now would be a good time to recall the passage from 1.7 that gives rise to the 
problem of motivation in the case of virtue and happiness. We ought to wonder why 
defenders of unintentional self-love like Whiting and Annas take Aristotle's requirement 
that we choose virtuous actions for themselves, along with his requirement that we wish 
our friends well for their sakes, to be incompatible with the view that our primary reason 
for engaging in such activities is that doing so is a form of self-realization, for Aristotle 
does not seem to take the requirement to be so incompatible: 
Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose 
because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had 
no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, 
supposing that through them we shall be happy (NE I. 7, 1 097b 1-5). 
The awkwardness of unintentional self-love shows its face here perhaps even more so 
than in the passages in Book IX that have been examined. Presumably, Annas and 
Whiting would read Aristotle here as saying that people, as a matter of psychological 
fact, tend choose virtue for the sake of happiness, but the virtuous agent ought only 
choose virtue for its own sake. But to understand Aristotle to be claiming in that passage 
that, "This is your end, but you ought not aim at it," is unnecessary and unwarranted. 
Some have argued that what Aristotle means by saying that we choose virtue both 
for itself and for the sake of happiness is that on some occasions we choose virtue 
because it contributes to our happiness, and on other occasions we choose virtue for its 
own sake. The motives are independent of each other, and the virtuous move back and 
forth from acting on the one to acting on the other.83 Applying this to friendship, 
Aristotle's view would be that on some occasions I aim at my friend's good for its own 
83 Kenny (1965-6, 28). Gottlieb (2009, 138) wrongly attributes this view to Kraut (1989). She does not 
cite any page numbers. It is clearly not Kraut's view. His view, as will be discussed, is that "an act can be 
done for two independent reasons: to benefit others and to benefit oneself." 
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sake, and on other occasions I aim at it for the sake of my own happiness. As it has been 
noted in the literature,84 this interpretation concedes to someone like Annas or Whiting 
the incoherence of something being chosen simultaneously for its own sake and for the 
sake of something else. It is also problematic because the requirement that we love and 
benefit our friends for their sakes is a necessary condition on friendship, according to 
Aristotle. If there are some occasions on which the virtuous agent aims at his friend's 
good purely for the sake of his own happiness and not for the sake of his friend, then 
Aristotle would in effect be saying that the virtuous agent acts wrongly pretty often. If 
virtue and friendship cannot be chosen both for themselves and for eudaimonia, 
Aristotle's agent appears always to be in a state of tension. On the one hand, he's told 
that eudaimonia is his ultimate end, but on the other hand, he's told that he's not being 
virtuous when he aims at that end. For these reasons, this interpretation ought to be 
avoided. The I.7 passage suggests that, and beckons us to see how, it is not incoherent to 
simultaneously choose X both for itself and for the sake of Y. 
According to the overdetermination solution,85 Aristotle's virtuous agent acts on 
behalf of his friend for two independent reasons: to benefit his friend, and to benefit 
himself. Both the self-regarding and other-regarding motives work together to cause the 
84 Gottlieb (2009, 138). 
85 We call something "overdetermined" when it has more than one cause. There is a large and 
sophisticated literature on causal overdetermination, but not as large on motivational overdetermination 
(Hensen 1979 makes much use of it in criticizing and interpreting Kant). In the literature on causal 
overdetermination, philosophers struggle with the metaphysics of alleged cases of overdetermination. 
Some argue that overdetermination is metaphysically impossible, while others try to make sense of it. E.g. 
Funkhouser (2002), Spohn (2006), O'Connor (1976), Hall & Paul (2003), and Schaffer (2002). Rather than 
engage the question of whether overdetermination is metaphysically possible, I assume that it is possible in 
this section. This, in effect, strengthens the view I aim to show cannot be attributed to Aristotle. Also, to 
actively engage the causal overdetermination question would require us to consider the fact that the 
virtuous agent's actions are caused not only by his motives and reasons, but also by his upbringing, his 
brain states, and seemingly irrelevant things like oxygen. It is beyond the scope of the current project to 
take seriously issues of that nature, though I recognize their philosophical importance. 
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action.86 The key for this strategy is to spell out the relation between the two motives in a 
way that gets rid of the prima facie conceptual and moral difficulties. To do this, the 
strategy relies on counterfactual claims. To make this more precise, I offer the same grid 
that I offered in Chapter I. First, we have our two motives: 
MI) The motive to choose the good of one's friend for its own sake. 
M2) The motive to choose the good of one's friend for the sake of one's 
own eudaimonia. 
Then we have four possible counterfactual scenarios that describe the relation between 
the two motives: 
SI) Both Ml and M2 motivate in the actual case, while Ml would be 
sufficient for action in the absence of M2 (but M2 would be 
insufficient for action in the absence ofMI).87 
S2) Both MI and M2 motivate in the actual case, while M2 would be 
sufficient for action in the absence of MI (but MI would be 
insufficient for action in the absence ofM2). 
S3) Both Ml and M2 motivate in the actual case, while either Ml or M2 
would be sufficient for action in the absence ofthe other. 
S4) Both MI and M2 motivate in the actual case, while either Ml or M2 
alone, in the absence of the other, would be insufficient for action. 
Consider the following analogy that should help illustrate S 1-4: Suppose we are driving 
along a street, and our car breaks down, and we need to push it home the rest of the way. 
For the purposes of the analogy, let's say that I represent Ml and you represent M2. 
According to SI, I would be sufficiently able to push the car home alone, without your 
86 This view is found in Kraut (1989, 137-138) and Gottlieb (2009, 138-141). I have not found any other 
author who argues that Aristotle's virtuous agent is motivationally overdetermined, and Kraut and Gottlieb 
themselves do not go into the kind of detail that I will be going into in this section. 
87 This is the sort of scenario that Hensen (1979, 44) describes when he argues that a Kantian ought still 
have moral worth when he does the right thing both from duty and from immediate inclination as long as 
the motive from duty would have sufficed in the absence of the inclination. 
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help. This, of course, does not preclude us from pushing the car together, each equally 
contributing to getting the car home, which is what we do in S 1.88 According to S2, we 
again push the car home together, while you would be sufficiently able to push the car 
home alone without my help, but not vice versa. According to S3, we again push the car 
home together, even though each of us could very well get the job done without the help 
of the other. According to S4, each of us alone would not be able to push the car home, 
and each of our efforts together are necessary and sufficient to get the job done. 
Before attempting to answer the question of which of these scenarios, if any, can 
be attributed to Aristotle, it would be best to go through the philosophical merits of each. 
But first, a brief note about motives. 
3.1. How to Not Have a Motive 
When we think about taking some course of action, we deliberate by considering 
the reasons we have to act or not act. Sometimes the circumstances can effectively 
cancel out a potential reason to act, and thereby effectively prevent a motive from being 
present. For instance, suppose Charlie is debating whether or not to take Philosophy 101 
next semester as an elective. He has two reasons for wanting to take this course - one 
reason is that Professor X, his favorite professor, is teaching the course, and another 
reason is that it is a night class and Charlie loves night classes. Both of these reasons are 
working in him as motivators as he deliberates on what to do. But suppose he then 
88 Examples and thought experiments like this abounds in the literature on causal overdetermination. For 
instance, Funkhouser (2002, 337) offers the following example which nicely illustrates our S3: "A 
convicted spy stands before a firing squad Two shooters have live ammunition, and each, at precisely the 
same time, succeeds in shooting the spy in the heart. Either bullet on its own would have killed the spy in 
roughly the same manner. The spy dies." Funkhouser calls this "independent causal overdetermination", 
which is the standard case. 
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discovers that the class has been moved from 8pm to 9am. Having discovered this, he 
can no longer be motivated to take the course because it's a night class, for it is no longer 
a night class. The circumstances prevent him from having one of the motives. Call this 
lack of a motive the circumstantial lack. 
I think that the circumstantial lack best explains why agents in S 1-4 would lack 
the motives they lack. So take Charlie in the previous example, and apply S 1 to his case. 
We say, then, that Charlie signs up for the class both because he loves Professor X and 
because he loves night classes, but that in the absence of his motive to take the class 
because it is a night class, his motive to take the class because he loves Professor X 
would suffice for his taking the class (but not vice versa). And it seems to me a very 
important question - What could make Charlie not have the motive to take the class 
because it is a night class? One obvious way for Charlie not to have that motive, the way 
I just described, is for him to discover that the circumstances have changed such that it is 
no longer a night class. That seems to be a sensible way to understand the claims about 
motives being absent in each of S 1-4. 
But it's not the only way. When we say that Charlie signs up for the class both 
because he loves Professor X and because he loves night classes, but that in the absence 
of his motive to take the class because it is a night class, his motive to take the class 
because he loves Professor X would suffice for his taking the class, we might mean the 
following: If the circumstances were the same, but Charlie didn't care for night classes, 
he would still take the class because of his love for Professor X. Call this lack of a 
motive the desiderative lack. The main difference between the circumstantial lack and 
the desiderative lack is this: On the circumstantial lack, the agent's basic desires do not 
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change. Rather, in the counterfactual, the circumstances change so that one of the agent's 
desires becomes irrelevant. On the desiderative lack, in the counterfactual the 
circumstances remain the same but the agent's desires are described as different in that he 
no longer has one of them. 
I raise this distinction because it needs to be pointed out that each of S 1-4 implies 
at least that the counterfactuals in them are true in terms of the circumstantial lack. 
Consider S 1: According to that scenario, I would choose to benefit my friend for his own 
sake even in the absence of my motive to benefit him for the sake of my own 
eudaimonia. If this is true, then it necessarily implies that if the circumstances changed 
so that benefiting my friend was not conducive to my own eudaimonia, I would still be 
sufficiently motivated to help him just because he's my friend. S2 necessarily implies 
that if the circumstances changed so that benefiting my friend were not conducive to my 
own eudaimonia, then I would not be motivated to help him. S3 (one half of it, at any 
rate) necessarily implies precisely what S 1 implies. And S4 (one half of it at any rate) 
necessarily implies precisely what S2 implies. But, as we shall see shortly, it matters that 
the counterfactuals can also be understood in terms of the desiderative lack. This will 
become clear when we consider which, if any, of S 1-4 can be attributed to Aristotle. 
3.2. SI-4 and the Conceptual Difficulty 
The conceptual difficulty is that it seems that choosing something for itself 
excludes choosing it for other reasons. As it was put in the previous chapter: If X is 
desired for its own sake, then X is an ultimate aim, and so the desire for X is an 
independent desire. But if X is desired for the sake of something else, X is not an 
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ultimate aim, and so the desire for X depends on the desire for something else. To say 
that X is desired both for its own sake and for the sake of Y would imply that X both is 
and is not an ultimate aim, and that the desire for X is both a dependent and independent 
desire. Each of S 1-4 shows that this conceptual worry is misguided. What S 1 shows is 
that that one can have an independent desire for X, while still desiring X for something 
else. That is, just because I desire X for the sake of Y does not mean that my desire for X 
depends on my desire for Y. In S 1, my motive to choose the good of my friend for its 
own sake would suffice for action in the absence of my motive to choose the good of my 
friend for the sake of my own eudaimonia, but not vice versa. And though this 
counterfactual claim is true, it is nonetheless true that in the actual case both motives 
contribute. In contrast, S2 shows that just because X is desired for its own sake does not 
mean that it must be desired as an ultimate aim. In S2, my motive to choose the good of 
my friend for the sake of my own eudaimonia would suffice for action in the absence of 
my motive to choose the good of my friend for its own sake, but not vice versa. 
Nonetheless, in the actual case, the agent in S2 is motivated to choose X simply in virtue 
ofX's intrinsic features, it's just that this motive is supplemented by the other. 
S3 shows that it is possible to desire X for its own sake and to desire X for the 
sake of Y and for both of these desires to be independent of each other. Neither Ml nor 
M2 depends on the presence of the other for its causal efficacy. So, suppose I am 
debating whether to meet my friends at the restaurant around the comer where they 
planned to have dinner. I want to go because the restaurant has a dish that happens to be 
my favorite, and I also want to go because I want to see this one friend in particular, Sam, 
who figures to be there. In S3, if! found out that my favorite dish was suddenly taken off 
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the menu, but that Sam was going to be there, I would go. If I found out that Sam was 
not going to be there, but that my dish would be waiting for me, I would go. Finally, S4 
shows that it is possible to desire X for its own sake and to desire X for the sake ofY and 
for both ofthese desires to be dependent on each other. Both MI and M2 depend on the 
presence of the other for its causal efficacy. To use the previous example once again: In 
S4, I need to know both that my favorite dish is available and that Sam is going to be 
there in order for me to be sufficiently motivated to go to the restaurant. 
The overdetermination solution, then, adequately resolves the conceptual 
difficulty. However, someone who thinks that the conceptual difficulty cannot be 
resolved might nonetheless insist that to choose X for its own sake, by definition, 
excludes choosing it for any other reason at all. But it is hard to see why we should 
accept this definition. If we think that a reason is a consideration that counts in favor of 
something, then we ought to say that to choose X for its own sake means to take X, by 
itself, as a consideration that counts in favor of choosing it. That other considerations 
might playa supporting role in the choice should not change the fact that X-for-itselfwas 
taken as a reason. However, those "other considerations" might present moral difficulties 
instead of conceptual ones, and this brings us to how S 1-4 purport to deal with the moral 
difficulty involved in choosing the good of one's friend both for its own sake and for the 
sake of one's own eudaimonia. 
3.3. S 1-4 and the Moral Difficulty 
The moral difficulty concerning the problem of motivation is that self-regarding 
motives spoil other-regarding motives and thereby make for a morally deficient agent. 
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Someone who benefits his friend, for example, just for his friend's sake and not for the 
sake of his own happiness seems morally better than someone who benefits his friend for 
his friend's sake and for the sake of his own happiness. It may be helpful to observe a 
remark that Annas makes regarding the noble (to kalon) in the IX.8 passage discussed in 
the previous section: 
Is the agent supposed to think, 'I'll sacrifice this money so that my friends 
can gain more, for that is a generous action, and so noble; and I'm 
sacrificing mere money and gaining the noble, so I'm assigning myself the 
greater good, and so come off best after all'? There is clearly something 
wrong with this thought; the second half undermines the first. The agent 
cannot give as his end in doing something both that he is helping his 
friends for their sake and that he is assigning himself the greater good 
(1988, 12). 
Annas thinks that the only way to resolve the moral difficulty is to rid the agent of the 
self-regarding motive entirely. The overdetermination solution begs to differ. 
While both motives causally contribute to the action in each of S 1-4, the strength 
of each motive is different in each scenario. And this bears on the moral difficulty, for 
that difficulty may be able to be overcome if the other-regarding motive is of the right 
strength. Given the strength of the motives in each scenario, I argue that S2 and S4 
cannot overcome the moral difficulty. S3 can overcome it, but not as well as S1. SI, I 
shall argue, is the ideal scenario. After making these arguments, we shall turn to the 
question of which, if any, of these scenarios can be attributed to Aristotle's virtuous 
agent. 
In S2, the self-regarding motive (M2) is clearly the dominant motive since only 
that motive is the one that would suffice for action on its own. So, the other-regarding 
motive (Ml) is never enough to get the agent to benefit his friend in this scenario. The 
agent always needs to think that he is about to do something that is beneficial from the 
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standpoint of his own eudaimonia, and if he does not have that thought, then there is no 
action. Clearly this does not get around the moral dilemma. And if we look at S4, we see 
that it too is of no help for basically the same reasons. In that scenario, it is also always 
the case that the other-regarding motive is never enough to motivate the agent to benefit 
his friend, and that the agent always needs to think that he is about to do something that is 
beneficial from the standpoint of his own eudaimonia. Now, in fairness to S4, it is in 
addition true in that scenario that the self-regarding motive is never enough to motivate 
the agent to benefit his friend. The two motives need each other. Circumstances must be 
such that the agent does something both worth doing for itself and worth doing for the 
sake of his own eudaimonia. But from a moral standpoint, it counts against S4 that the 
agent will not choose to do what is worth doing for its own sake when doing so does not 
benefit him. 
S 1 is fully equipped to resolve the moral difficulty, for that scenario is precisely 
the opposite of S2. That is, in Sl it is the other-regarding motive (Ml) that is the 
dominant one, since it is present at the time of the action and also would have sufficed on 
its own for the action. The self-regarding motive in S 1 would not suffice on its own. 
This tells us something about the agent's priorities - that he values his friend more than 
he values his own happiness since he is prepared to sacrifice his own happiness for his 
friend should the circumstances call for it. Now, all of that is true in S3 as well, since in 
that scenario too the other-regarding motive would suffice for action on its own. But S3 
is complicated since it is also the case in that scenario that the self-regarding motive 
would suffice for action on its own. This creates a problem for S3. The problem arises 
when we ask what could make it the case that the agent lacks the other-regarding motive 
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and only has the self-regarding motive (which would suffice for action).89 Whatever 
makes it the case, it cannot be that when the agent finds himself in a set of circumstances 
in which his own happiness and the good of his friend conflict, he chooses to side with 
his own happiness. After all, the very action in question is the action of benefiting one's 
friend. And besides, half of 83 already establishes that when the good of one's friend and 
one's own happiness conflict, the good of one's friend sufficiently motivates one to help 
one's friend. Therefore, when 83 says that the self-regarding motive would suffice in the 
absence of the other-regarding motive, we must interpret that claim to mean: "If A's 
character friend B was on some occasion not worth benefiting for B's sake, A would still 
benefit B for the sake of A's eudaimonia." This is pretty odd. It is unclear what could 
ever make it the case that the good of one's friend was not worth choosing for its own 
sake but still worth choosing for the sake of one's own eudaimonia. But odd does not 
equal impossible or incoherent, so it may stand as is. With the concession to that oddity, 
83 can resolve the moral difficulty since it makes the other-regarding motive dominant. 
Might we be able to understand the lack of the other-regarding motive in 83 to be 
a desiderative lack rather than a circumstantial lack? On this view, the circumstances 
don't change. Rather, the claim being made is just that if the agent only had the self-
regarding motive when he had a chance to benefit his friend, that motive would suffice. 
But this comes at a cost, for we have to imagine the agent in this case as someone who 
does not desire the good of his friend for its own sake. We would in effect be saying the 
following of the agent: "If he was not a good friend, he would be sufficiently motivated 
to benefit his friend for the sake of his own eudaimonia." This is uninformative and does 
89 This problem also arises for 82. I did not mention it before because all that was pertinent for 82 was that 
the other-regarding motive was never enough to get the agent to benefit his friend. This provided sufficient 
grounds for claiming that 82 cannot resolve the moral difficulty. 
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nothing to assuage the moral difficulty. We should stick to understanding the lack of the 
other-regarding motive in 83 in terms of the circumstantial lack, then. In that way, 83 
can resolve the moral difficulty, because it still remains the case that the other-regarding 
motive is dominant enough to get the agent to benefit his friend. But because 81 can 
resolve the moral difficulty without having to endorse the odd claim that if the good of 
one's friend were ever not worth choosing for its own sake then the agent would choose it 
for the sake of his own eudaimonia, it is the ideal scenario. Ideally, we'll want to be able 
to attribute 81 to Aristotle. 
3.4. Why None of 8 1-4 Can Be Attributed to Aristotle 
Let us distinguish between whether 81-4 can be attributed to Aristotle in terms of 
the circumstantial lack and whether 81-4 can be attributed to Aristotle in terms of the 
desiderative lack. These are separate issues. I first want to show that none of 81-4 
should be attributed to Aristotle on the desiderative lack interpretation, and then show the 
same for the circumstantial lack. The desiderative lack interpretation of lacking a motive 
asks us to imagine what the agent would do if he entirely lacked one of those motives 
because he entirely lacked the desire that gives rise to that motive. 80 take 81. Here we 
would say that the agent currently acts from both the self-regarding and other-regarding 
motives, but if he lacked the desire to pursue the good of his friend for the sake of his 
own happiness, he would nonetheless be sufficiently motivated to choose the good of his 
friend. For 82, we would say that the agent currently acts from both the self-regarding 
and other-regarding motives, but if he lacked the desire to pursue the good of his friend 
for its own sake, he would still perform the action. For 83, we would say that the agent 
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currently acts from both the self-regarding and other-regarding motives, but if he lacked 
the desire to pursue the good of his friend for the sake of his own happiness, he'd pursue 
the good of his friend nonetheless, and that if he lacked the desire to pursue the good of 
his friend for its own sake, he would pursue it nonetheless for the sake of his own 
happiness. For S4, we would say that the agent currently acts from both the self-
regarding and other-regarding motives, but if he lacked either desire, he would not 
perform the action. 
But if we look closer at what each scenario asks us to imagine here, we will see 
that none of them can be what Aristotle means. Each scenario, on the desiderative lack 
interpretation, basically asks us to imagine what the agent would do if he were a very 
different kind of person. In every scenario other than S 1, we end up having to ask what a 
good friend would do if he weren't a good friend. Even in SI, we're asked to imagine 
what the agent would do if he were a different kind of agent than the one Aristotle 
describes. Aristotle clearly describes the good friend as wanting the good of his friend 
for its own sake and for the sake of his own eudaimonia. It simply doesn't help to ask 
what this agent would do ifhe were a different agent with different desires.9o Remember, 
on the circumstantial lack interpretation of lacking a motive, the agent's basic desires do 
not change. Rather, the circumstances change so as to make one of those desires 
irrelevant, thus preventing the presence of the motive based on that desire. For the 
purpose of discovering Aristotle's solution to the problem of motivation, then, it is only 
90 Professor Sher has raised the objection that a person's desires can change without the person changing. 
In other words, the agent's desires may simply waver from time to time. Sometimes he's motivated to 
value his friend for the sake of his own eudaimonia. and sometimes (for whatever reasons) he's not. 
Sometimes he's motivated to value his friend for the friend's sake, and sometimes (for whatever reasons) 
he's not. Here I respond by appealing to Aristotle's conception of the phronimos - the person of practical 
wisdom - which is the agent with whom we (and Aristotle) are concerned. Due to the sophisticated 
demands of being a phronimos (see NE VI, especially chapter 13), his desires are not prone to such 
wavering. 
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on the circumstantial lack interpretation that the counterfactuals make sense and are 
potentially helpful. 
But here lies the main problem for attributing the circumstantial lack 
interpretation of the overdetermination solution to Aristotle. The main question that 
solution asks is this: What would the agent do if his friend became no longer valuable 
from the standpoint of the agent's own eudaimonia? If circumstances somehow made it 
so that valuing and benefiting his friend in no way whatsoever contributed to his own 
eudaimonia, what would he do? The problem is that Aristotle never recognizes 
circumstances of that kind. He does not, I claim, think it possible that a friend could ever 
not be beneficial to the agent from the standpoint of the agent's own eudaimonia. 91 In 
short, the main reason none of S 1-4 can be attributed to Aristotle in terms of the 
circumstantial lack is this: Aristotle does not think that there can be circumstances 
between friends A and B in which A benefits B without there being a eudaimonic benefit 
for A.92 But each of SI-4 exploits the possibility of such circumstances. Indeed, the 
ability of S 1-4 to resolve the moral difficulty depends on the possibility of such 
circumstances and on what the agent does under those circumstances. The agent in S 1, 
for example, is not morally blameworthy because he would still be motivated to pursue 
91 Unless the friend becomes vicious, in which case Aristotle says that the agent may have to end the 
friendship! (NE IX.3) 
92 Professor Mackie has raised the objection that Aristotle could be conceding that this is a theoretical 
possibility that is never in fact actualized. For now I am willing to grant that it is possible that Aristotle 
makes this concession. I shall strike this objection with what I hope is a fatal blow in the next chapter. For 
now, I think the fact that Aristotle does not recognize any such circumstances counts against the 
overdetermination solution (I say more about this in the rest of this section). 
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the good of his friend even if doing so would not in any way contribute to his own 
eudaimonia. 93 
The one place in the books on friendship where he might be thought to 
countenance such circumstances is a passage in IX.8 that has been examined in section 2. 
At 1169b18-34, Aristotle claims that the good person will give up goods to his friend and 
even sacrifice his life if necessary. But the reason Aristotle gives for why the good 
person does this is that the good person wants the kalon, which is described as the greater 
good. After all, "every nous chooses what is best for itself' (1169a18). 
Kat XPrl\laTa npOOlVT' av eq>' c';lnAe(ova Arl'¥OVTat oi q>lAOl' Y(VETal 
yap T4J \lEV q>iACf,l XPrl\laTa, aVT4J BE TO KaAOV' TO Bn \lEl~OV aya60v 
eavT4J anOVE\lEl. 
And he gives up money on condition that his friends receive more, since 
the friend gets money, but he gets what is noble; thus he assigns the 
greater good to himself(NEIX.8, 1169a18-30). 
In this manner, Aristotle says, the good person acts as a self-lover (1169bl-2). So, even 
in cases of "self-sacrifice", the self-regarding motive is clearly at play.94 Therefore, IX.8 
does not give us an agent who is or would be sufficiently motivated by the other-
regarding motive in the absence of the self-regarding motive. When it comes to 
friendship, Aristotle does not think that there can be circumstances that effectively 
prevent the motivational efficacy of the self-regarding motive. 
93 Gottlieb (2009, 140) thinks that SI accurately describes what Aristotle means, and relies on an 
interpretation of the 1.7 1097bl-5 passage to defend that view. Because she does not discuss friendship per 
se, but only virtue & happiness, I will save a more thorough discussion of her view for Chapter IV. 
94 See Wielenberg (2004, 278-286), who correctly notes that even when giving up actions themselves for a 
friend, the agent does so because it is nobler to do so. "For a given virtuous action V, enabling one's friend 
to perform V is more ethically virtuous than performing V oneself. So, in enabling his friend to perform the 
virtuous action, an ethically virtuous person actually acts more virtuously than his friend does. In this way, 
he assigns the larger share of virtuous activity to himself and, once again, gets the better end of the bargain" 
(2004, 284). 
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Now, that alone may not be a fatal blow against the overdetermination solution. 
Perhaps Aristotle just thinks that it is just a matter of happy fortune that the 
circumstances always provide us with a eudaimonic benefit to value and benefit our 
friends, even in the most extraordinary of circumstances. But the fact that Aristotle does 
not think that there are such circumstances as required by S 1 strongly indicates, to me at 
least, something important: It indicates that valuing a friend for himself is intimately 
intertwined somehow with valuing him insofar as he contributes to one's own 
eudaimonia. That is, it indicates that the standard way of understanding what it means to 
value something for itself is not the way in which Aristotle understands it. If it were the 
way he understood it, then the IX.8 passage above would seem to make for a very 
morally unattractive agent. The reason for this is that in that passage, Aristotle does not 
seem to mention an other-regarding motive at all. All he says is that the agent 
"sacrifices" for his friend so that the agent may attain the greater good of nobility. 
Remember, the standard meaning of valuing someone for himself says that to value a 
friend for his own sake is to value him independently of how he contributes to one's own 
eudaimonia, and to take his good as something that by itself provides a reason to promote 
it. Aristotle's agent in the IX.8 passage is apparently doing neither of these things. 
Rather, the agent in that passage values his friend purely in virtue of a desire for nobility, 
thus purely in virtue of a desire for his own good. 
However, if valuing a friend for his own sake is intimately intertwined with 
valuing him for the sake of one's own eudaimonia, i.e. if to value a friend for his own 
sake just is, somehow, to value him for the sake of one's own eudaimonia, then the 
passage would have to be interpreted differently. But in addition to these things, our 
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refutation of unintentional self-love, particularly our refutation of Annas' interpretation 
of Aristotle's derivation of friendship from self-love in the IX.4 passage, strongly 
indicates that Aristotle is working with some other meaning of "choosing something for 
itself' than the standard meaning. As we have seen, according to the argument of IX.4, 
we love our friends for their sakes because they are our "other selves". Valuing a friend 
for his own sake, therefore, does not seem to be a way of valuing him independently of 
how he stands in relation to oneself. The constitutive solution then, according to which 
we value our friends as constituents of our own happiness, seems promising. To that 
solution we now turn. 
4. The Constitutive Solution 
The constitutive solution takes its cue from a certain interpretation of Aristotle's 
view of the relation between virtue and happiness, one famously offered by John Ackrill. 
The basic idea is that virtue is valued as a constituent part of eudaimonia, rather than as 
an instrumental means to eudaimonia (this, as we shall soon see, is a key contrast). 
That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sake of eudaimonia 
is not incompatible with their being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is 
constituted by activities that are ends in themselves ... when Aristotle says 
that A is for the sake of B, he need not mean that A is a means to a 
subsequent B but may mean that A contributes as a constituent to B. This 
is what he does mean when he says that good actions are for the sake of 
eudaimonia. 95 
95 Ackrill (1980, 29-30); cf. Irwin (1999, 182): "The highest good, chosen only for its own sake, is 
composed of the non-instrumental goods that are chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of the 
highest good. To choose them for the sake of happiness is not to choose them purely as instrumental 
means, since the 'for the sake of' relation, as Aristotle understands it, includes the relation of part to 
whole." It should be noted that Ackrill (and Irwin) is not directly taking up the problem of motivation, but 
rather is defending an inclusive conception of eudaimonia against an exclusive conception according to 
which eudaimonia consists solely in 8ecup[a. 
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The idea that the agent aims at virtue as a constituent part of happiness rather than as an 
instrumental means to it is one that has been applied to friendship by scholars who seek 
mainly to assuage the worries of those who fear that Aristotelian friendship is too egoistic 
and cannot properly do justice to the requirement that we love our friends for their sakes. 
The thought is that if John aims at Sally's good as an instrumental means to his own good 
(as would appear to be the case in friendships of pleasure and utility), then he's not acting 
for her sake, but rather for his own. But if John aims at Sally's good as a constituent of 
his good, that is, as something that is an integral part of his own good, then he is still 
being a good friend.96 At least, he's not pejoratively egoistic, as he appeared to be in the 
instrumental case, so the thought goes. A representative quote: 
Eudaimonia is not to be understood as restricted to a person's narrowly 
conceived interests; it is not, for instance, a hedonist's conception of 
happiness. Rather, it may include such things as the happiness of others. 
On such a construal, I can desire the good for my friend for his own sake 
while adhering to the eudaimonist axiom because my friend's good is part 
of my own eudaimonia; whenever I act for my friend's sake I am also 
acting for my sake.97 
One piece of textual support for this view is in VII!.3, where Aristotle describes the 
defect found in friendships based on pleasure and utility. In these relationships, friends 
96 Whether this is truly enough is taken up in section 4.1. 
97 Milgram (1987,375). What's really interesting about Milgram's view is that he objects to this strategy 
not because it cannot properly do justice to the claim that we value our friends for their sakes (which is the 
natural thought, I think), but rather because it threatens to make the eudaimonist axiom empty. The 
constitutive view is also found in Politis (1993, 158): "One's own concern for one's own good is always 
present, even in acting altruistically, in so far as acting altruistically, too, is an ingredient or constituent in-
though not an instrumental means to - one's own good;" Brink (1997, 147): "Aristotle believes that 
eudaimonia is the only unconditionally complete good; all other goods are chosen for its sake. Some goods 
chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, though not choiceworthy in themselves, are choiceworthy as causal 
means to some ingredient of eudaimonia; these goods are incomplete, instrumental goods. But other goods 
- such as the virtues - that are chosen for the sake of eudaimonia are also choiceworthy for themselves. 
They are chosen for the sake of eudaimonia in the sense that they are constituent parts of eudaimonia; they 
are valuable in their own right for their constitutive contribution to a valuable life. In friendship, the lover 
is concerned for the other's own sake while valuing his beloved's well-being for the constitutive 
contribution this makes to his own eudaimonia;" and Irwin (1988, 393-394). 
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"do not love each other in their own right, but rather in so far as something good comes 
to them from the other" (1156al0-12). This suggests that what makes these relationships 
defective is that the concern that friends have for one another in them is purely 
instrumental. By contrast, in friendships based on character, friends love each other for 
their own sakes. But notice that just because Aristotle thinks that character-friends do not 
value each other purely instrumentally does not mean that he does not think that they 
value each other for different self-regarding reasons. So, by contrasting valuing someone 
for his own sake with valuing someone for the sake of utility or pleasure, Aristotle need 
not be contrasting purely other-regarding concern with purely self-regarding concern. 
The other main loci of textual support for this view are IX.4 and the other-self 
claim, and the argument of IX. 7. These commentators read Aristotle's claim that a friend 
is another self as explaining how the agent's eudaimonia comes to include that of others. 
Since my friend's activity is an extension of my own activity, with the actualization of 
myself in him (NE IX.4 1166a30-4; IX.7 1168a5-8), his well-being becomes a part of 
mine. The result of this is that, to put it in Aristotle's own words: "It is through loving 
their friend that they love what is good for themselves, since a good person who becomes 
a friend becomes a good for the person to whom he is a friend; so each of them, then, 
loves what is good for himself' (NE VIII.5 1157b32-37). 
But then we can see how Aristotle can think that friendship involves 
concern for the friend's own sake and yet admits of eudaimonist 
justification. If B extends A's interests, then B' s interests are a part of 
A's. This is true when A and B are the same person and when they are 
different people. My friend's good is a part of my own overall good in 
just the way that the well-being of my future self is part of my overall 
good.98 
98 Brink (1997, 131). 
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Now, this solution still has quite a lot of explaining to do. At the start of this 
chapter, I argued for a certain reading of the IXA passage according to which I value my 
friend, basically, insofar as I see myself in him. This point, and the very points raised by 
the commentators who endorse the constitutive solution, are the very sort of points that 
Annas and Whiting railed against. As Whiting argued, the idea that I should wish well to 
my friend for his sake because doing so is a form of my own self-realization, seems 
morally problematic (2006, 297). So we must ask two questions: 
Ql: How is it, exactly, that by aiming at my friend's good as a constituent 
part of my own, I thereby aim at his good for his sake? That is, with just 
what meaning of "for his own sake" is the constitutive solution working? 
Q2: Does the answer to Q 1 show that I am not aiming at the good of my 
friend in a morally objectionable way? 
The answers to both of these questions are to be found in this crucial distinction between 
something being an instrumental means to a good, and something being a constituent of a 
good. Most unfortunately, while many like to draw this distinction, few clearly explicate 
just what it amounts to.99 So awkward does the use of this distinction become, that 
commentators often end up speaking of how a friend's good contributes to the good of 
99 One would expect to find a clear statement or two of this distinction in the vast literature on whether 
Aristotle thinks that eudaimonia is a dominant or inclusive end. But I have been hard-pressed to find any 
clear and precise statement of it in any of the following sources: Ackrill (1980), Crisp (1994), Cooper 
(1999), Devereaux (1981), Keyt (1989), Roche (1988), White (1990), Kraut (1989), Lear (2004), Van 
Cleemput (2006), and Whiting (1986). I finally stumbled upon something resembling a clear statement of 
the distinction in Keyt (1983,368), who actually took his cue from Greenwood (1973, 46-47). Greenwood 
claims that: "A thing may be a means to an end in either of two senses, as a component part of it, or as 
wholly external to it. To take a trivial example, fire and basin and cloth are means to a pudding in the latter 
sense, suet and flour and currants in the former. Happiness being considered as the end, the contemplation 
of beautiful pictures may be considered rightly or wrongly as a means to this end in the component sense, 
the going to picture galleries as a means to it in the external sense." But to say that the difference between 
a component and an instrumental means is that one is a component and the other is external is not very 
precise, and somewhat question-begging. So, in this section, I offer my own statement of the distinction. 
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the agent in lieu of using the language of "being a means". 1 00 But saying that I aim at my 
friend's good because of the way his good contributes to my good just sounds like a 
euphemistic way of saying that I aim at his good as a means to mine. 
4.1. Instrumental Means Versus Constituents 
I propose that the best way to understand the distinction is as follows: 
Instrumental means are relevantly distant from their ends in a way that constituents are 
not. Furthermore, instrumental means can fail to cause their ends, whereas to treat a 
constituent of an end is ipso facto to treat the end. I care about an instrumental means 
only insofar as it is a way of bringing about some other end that is related to it in only a 
cursory kind of way. I need to get to campus in the morning, and taking the bus is my 
usual means of getting there. But there are lots of other ways I can get to campus. I can 
walk, I can ask a friend for a ride, or I can bike. All of these modes of transportation are 
efficient-causal means of getting me to campus. It is also possible for the bus to break 
down, for my legs to get too tired to go further, and for my friend to forget to pick me up. 
These means can fail to cause their ends, and when they do, we no longer value them on 
the occasion in which they fail. By contrast, a constituent of an end is - as the name 
indicates - constitutive of that end. This being the case, there is not the same distance 
between it and the end as there is in the case of instrumental means. To care about and 
promote the good of the constituent is to care about and promote the good of the end, 
precisely because of the constitutive relation. For example, the strings on a guitar are 
constitutive of the guitar. To harm them or to treat them well is to, ipso facto, harm or 
100 So, Brink (in the above quote) speaks of the friend's well-being as making a "constitutive contribution" 
to the well-being of his friend. 
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treat well the guitar itself. Insofar as I am making sure that the strings are in good shape 
- in tune, shiny, etc. - I am making sure that the guitar is in good shape. 
Taking that explanation of the distinction as a guide, let us try and answer Ql. 
One answer to that question is this: By aiming at something as a constituent part of some 
whole, I aim at it for its own sake precisely because I am not aiming at it as an 
instrumental means. Here is where we must keep in mind the relevant distance between a 
means and an end that characterizes instrumental means. I can aim at the good of a 
constituent part of some whole for its own sake because I am not trying to use it to 
achieve some further end. It is rather part of the very end I am already trying to achieve, 
and my aiming at it therefore stands in no further need of justification. Therefore, by 
aiming at my friend's good as a constituent part of my own good, I aim at his good for his 
sake because there is no further end I am trying to achieve by aiming at his good - no 
further end that bears any efficient-causal relation to my aiming at his good. And by 
aiming at his good, I am ipso facto aiming at mine, and so I aim at my own happiness as 
well. In this sense, I choose my friend's good both for its own sake and for the sake of 
my own happiness at one and the same time. 
We might question whether we have enough here to provide for an adequate 
account of how one aims at a friend's good both for the friend's sake and for the sake of 
one's own happiness. It matters just how tight the constitutive relation is between the 
part and the whole. I might try to take care of my guitar strings just because I think 
strings in themselves ought to look nice and be in good shape, but not because they are a 
part of the guitar, and in this case it seems I might care more about them for their sake 
than someone who takes care of them qua guitar parts. And even if the constitutive 
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relation is very tight, it also matters how I feel about that relation. Consider this example: 
Thomas, being a tenured faculty member of the philosophy department at X-University, 
is a constituent of the department. Tim, a philosopher at some other school, is looking 
for a new job, and really wants to work with Thomas. But just because Tim wants to 
work with Thomas does not mean that he, ipso facto, wants to work with the rest of the 
philosophy department at X-U. And vice versa, of course. Just because he wants to get 
that job at X-U does not mean, ipso facto, that he relishes the chance to work with 
Thomas. 
Now, in perfect friendship, friends obviously don't feel that way. No friend, ifhe 
is a friend, laments the fact that by helping his friend he thereby helps himself, and that 
by helping himself he thereby helps his friend. Yet questions still remain, for it seems 
that the constitutive solution has merely given us the following: It seems that I either take 
as my main aim my own good, or the good of my friend, and in each case it is ipso facto 
true of me that I aim at the other end, but only from a third person perspective. That is, 
my intention may be for either my own good or the good of my friend, and then because 
of the constitutive relation between the two, it will always be true of me - but only from 
an outside perspective - that I aim at the other. Interestingly, this idea was one of the key 
ideas of unintentional self-love. C3) of unintentional self-love stated that: "Because by 
helping a friend and by generally being virtuous the agent does attain something good for 
himself, he can be said to act for the sake of his own happiness from an outside 
perspective. It is only in this third-person-perspective sense that he acts for the sake of 
his own happiness." The constitutive solution needs to give us more than this. The 
agent, when aiming at the good of his friend, must have both the thought that he is doing 
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it because it is his friend, and that he is doing it because it is a part of his good. The 
constitutive relation between his friend's good and his own must explain the necessity of 
having both thoughts cause the action. 
4.2. The Hand Analogy 
Aristotle has just the sort of thing that may be of assistance here. Consider this 
analogy: On Aristotle's view, a hand would not be a hand if detached from a body. 
Since a hand is essentially part of a body, since what it is to be a hand is to be a part of a 
body, to care for one's hand for itself -for what it is - is just to care for it insofar as it is 
a part of a body. So to aim at the good of one's hand for its own sake is, ipso facto, to 
aim at the good of one's body (not merely from a third person perspective). A person 
could care for his hand under some other guise, I suppose. Someone with a strange sort 
of hand-fetish could care for his hand qua beautiful aesthetic appendage. But in 
Aristotle's language, such a person would not be caring for his hand insofar as it is a 
hand. Such a person would therefore not be caring for his hand for itself - for what it is. 
Suppose someone broke his hand and went to the doctor to get it fixed, and we asked 
him: Why are you getting your hand fixed? What do you really care about more, your 
hand or your body? Such a question would be misplaced, and it probably embodies 
some sort of category mistake. But in the example of Thomas and Tim used just a while 
ago, the constitutive relation between Thomas and his department at X-University is not 
the same. While Thomas is a member of the philosophy department, and so in some 
sense a constituent part of it, this is not what Thomas is essentially. Thomas detached 
from his department would still be Thomas, and so Tim can certainly aim at Thomas' 
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good for itself without thereby also intending to do something good for the department. 
There is more to Thomas the individual and his life than being a philosopher at X-
University. Unlike a hand and the body of which it is a part, Thomas is not defined by 
his constitutive relation to his department. 
What the hand analogy shows is that the only way to care for a hand for its own 
sake is to care for itfor what it essentially is. And what a hand is essentially is a part of a 
body. And this, finally, is our new meaning of what it means to value X for its own sake 
- for itself. It means to value X for what X essentially is. Does Aristotle hold this view? 
We saw in the first section, in fact, that he does. Consider once again how he contrasted 
character friendship with the lesser forms of friendship: 
Hence, those who love on account of usefulness, love on account of what 
is good for themselves; and those who love on account of pleasure, love 
on account of what is pleasant to themselves - and not in so far as the 
beloved is [what he is] (OVX U 6 q>lAOVllEV6S EC}T1V), but rather in so far as 
he is useful or pleasant (NE VIII.3 1156aIO-16). 
In a friendship of pleasure or utility, a friend is not loved for "what he is", but for 
something else. This is why Aristotle calls these friendships "accidental": "Hence, these 
friendships are so by accident (KOTCx aVll!3E!3TJK6S), because it is not as being the man that 
he is that the beloved is loved, but rather in so far as he provides something" (NE VIII.3 
1156aI6-18). There would seem to be an essentialist claim lurking in this passage. What 
a friend is, qua friend, is not something instrumentally beneficiaL A friend is rather 
something else. But what? Aristotle closely associates "what he is" with his character, 
but how exactly does that help here? On the constitutive solution, it would seem that a 
friend must be, or at least his happiness must be, essentially, a constituent part of one's 
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own happiness, just like a hand is essentially part of a body. And it is this fact that gets 
the constitutive solution into trouble. 
4.3. The Moral Objection 
While something like the hand analogy might provide for an adequate answer to 
Q I with respect to friendship, unfortunately I do not think that it does so in a way that 
provides for an answer in the affirmative to Q2. Is it objectionable to aim at the good of a 
friend as an essential constituent part of one's own good, acknowledging the difference 
between that and aiming at his good as a means to one's own? I think it is objectionable 
for the following reason. The hand analogy does not seem to carry over to the case of 
friendship - for while my friend's well-being may happen to be a part of my own, this is 
not what my friend's well-being is essentially. Even if his good were detached from its 
constitutive relation to mine, he would still be who he is, presumably; he would still be a 
separate being unto himself. It would not be like the hand case, where the hand literally 
loses its essence -literally ceases to be - once it is detached from the body. 
In addition, a good friend seems to be one who values his friend not just because 
it is a way of valuing himself, even if he aims at his friend's good as a constituent of and 
not as a means to his own. The standard meaning of valuing someone for his own sake 
seems, at any rate, more morally acceptable. And understanding the "other self' claim in 
the way required by the constitutive solution seems to invite an unwelcome sort of 
narcissism into friendship that is strongly at odds with how it seems friends ought to care 
for one another. Interestingly, some proponents of the constitutive solution lament it for 
this very reason. Thus, Milgram writes of what he believes to be Aristotle's view: "It 
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seems to me that self-love is playing too great, and the wrong kind of, a role. As Robert 
Frost puts it in his poem, 'Hyla Brook': 'We love the things we love for what they are' -
not for what we have made them" (1987, 376). The point is - if I love my friend only 
because and to the extent that I see myself in him, or only to the extent that he instantiates 
me in some way, then I'm not really loving him; I'm loving me. 101 
Despite those reservations, the constitutive solution has the best textual support of 
the three. To be clear, I am not saying that we shouldn't attribute the constitutive 
solution to Aristotle because of its troubling implication. Is Aristotle simply stuck with 
this objection, then? I think not. I shall explain why in the next chapter. 
5. Conclusion 
I have tried to do the following in this chapter. By showing up the fatal 
difficulties with the unintentional self-love interpretation, I intended to show just how 
pressing the problem we are dealing with is, both as a textual and philosophical matter. 
The facts are that Aristotle endorses both motives, and claims that the motive to love a 
friend for the friend's sake is a necessary condition on the best kind of friendship. We 
are not yet in possession of an account of the virtuous agent's structure of motivation that 
adequately diffuses the conceptual and moral worries at hand. On the constitutive 
solution, the attitude I take towards my friend does appear to be morally objectionable. 
Yet I believe that the constitutive solution is basically right as an interpretation of 
Aristotle, and I think a compelling response on his behalf can be given to the moral 
objection. 
101 Cf. Nussbaum, echoing the sentiments of Annas and Whiting: "The object of philia must be seen as a 
being with a separate good, not as simply a possession or extension of the phi/os; and the real phi/os will 
wish the other well for the sake of that separate good" (1986,355). 
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What we need is a better account of the relation between two individuals who 
have a friendship based on character, and a better interpretation of the other-self claim. 
In short, we need to know what Aristotle thinks two people who are friends are, insofar 
as they are friends. Why is this an important question? It is important because Aristotle 
holds that to value a friend for his own sake is to value him for what he is. The reason I 
think Aristotle tries so hard to conceive of friends as other selves, as sorts of replicas of 
each other, is in order to try and overcome the recalcitrant "otherness" that friendship 
presents. At NE IX.8 1168b7, Aristotle endorses the proverb that friends are a "single 
soul" (llia "INxn). This is, I think, what he wants to be true. He wants it to be true that 
friends are a kind of unity, in order to do away with the "otherness" that his eudaimonism 
seems unable to properly accommodate. That he has the resources to do this, and that it 
is a view worthy of endorsement, is what I plan to show in the next chapter. Aristotle, I 
will argue, is able to answer the objection raised against the constitutive solution. That is, 
he has an argument for why it is not morally objectionable to aim at the good of one's 
friend in the way required by the constitutive solution. But his ultimate view is also 
importantly different from that solution and improves upon it. 
III 
The Single-Soul of Friendship 
In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely 
that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again. If you press me to 
tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because it 
was he, because it was I. 
- Montaigne, "Of Friendship" 
1. Introduction 
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The main question to be raised in this chapter is: What is it, according to 
Aristotle, for two people to be friends to each other? Insofar as two people are friends, 
what are they exactly? His ultimate answer to that question is, in short, that true friends 
are a single soul (J..lia \lNXTl). This is a provocative idea, and one bound to strike us 
modem readers as obscure and metaphorical at best, plainly false at worst. After all, 
friendship by defmition is between two distinct individuals. Yet the idea is one that 
Aristotle endorses in both of his ethical treatises. 102 As well, Diogenes Laertius reports 
of Aristotle that: "To the query, 'What is a friend?' his reply was, 'A single soul dwelling 
in two bodies'" (D.L. 5.20). Diogenes' testimony shows something important, for it 
shows that Aristotle did not lose sight of the obvious - namely, that friends are 
numerically distinct (' two bodies'). Yet he doesn't think that numerical distinctness 
precludes the existence of unity between friends. Aristotle does not make the claim that 
friends are a single-soul haphazardly, as merely a metaphorical way of claiming that 
friends are really close to each other. The claim has more substance than that. In fact, a 
102 He speaks of friends as a single soul at EE 1240a36-1240b9 and at NE IX.8 1168b7. 
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proper understanding of that claim yields Aristotle's solution to the problem of 
motivation as it arises in the case of friendship. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops Aristotle's view that friends 
are a singe soul. The view, I argue, comes by way of three key Aristotelian concepts. 
The first is nous, the "thinking part" of the soul. The second and third respectively are 
shared perception (avvola8avea8at) and shared living (TO av~tiv) - two things that 
Aristotle considers to be most important features of the best kind of friendship. Section 3 
shows how the single soul view solves the problem of motivation and defends the view 
against objections. In short, that solution is as follows: To the extent that friends are a 
unity, the unity prevents a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding motives 
with respect to the friends themselves in relation to each other. To the extent that friends 
are a single soul, it is not the case that I act on behalf of my friend, or that he acts on 
behalf of me. Rather, it is the single soul that acts on behalf of itself. I conclude in 
section 4 with a discussion of the merits of Aristotle's resolution of the aporia regarding 
self-sufficiency and friendship, in light of the single-soul view. 
2. The Single Soul 
2.1. Nous 
Nous - one's intellect or mind - is the capacity of the soul responsible for 
reasoning and thinking.103 The two most central points that I argue for in this sub-section 
are that (1) Aristotle identifies the self with nous in NE IX.4 and IX.9, and that (2) this 
nous is the same entity as the passive cognitive nous of De Anima 111.4, and so the self 
103 DA I1I.4 429a15-16. 
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that is nous requires others in order to become what it is.104 Aristotle twice in the 
Nicomachean books on friendship identifies a person with his nous. The first occurrence 
is at IX.4 1166a 14-19, where he makes the claim that the features of friendship are found 
in the virtuous person's relation to himself. The second occurrence is at IX.8 1168b32-
1169a3, where Aristotle claims that the true self-lover is one who gratifies his nous. Here 
are the passages: 
For he agrees with himself and desires the same things with his entire soul. 
Hence, he wishes for himself both good things and things that appear to be 
good, and he acts (since it is characteristic of a good person to cultivate 
what is good) for the sake of himself (since he does so for the sake of his 
thinking part [TOO yap 8l0VOT]Tll<OO XaplV], which in fact each person 
seems to be [olTep El<OCnOS eTval 8ol<eiD. (NE IX.4 1166aI4-19) 
Just as a city, or any other organization, seems to be its supreme element 
most of all (\.laAlOT' eTvol), so also a human being - and thus someone 
who cherishes this and gratifies this is most of all a self-lover. And 'self-
controlled' or 'lacking self-control' are applied depending upon whether 
the mind (TOV voOv) rules or not, on the presumption that each person is 
this (wS TOVTOV El<aOTOV OVTOS). (NE IX.8 1168b32-1169a3) 
These two passages ought to make us ask what exactly the relation is, according to 
Aristotle, between nous and "the thinking part" (TO 8l0VOT]TlKOV). Is Aristotle saying 
that a person is his dianoetic part, which is his nous? Or is the dianoetic part just a part 
of nous, so that even in the second passage he is not identifying a person with his nous, 
but only with a part of it? We should read Aristotle as making the first claim - that a 
person is his dianoetic part, which is his nous. De Anima 111.4 is helpful in this respect, 
for in that chapter Aristotle tells us straightforwardly what he means by nous. 
2.1.1. Parts of Nous? 
104 I am aware that NE X.7-8 presents special exegetical and philosophical difficulties. I discuss these 
difficulties in section 2.1.4. 
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Nous is described as the part of the soul by which the soul performs various 
cognitive functions. Consider the following two passages: 
Concerning the part of the soul by which the soul knows and reasons 
practically (i;) YIVWOKEI TE Ii \VVxiJ Kat CPPOVeI), whether it is separable 
from the others in definition only, or spatially as well, we have to inquire 
what differentiates this part, and how thinking can take place {Kat TTWS 
TTOTE yiVETat TO VOelV).105 
"By nous I mean that by which the soul thinks and judges (Myw oE voiJv 
i;) OlaVOElTat Kat tITToAa\l[3avEI Ii \VvXrl).,,106 
As we see in these passages, Aristotle thinks of nous as that part of the soul that performs 
the functions described by the following verbs: YIYVWOKEIV, CPPOVEIV, VOEIV, 
OlaVOEI08at, and llTToAa\l[3avElv. Now, it would be wrong to think that each of those 
verbs signifies a different part of nous itself - that nous has a gignosketic, phronetic, 
noetic, dianoetic, and hupolambanetic part. The mental functions denoted by each of 
those verbs are too similar for that to be true, and he does not use those verbs in ways that 
suggest that they are the proper functions of distinct noetic parts. So when Aristotle says 
in IX.4 that a person is his dianoetic part, we should not read him as meaning to exclude 
the other mental functions of nous. 107 Doing so would create many unnecessary 
problems, the biggest of which resulting from the fact that there is a clear reference to the 
mind's capacity for practical reasoning linked with ethical virtue in the IX.8 passage 
lOS DA IlIA 429a 10-14. J.A. Smith's translation, amended (Smith, for some reason, leaves cppovel entirely 
unaccounted for). 
106 DA IlIA 429a23. 
107 Also, in NE VI.2 Aristotle says that nous is one of three capacities of the soul that control action and 
truth. (The other two are sense perception and desire.) Nous' job in the practical sphere is to see truth 
regarding what the right thing to do is, and in addition to get desire to agree with it (NE VI.2 l139a27-30; 
there is an obvious similarity here to Plato's ideal of psychic harmony in Republic IV). I will discuss NE 
VI.2 in greater detail shortly. 
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above. lOS He claims there that whether we call someone continent or incontinent depends 
on whether nous rules in that person. Though he does not mention phronesis by name, 
Aristotle clearly has it in mind. But if we read the IX.4 passage as identifying a person 
with the dianoetic part of his nous at the exclusion of the other parts of nous (like the 
phronetic part), we would then have to read the IX.8 passage in the same way, which 
would make the reference to continence and incontinence make very little sense. It is, 
therefore, better to think of nous as one part of the soul that performs all of the mental 
functions above, so that the "thinking part" is the same as the "knowing part", which is 
the same as the "judging part", which is the same as the part that reasons practically 
(CPpoVEiv), etc. 
2.1.2. Nous as "What One is Most of All" 
Several features of the IX.8 passage merit further attention, and I want to now 
focus more on that passage and draw out its implications. It will be helpful to make that 
passage (1l68b31-l169a3) front and center once more, this time divided into sections for 
clarity and with the Greek alongside in its entirety: 
I. WO"lTEP Be Kat lTOAlS TO Kvplc':lTaTOV \.l<lAlO"T' ETval BOKEi Kat lTOV 
aAAO aVO"TT)\la, o\JTc.u Kat av8pc.ulTos· Kat cplAaVTos Btl \lclAlO"Ta 6 
TOUTO clyalTWV Kat TOVTC+> xapl~O\lEVOS. Just as a city, or any other 
organization, seems to be its supreme element most of all, so also a human 
being - and thus someone who cherishes this and gratifies this is most of 
all a self-lover. 
II. Kat eyKpa-riJs Be Kat clKpaTtlS MYETQl T4J KpaTEiv TOV VOUV ti \In, 
WS TOVTOV EKclO"TOV OVTOS· Kat lTElTpayeval BOKOUO"lV aVTOt Kat 
EKOVO"Ic.us TO: \lETO: AOYOV \lclAlO"Ta. And 'self-controlled' or 'lacking 
self-control' are applied depending upon whether the mind rules or not, on 
the presumption that each person is this. And people seem themselves to 
do, and to do voluntarily, most of all those actions that involve reason. 
lOS See Stem-Gillet (1995,25-6), Price (1990,107), and Gill (2006,8). 
III. chI !lEV OVV TOUS' EKaO'Tos EO'TIV Tl!lOAIO'Ta, OUK 8:8TJAov, Kat OTI 0 
ETTlEIKf)S !lOAIO'Ta TOUT' ayalT~. 810 cpiAavTos !lOAIO'T' av E'(TJ... Well 
then, that each person is this, or is this most of all, is not unclear, and also 
that a good person cherishes this most of all. This is why he would be 
most of all a self-lover ... 
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The first thing to note is that the IX.8 passage sheds important light on just what Aristotle 
means by autos - self. Simply put, IX.8 establishes that Aristotle thinks that one's self is 
one's ruling part, and that one's ruling part is one's nous. 109 One's self is one's nous. 
After all, what makes someone a phi/autos (a self-lover) is the fact that he gratifies his 
nous, since nous is "what one is", or what one is "most of all". Autos and nous, then, are 
clearly brought together in IX.8. 
Now, as simple as I made the previous point about autos and nous seem to be, 
there is a problem with which I must contend. The problem concerns the status of the 
"ruling part" in akratic and vicious people. In an akratic person, for instance, the 
appetitive part rules. Does this mean that an akratic person is his appetitive part, and that 
he is just as much of a self-lover as a virtuous person whose nous rules him? Ifnot, then 
is the akratic or vicious person "self-less", as it were? The answer to the first question 
cannot be 'yes', for Aristotle says clearly that the virtuous person's self-love is superior 
to the self-love of the base. However, Aristotle is still willing to call base people "self-
10vers,,1l0, so we cannot attribute to Aristotle the view that base people have no self.lll 
109 Or, nous is what the self is "most of all" (IlCxAIOT' eTVOI). I will soon discuss the problems that this 
qualifier presents. Also, it should be noted that the IXA passage probably establishes this claim too, though 
I think it is more explicit in the IX.8 passage. 
110 He attributes a kind of self-love (i.e. a base kind) to certain people (i.e. base people) at NE IX.8 
1168bll-28. 
III Pace Stem-Gillet (1995, 29). On her view, akratic and vicious people are not selves. I depart from her 
account here, but I am not sure to what extent my dispute with her is merely verbal. I think that the correct 
thing to say about a base person is not that he lacks a self altogether, but that he has an inferior self. I rest 
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His view rather seems to be that base people are self-lovers, but in a very bad kind of 
way. It would be wrong to attribute the view to Aristotle that vicious and akratic people 
are not self-lovers at all, and that only the virtuous are self-lovers. He never says this. 
What he does say is that a virtuous person is more of a self-lover than the base person: 
8o~ElE 8' av 6 TOlOVTOS ~aAAov elval <pIAavTos. 
So, we cannot read Aristotle as claiming that base people are not selves at all. 
However, we also cannot just say that Aristotle's view is that the self is whatever happens 
to be the ruling part in a person, because he clearly thinks that nous has a greater claim to 
being "what someone is" than the appetites have. Rather, I think there is a strong case to 
be made that Aristotle thinks that selfhood comes in degrees, and that the virtuous person 
is more of a self than a base person. At least two considerations count strongly in favor 
of this claim: 1) He thinks that a person is his ruling part, but he also thinks that in a 
human being it is nous that ought to rule. 2) He thinks that a virtuous person is more of a 
self-lover than a base person (NE IX.8 1168b29). This is strong textual evidence in 
support of the claim that Aristotle thinks that there can be degrees of selfhood because it 
is a case of Aristotle applying the word ~aAAov to mhos. The virtuous person is more 
of a self-lover (<pIAavTos) than the base person because he is more of a self (in that he 
gratifies that part of him that he is most of all). For further confirmation of this, we must 
examine another problem raised by the IX.8 passage currently under examination. 
What does Aristotle mean when he says that, just like a city, a person seems most 
of all (~aAlaT' eTVal) to be his ruling part (TO KvplwTaTov)? The problem is that 
Aristotle's use of the phrase ~aAlaT' eTVal 80Kel ( ... seems to be most of all ... ) is 
this claim very much on Aristotle's claim that a virtuous person is more of a self-lover than a base person. 
He never says that a base person is not a self-lover at all, a point Stern-Gillet does not seem to recognize. 
How can Aristotle say that the base person is a self-lover if he has no self? 
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ambiguous. Here are two possible meanings of the claim that someone seems to be most 
of all his ruling part: 
MI: Most of all, it seems that a person is his ruling part. In other words, 
what the evidence suggests more than anything else is that a person is his 
ruling part and nothing else. 
M2: It seems that a person is most of all his ruling part. In other words, 
the evidence suggests that a person is his ruling part more than he is any 
other part. 
Ml identifies the self with the ruling part at the exclusion of other parts of the soul, while 
M2 does not. Aristotle is not clear about which of these is the right one, as he seems to 
hedge between both of them: OTI llEV OVV TOOS' EKacn6s eOTlv ft 1l0:AloTa... Each 
person is his ruling part, Aristotle thinks. Or each person is his ruling part most of all (ft 
1l0:AIOTa), he thinks. 
Unclear on this point as Aristotle may be, I think that M2, and not MI, accurately 
describes the meaning of Aristotle's claim. Aristotle cannot mean to (at least, he should 
not mean to) identify the self with one's nous at the exclusion of the other parts of the 
soul. It is part of our nature as humans, Aristotle thinks, to be both rational and 
appetitive. The ethical ideal is for a person to habituate himself and achieve that state of 
soul in which his appetites not only obey his reason, but also agree with his reason (NE 
1.13 l102bI4-35). This is why the good person is described in the IX.4 passage as 
someone who "agrees with himself' and "desires the same things with his entire sour' 
(1l66aI4-19; my emphasis). So, while the self may be mostly nous in that it is nous that 
ought to rule, the appetitive part of the soul does have some claim to be part of what 
constitutes the self. That Aristotle thinks this is also made clear by the fact that he draws 
a strong evaluative distinction between the virtuous person and the merely continent 
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person. The continent person is almost there - his nous rules, but his appetites do not yet 
fully agree with his nous and have to be fought off to some extent. He is a self, but not as 
much of a self as the virtuous person. In order to become a self in the fullest sense, he 
must get the non-rational part of his soul to agree with his rational part.112 If Aristotle 
had intended to identify the self with one's nous at the exclusion of the other parts of the 
soul, then he should not have claimed that the virtuous person was ethically superior to 
the continent person. 
2.1.3. The "Plasticity" of No us 113 
I want now to turn to De Anima 111.4, for what is found in that chapter, when 
combined with what has already been established about nous, has profound implications 
for friendship. Having distinguished the five senses, Aristotle asks in 111.4 how thinking 
(TO VOelV, literally 'nous-ing') differs from perceiving (TO aicr8avecr8at). Thinking and 
perceiving are alike in one important respect, namely that just as sense organs take on the 
form of their objects, nous becomes that which it thinks (DA 111.4 429a12-18).114 But 
thinking differs from sensing in that everything is a possible object of thought, whereas 
not everything is a possible object of hearing, seeing, tasting, smelling, and feeling. That 
is, one cannot see sounds, or taste sights, or smell touches. But everything is a possible 
object of thought. This is why, on Aristotle's view, nous is not located in any physical 
112 And so, Stem-Gillet is surely right when she says that "self' is an "achievement word" for Aristotle 
(1995,29). 
113 I borrow this phrase from Stem-Gillet (1995, 49). 
114 "Thinking" is somewhat of an unhappy translation of nous for me. This will become clear later in the 
chapter. I don't know of any English word, however, that fully captures what Aristotle means by nous-ing, 
as it were. 
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organ, which gives it "the plasticity required to think all things." Unlike the sense 
organs, nous is pure potentiality and so cannot be anything prior to exercising its specific 
function. I 15 
It follows that it can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a 
certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by which I 
mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not 
actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as 
blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or 
cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. 
It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms', though this 
description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only 
potentially, not actually. (DA 111.4 429a20-29) 
This passage licenses the inference that, as aptly noted by Stern-Gillet,116 it is only 
through individual acts of intellection that nous can overcome its purely potential state. 
Nous can only actualize itself by becoming something else.,,117 
It has been pointed out that Aristotle lacks a conception of the self, one commonly 
attributed to Descartes, according to which the self is the ultimate datum of experience, 
an object directly knowable through introspection.118 Catherine Osborne, very much in 
the spirit of Stern-Gillet's remarks, has claimed that for Aristotle, the very idea of 
115 Stem-Gillet (1995, 49). See also Polansky (2007, 435) and Hamlyn (1993, 136) who apply the same 
reasoning to explain why nous is not located in any physical organ, which it seems Aristotle himself makes 
fairly clear. But despite the fact that nous has no physical organ, Aristotle still applies the same formulae to 
it as he does to the other sense organs according to which a cognitive faculty is potentially what its object is 
actually (see Modrak 1981). As Hamlyn (1993, 135) notes, Aristotle never fully resolves the difficulties 
that result from applying the same formulae to nous. On the obscure ontological status of nous in this 
passage: Hamlyn (1993, 136) offers the suggestion that the capacity of nous is one of the whole man and is 
dependent on the other faculties that do have organs. Hartman (1977, 7) finds the characterization of nous 
to be an irredeemably week point of Aristotle's psychology, while Wedin (1986 and 1988) attempts to 
come to Aristotle's rescue, though he does this by a treatment of the active nous of III.5, as does Kahn 
(1992, 360). Kahn does not so much try to explain the ontology of nous as he does attempt to reconcile the 
existence of nous with Aristotle's conception of the soul as the form of the body. 
116 Stem-Gillet (1995, 51-2). 
117 Stem-Gillet (1995, 50). 
118 Stem-Gillet (1995, 18-24), Osborne (2009, 356-62). 
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"knowing oneself' is problematic, "since the self in Aristotle is actualized only in the 
form of its thoughts and experiences, and not as a subject independent of the objects of 
attention" (2009, 349). The De Anima passages examined thus far, in which we learn that 
nous is pure potentiality and must become, in Aristotle's words, something else in order 
to become what it actually is, support Osborne's view: The self is not, in principle, the 
sort of thing that could be an object of awareness, since the only way for the self to 
become actual and determinate is for it to take on the form of a determinate object. 119 
And once this process is complete, there are not two separate things - the self and the 
object - but a single actuality constituted by the intellection of the object 120 
Everything that has been said about nous so far has important implications for 
friendship. But at this point, any ethical imports I might draw from the foregoing would 
depend on the claim that the nous of NE IXA & 8 is the same entity as the nous of DA 
IlIA. Rather than simply assume that claim, I argue for it in the next sub-section. 
2.104. Why the Nous of NE IXA & 8 is the Same Entity as the Nous of DA IlIA 
Some reasons for thinking that this is true have been rehearsed early in this 
section. We noted earlier that in DA IlIA Aristotle thinks of nous as that part of the soul 
that performs the functions described by the following verbs: YlyvwoKelv, q>poveiv, 
voeiv, 81avoeio8al, and \/lTOAalll36:velv. Furthermore, it was argued that when Aristotle 
119 Osborne (2009, 358). Cf. Kosman (2004,142-145). 
120 "To perceive that one sees is not to perceive an act of seeing, or to perceive a self doing some seeing, or 
anything like that: it is to perceive the object of sight, the whiteness, the largeness, actualized at the time of 
seeing. It is for this reason that Aristotle always speaks of 'seeing' that one sees, for what one sees is not a 
self but the seen object actualized as seen. So it is not that we are aware both of ourselves and ofthe object 
of attention, as though subject and object were two separate things, for the actuality of subject and object 
are just the same thing. There is no such thing as awareness of oneself that is not constituted by awareness 
of what we are aware of' (Osborne 2009, 358-59). 
99 
says that a person is his dianoetic part in NE IXA, we should read him as saying that a 
person is his dianoetic part - and that this part is his nous. And the use of the verb 
q>poveTv in the first sentence of DA IlIA evokes practical wisdom, so we have plenty of 
reason to think that the ethical nous of NE IXA & S is the same entity as the passive 
cognitive nous of DA IlIA. The ethical nous performs the same functions as the 
cognitive nous. The moral agent has to think, judge, and know as he goes about life and 
assesses his particular circumstances, trying to discover what right action is in any given 
situation. What in addition has to happen in the ethical sphere is that this knowing, 
thinking, and judging part rules in the soul. 
One aspect of Aristotle's ethics and psychology that might make us doubt that 
each nous is the same entity is the fact that in X. 7 -S of the NE he seems to identify a 
person with a purely cognitive nous at the exclusion of anything ethicaL This would 
seem to be a problem for my argument, for so far I have argued that Aristotle thinks that 
one's self is one's ruling part and that nous ought to rule, so that nous is the self in the 
highest sense and is, in fact, the self of the virtuous person. Furthermore, I have argued 
that Aristotle does not mean to identify the self with nous at the exclusion of the 
appetitive parts of the soul. Yet in NE X. 7 -S, Aristotle seems to do exactly that - identify 
the self with nous at the exclusion of the other parts of the soul. In addition, he seems to 
mean something very different by nous than what he means by it in IXA and IX.S. In 
extolling the life of theoretical virtue in preference to the life of practical virtue, he claims 
that the activity of nous (n Be TOV VOV evepyela) is superior in excellence because it is the 
activity of study (8ecuPTJTIKtl o\1O'a) (NE X.7 1177b219-20). Furthermore, he claims that 
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the life in accordance with this nous is superior to the practical life because it contains 
something divine: 
ei btl 8eTov 0 voOS lTPOs TOV av8pc:..:mov, Kat 0 KaTO: TOOTOV !3{OS 8doS 
lTPOS TOV av8pwlTlvov !3{ov. Hence if nous is something divine in 
comparison with a human being, so also will the life in accord with 
understanding be divine in comparison with human life. 
He elaborates on this in X.8. The virtues of character, he reminds us, are tied up with 
feelings, and are the virtues that belong to a person insofar as he is a compound (TO 
O'VV8ETOV) of reason and desire. The virtue of nous, however, is separated from the 
compound (Ii be TOO voO KexwpIO'\lEVfJ). This seems to be a very different nous from the 
one linked with virtue of character in IX.4 and IX.8. 
This problem raises a host of exegetical difficulties that have exercised many 
scholars for quite some time, and invites us to consider (among other things) whether 
Aristotle thinks that the best life is the practical life or the contemplative life. 121 This 
problem is very far from being resolved, and to fully resolve it is more than I can do here. 
But fortunately, my argument does not depend on whether this problem can be solved. 
F or whether or not Aristotle thinks, in the end, that one should embrace the theoretical 
life at the expense of everything practical and distinctively human (the theoretical life is, 
after all, divine), it is either way the case that the nous spoken of in practical contexts is 
the same entity as the nous of DA 111.4. Indeed, even the nous that he speaks of in Book 
121 See Ackrill (1980), Devereaux (1981), Keyt (1983), Whiting (1986), Roche (1988), Keyt (1989), Kraut 
(1989), White (1990), Crisp (1994), Cooper (1975, 168-80), Cooper (1999), Lear (2004), and Van 
C1eemput (2006). There is a similar problem found in the De Anima that results from Aristotle's positing of 
the active nous in III.5. This nous is said to be is pure actuality, spatially separable from the rest of a 
person, impassible and unmixed with anything physical, and furthermore immortal and eternal. This raises 
the problem of how to reconcile the existence of an active, impersonal and immoral nous with Aristotle's 
entelexeia conception of soul according to which the soul is the life principle of the body and cannot out-
live the body's death. 
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X of the NE is the same entity as the nous he speaks of in these other contexts. To make 
this argument, I turn briefly to NE VI.2 
NE VI.2 is about the capacities of the soul that control action and truth. There are 
three: sense perception (a'(a811aIS), desire (OpE~IS), and nous. Aristotle goes on in this 
chapter to refer to nous as the dianoetic part. l139a22-3l is a telling passage. In it 
Aristotle distinguishes the function of the dianoetic part when it comes to action, and the 
function of that part when it comes to study. 
TTlS 8e 8EWPllTIKTlS 81avofas Kat ~.l11lTpaKTIKTls ~1l8e lTOlllTIKTlS TO EV Kat 
KaKWS TaA1l8es eaTI Kat '4'E08os (TOOTO yap eaTI lTaVTOS 81aVOllTIKOO 
EPYOV). TOO 8e lTpaKTIKOO Kat 81avollTIKOO aAf)8Ela o~oA6ywS Exovaa Ta ope~EI Tlj op8lj. 
The thought concerned with study, not with action or production, has its 
good or bad state in being true or false; for truth is the function of every 
dianoetic part. But the function of the dianoetic part concerned with 
action is truth agreeing with correct desire. 122 
There are two ways we might read this passage. On the one hand, we might think that 
Aristotle is distinguishing between two different dianoetic parts, and so between two 
different kinds of nous - one theoretical, and one practical. On the other hand, we might 
think that Aristotle is distinguishing between two different spheres of life - one 
theoretical and one practical- in which the dianoetic part (nous) has an important role to 
play. 
It is in the second way that we should read the passage. Whether engaged in 
theoretical or practical life, nous is always doing basically the same thing: thinking, 
reasoning, searching for truth. 123 If it is engaged in theoretical pursuits, it will be 
122 MI' Y trans atlOn. 
123 Pace Kahn (1992,360) who argues that we should distinguish between "our noetic faculty as such" and 
"our concrete acts of human thinking". He does this in an attempt to reconcile Aristotle's positing of a 
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reasoning about things like differential calculus and the metaphysical principles of the 
universe. If it is engaged in practical pursuits, it will be reasoning about things like 
whether to trade with this or that country, or whether to go to war, or whether to drink 
that third beer at the bar.124 Either way, its job is to think. It is true that in Book X, 
Aristotle seems to say that the best kind of life is one in which one's nous is immersed 
almost entirely in theoretical pursuits. But this should not be read as a preference for one 
kind of nous over another kind of nous, but rather as a preference for one sphere in which 
nous can flourish over another sphere in which the same nous can flourish. 125 Book X, 
therefore, need not present any special problems for my argument. 126 
2.1.5. From Nous to Friendship 
separable active nous with his entelecheia conception of soul, according to which the soul is the form of the 
body. He admits, however, that the only place in which Aristotle makes this alleged distinction even 
remotely explicit is in "the extreme case of the disembodied nous in III.3". 
124 My line of thought here has an affinity to the argument that Lear (2004) makes for how the practical life 
approximates the theoretical life in that it too involves the excellent use of one's reason. 
125 Further confirmation of this may be found at X.7 1178a2-3, where Aristotle again says that a person is 
his nous since a person is his controlling part (to kurion, the positive version of the superlative he used in 
IX.8). While he does claim at X.8 1178a23-24 that nous is separable from the compound, he nevertheless 
does not specify whether he means separable spatially or separable in definition only. 
126 There is, of course, a nous that appears to be entirely out of left field, namely the one found in the 
notoriously cryptic DA III.5. In that chapter, Aristotle says that there is an active nous, which is pure 
actuality. It is also spatially separable, impassible and unmixed with anything physical, and furthermore 
immortal and eternal (unlike the nous of I1I.4, which is "perishable"). It is somehow causally responsible 
for the thinking of each of us without being essentially identified by its relationship with us. This has made 
some, like Ross (1923, 151), say that the active nous "goes beyond the individual" and is "identical in all 
individuals". Some have argued that this active nous is the nous that Aristotle extols in NE X (e.g. Stem 
Gillet 1995,34; Hardie 1980,71; Cooper 1975, 157), but I find this hard to believe. In NE X, even though 
Aristotle thinks there is something divine about contemplating, he still claims that nous is a fundamentally 
human thing (l178a8-9). Though he waxes poetic about striving to be like the immortals, he never actually 
claims that nous is immortal. Whereas in DA III.5, the active nous is explicitly said to be immortal while 
the passive nous is said to be perishable. Whatever the active nous is, it isn't human. Some, like Clark 
(1975, V.3) have even argued that the active nous is the unmoved mover. 
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We may now draw a crucial ethical import from all that has been said so far about 
nous: The self as nous is the sort of thing that requires others in order to actualize and 
become aware of itself. 127 DA 111.4 of course does not say that those others need to be 
friends, but friendship still presents a very interesting question: What happens when those 
others are friends? The Nicomachean Ethics answers this question in two places: IX.7, 
and especially in IX.9. Aristotle's claim at DA 429a25 that nous is not actually any real 
thing before it thinks is closely paralleled by certain claims in NE IX.7 and IX.9: "It is by 
our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting" (NE IX.7 l168a6-8); and 
"living seems to be strictly perceiving and thinking" (NE IX.9 1170a19). That these 
claims occur in the context of the value of friendship is no coincidence. Aristotle is 
claiming that friendship has a crucial role to play in self-actualization. This gets argued 
for at length in IX.9, and to a somewhat lesser extent in IX.7. Let us take a closer look, 
then, at these passages, beginning with IX. 9. Aristotle is trying to highlight friendship's 
role in facilitating self-actualization, and as we shall see, he is doing it in a way that 
solves the problem of motivation. 
2.2. Noetic Friendship 
The primary concern of Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 is the puzzle (aporia) regarding 
self-sufficiency and friendship - the question of whether the happy person will need 
friends or not. At 1170a13-b13, Aristotle offers a long and rich argument for why the 
127 It is hard to say how this applies to a base person, since a base person is a self but not a nous. I've 
argued that Aristotle's view is that a base person is an inferior self because his nous does not rule in his 
soul. But he still has a nous, and so he still has a part that represents his superior self. Also, the nous of a 
base person can still perform its cognitive functions (like receiving the form of a perceptible object) 
without ruling in the soul in the way necessary for ethical virtue. So, it is possible that a base person is still 
of such a nature that he requires others in order to actualize and become aware of himself (just like the 
virtuous person, whose nous rules). 
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happy person will need friends. I call this argument 'the argument from nature' since 
Aristotle claims that it is "more suited to nature" (<pVOIKc.:lTepov) and that it shows that a 
good friend is "by nature" (Tij <pvcm) worth choosing for the good person (1170a13-15). 
Commentators have not been sufficiently puzzled by this argument and usually regard it 
as establishing something fairly bland, for instance that friendship is by nature 
intrinsically goOd. 128 However, the argument from nature contains a number of 
unrecognized problems. Once we resolve these problems, we will see that this argument 
actually aims to establish the much stronger and more interesting Aristotelian thesis that 
true friends are a "single soul" (llia 'VUxn).129 
2.2.1. Higher-Order Perception and Aristotle's Use of 'Suna is thanes thai' in IX.9 
But to those who look upon this in a manner more suited to nature 
(<pvOIKwTepov), it looks as though a good friend is by nature (Tlj <pvcm) 
worth choosing for a good person. For, as we have said, what is good by 
nature is, for a good person, good and pleasant in its own right. (NE IX.9 
1170a13-16) 
The argument from nature proceeds as followS: 130 Aristotle first notes that living, 
for human beings, is a power of perception or of thought, and that powers refer back to 
their activities. Therefore, for a human being, living refers chiefly to perceiving or 
thinking (1170a19), i.e. human living consists chiefly in first-order perceiving (or 
thinking). In the next piece of text, 1170a20-26, Aristotle argues that living itself is good 
128 E.g. Kraut (1989, ch. 2.16, esp. page 141), and Whiting (2006,294-297). 
129 Later in section 4 I shall consider the merits of Aristotle's resolution of the aporia regarding self-
sufficiency and friendship. 
130 See Burnett (1900, 428-30), Ross (1925, commentary on 1170bI9), and Gauthier (1970,755-62) for 
formalizations of Aristotle's reasoning in this argument. Like Stern-Gillet (1995, 138), I concentrate 
almost exclusively on the argument's contents. 
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and pleasant in its own right (KaS' miTo). The reason for this is that living has "definite 
order" (WpIO~EVOV), and what has definite order has "the nature of goodness" (Tfjs 
TayaSoO <pvoews) (1170a21-22). Aristotle makes sure to tell us that this is a feature 
peculiar to the good person, and not the bad person, since the life of a bad person lacks 
order (1170a25).l3l 
In the next part of the argument, found in a long stretch of text from 1170a26 to 
b3, Aristotle claims that mental acts (like perceiving) are often accompanied by higher-
order mental acts (e.g. we perceive that we perceive ).132 In short, the main point that 
Aristotle makes in this stretch of text is that since living is good and pleasant, and since 
we perceive that we live, perceiving that we live is good and pleasant. Now, since living 
is first-order perceiving, perceiving that we live is higher-order perceiving. So, higher-
order perceiving is good and pleasant because a) first-order perceiving is good and 
pleasant, and b) it is pleasant to perceive a good existing in oneself (the good here being 
first-order perceiving). 
The stretch of text thus far examined yields the following premises of the 
argument: 
131 WPIOIJEVOV, typically translated as 'definition', is difficult to translate in this context. By claiming that 
the good person's life is WPIOIJEVOV, Aristotle is directing our attention to the fact that the virtuous person's 
soul is fully integrated, and as such, his life's choices are ordered and directed in a way that the base 
person's life's choices are not. The base person is chaotic, wanting one thing at one time, the opposite at 
another time, regretting his decisions because of their badness, etc. 
132 The claim that we perceive that we perceive is, one might say, belabored and over-emphasized in the 
argument, which shows however that Aristotle thinks it rather important. 
But if living itself is good and pleasant... and a seeing man perceives that he sees, a 
hearing man that he hears, a walking man that he walks; and in the other cases similarly 
there is something that is perceiving that we are active, with the consequence that we will 
perceive that we perceive and think that we think. But to perceive that we perceive or to 
think that we think is to perceive or think that we exist (since existing was perceiving or 
thinking); then perceiving that one lives is one sort of thing that is pleasant in its own 
right (since life is by nature a good thing, and to perceive a good actually existing in 
oneself is pleasant). (NE IX.9 1170a25-b3) 
1) Living itself is perceiving and thinking (first-order perceiving) 
(1170aI9). 
2) Living itself is good and pleasant (1170a20). 
3) Mental acts (like perceiving) are accompanied by higher order mental 
acts (we perceive that we perceive) (1170a29-bl). 
4) We perceive that we live (which is higher-order perception). (from 1 & 
3) 
5) If living itself is good and pleasant, then perceiving that one lives is 
good and pleasant (1170a25-b3). 
6) Perceiving that one lives is good and pleasant. (from 1-5) 
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Now I will turn to discussing the next and final stretch of text that generates the 
remaining premises, 1170b3-13. To make things easier, I shall separate this stretch into 
three parts: 
Text A: But living (TO ~iiv) is worth choosing, and especially so for good 
people, because existing (TO eTVat) is good and pleasant for them, since 
they take pleasure in having a shared perception (ovvaloSav6\leVol) of 
what is good in its own right. (1170b3-6) 
Text B: But as a good person is related himself, so must he be also to his 
friend, since a friend is another self. Therefore, in just the same way that 
his own existing is worth choosing to each, so too is his friend's, or nearly 
so (KaScllTep OVV TO av-rov eTvat aipeTov eOTlV eKaOT't), oihc.l Kat TO 
TOV cp(AOV, ti lTapalTAnO(c.lS). But his existing was worth choosing on 
account of his perceiving himself as being good; and this sort of 
perception is pleasant in its own right (TO S' eTvat Tjv aipETOV SIC): TO 
aioSaveoSal aVTOV ayaSov OVTOS, n Se TOla\rn"J a'iOSTJOlS nSeia KaS' 
eaVTrlv.). (1170b3-10) 
Text C: Hence there must also be a shared perception of his friend, that he 
exists, and this would occur by their living life together and sharing in 
discussion and thought (ovvaloSaveoSal apa Sei Kat TOV cp(AOV OTI 
eOTlv, TOVTO Se y(VOIT' av ev Tcil ov~iiv Kat KOIVc.lveiv A6yc.lV Kat 
Slavo(as). (1170bl0-14) 
Text A marks the first time in the argument that Aristotle introduces a thesis of 
choiceworthiness. One crucial feature ofliving (TO ~iiv) that makes it choiceworthy for a 
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good person is the fact that existing (TO eTVat) is good and pleasant for him. 133 What is 
crucial here is that all Text A claims is that living is choiceworthy on account of first-
order perceiving (which is living itself) being good and pleasant. So, simply put, living is 
choiceworthy because it is good and pleasant. 
But things change in Text B. There Aristotle reminds us of something he had 
claimed in NE IX.4 - that someone is related to his friend in the same way that he is 
related to himself because his friend is his other self. And so the existing, or being 
(einai) of one's friend must be choiceworthy in the same way that one's own being is 
choiceworthy. It is this point that leads Aristotle to advance another thesis about 
choiceworthiness according to which what makes one's own existing worth choosing is 
the pleasure found in perceiving oneself as good. The kind of perception being referred 
to here is higher-order perception. Perceiving myself as good amounts to perceiving that 
I am perceiving, since first-order perceiving - what living consists in - is good. Aristotle 
could have just said, "His existing was worth choosing on account of its being good," but 
that would have been a claim far less rich and informative. In Text B, it is not just the 
goodness of life that makes existing choiceworthy, but the perception of the goodness as 
well. 134 If we recall the long passage in which Aristotle first introduced higher-order 
perception, he claimed that one reason why higher-order perception (perceiving that one 
lives) is pleasant is that it is pleasant to "perceive a good existing in oneself' (1l70b2). 
So, what makes existing choiceworthy is the value of higher-order perception, not just 
133 Here it makes sense to read "living" (TO ~fiv) as synonymous with "existing" (TO ETvat), for as Aristotle 
claims in NE IX.7, "It is by our actuality that we exist (eO\.lEV B' eVEPYEic;t), since we exist by living and 
acting (TctJ ~fiv yap KallTpO:TTE1V)" (NE IX.7 1168a6-8). 
134 That this is a special kind of awareness, namely higher-order awareness, is also indicated by Aristotle's 
use ofTOlavTT\ in Ii BI: TOlaVTT\ a'tOST\OIS liBeta KaS' eaVTllv. 
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first-order perception (as Text A had it). It is important to see that Aristotle makes this 
claim immediately after noting that the existence of one's friend must be choiceworthy in 
the same way that one's own existence is choiceworthy. Something about friendship 
leads Aristotle to make this new claim about choiceworthiness. 
We may now add the following steps to the argument from nature: 
7) A friend is another self (alios autos) (1170b7). 
8) As the good person is related to himself, so he is related to his friend 
(1170b6-7). (from 7) 
9) In just the same way that one's own existing is worth choosing, one's 
friend's existence is worth choosing (1170b7-8). (from 7-8) 
10) One's own existence is worth choosing because of the pleasure found 
in perceiving oneself as good (1170b8-9). (from 6) 
And Text C gives us the final step of the argument: 135 
11) There must (Sei) be a shared perception (crvvolcr8avecr801) of one's 
friend, that he exists, and this occurs by their living life together 
(crvsfiv) and sharing in discussion and thought (1170bl0-13). (from 7-
10) 
11) may seem problematic, for it may seem not to follow at all from the preceding 
premIses. But Aristotle does, in fact, infer 11) from 7-10, and he is justified in his 
inference. I shall demonstrate this in due course, but we must now tum to the two 
problematic elements of the argument. Here I shall explain and motivate them, and in 
section II they will be fully examined and resolved. They are: 1) the appeal to the value 
of higher-order perception; and 2) the use of the verb crvvolcr8avecr8ol. The first presents 
135 Stem-Gillet (Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, 139) calls this step an "intennediate conclusion" and 
considers the "final conclusion" to be Aristotle's last remark of the chapter that "anything worth choosing 
for a divinely happy person needs to belong to him, or else in that respect he will be in need. So then, 
anyone who is to be happy will need friends who are good." I will address this piece of text in Section III. 
Though clearly based on things established in the argument from nature, I consider it to be an entirely 
separate argument. What Stem-Gillet calls the intennediate conclusion above, I think is actually the final 
conclusion of a self-contained argument. 
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a philosophical difficulty because the argument from nature does not seem to need it. 
The long stretch of text from 1170a25-b3, in which Aristotle spends much time telling us 
about how we perceive that we perceive, and that there is great value in doing so, is odd. 
It is hard to see how this point about higher-order perception advances an argument 
primarily about what makes friends choiceworthy. In fact, the argument would seem to 
be able to succeed by appealing to the value of first-order perception all the way through. 
Having established that existing (first-order perceiving) is pleasant, Aristotle could have 
just said that one's own existence is choiceworthy because it is good and pleasant. Since 
a friend's existing is choiceworthy in the same way, it too is choiceworthy because it is 
good and pleasant. So why does he place such strong emphasis on higher-order 
perception? 
The second problem presents us with an obscurity. After having established that a 
friend's existence is choiceworthy in the same way as one's own, and that one's own 
existence is choiceworthy because it is pleasant to perceive oneself as good, it would 
seem to follow for Aristotle that a friend's existence is choiceworthy because of how 
pleasant it is to perceive (aio6avEo6al) one's friend as good, and so one should perceive 
(aio6aVEo6m) the existence of one's friend. But Aristotle does not conclude that one 
must perceive - aio6avEo6m - one's friend, but rather that one must O'Vvmo6avEo6al 
one's friend (1170blO-13). This use of the verb ovvalo6aVEo6al is, as one scholar has 
noted, bizarre.136 The prefix 'O'VV' presumably indicates that the word denotes a kind of 
136 See Flakne (2005, 37). I will discuss this tenn in detail later. I shall not make any comparisons with 
other uses of this verb by other authors in the effort to discern the meaning of Aristotle's use of it. That is 
mainly because Aristotle appears to have been the first to use this verb philosophically, and so later Greek 
uses of it won't be of much use in figuring out what Aristotle means by it. LSJ does not give any citations 
of the verb before Aristotle. I have only found, via Flakne (2005, n2), that Plutarch reports that Solon's 
aim in allowing citizens to pursue suits on behalf of other citizens was to engender ovvalo6TiOIS among the 
110 
sharing in perception with another person, such that two people are engaged in perceiving 
the same things. 137 But in the passage at hand, the object of the verb is one's friend (TOU 
cpIAOU), which is why I find it significant that Aristotle chose to use avvata8avea8al 
instead of the ordinary verb for perceiving - aia8avea8at. But what could it mean to 
jointly perceive, or to co-perceive, or to have a shared perception of, one's friend? How 
should we understand and translate avvata8avea8al as it occurs in the argument from 
nature?138 
One way of explaining these obscurities is inspired by an interpretation of the 
relation between self-love and friendship in Aristotle that was refuted in Chapter II, 
namely the interpretation according to which self-love and friendship are isomorphic. As 
Kraut puts it, "friendship towards others 'comes from' self-love in the sense that the latter 
provides the paradigm case of the attitudes characteristic of the former.,,139 Applying this 
to the argument from nature, when Aristotle says that one's own existence is 
choiceworthy because of how pleasant it is to perceive oneself as good (higher-order 
perception), and that one's friend's existence is choiceworthy in the same way, his point 
is simply that just as I find the perception of my own existence pleasant, I find the 
perception of my friend's existence pleasant. A Kraut puts it: 
populace. It is worth noting that, as Sorabji (2005 v.1, 159) notes, Plotinus and the commentators use the 
verb to denote self-awareness and consciousness, and that they borrowed this usage from the Stoics. See 
Warren (1964) for its use in Plotinus. This may be significant, for it may indicate that these later writers 
understood Aristotle to be talking about self-awareness with his use of the verb. 
137 It would seem to have this meaning at EE l244b25 and l245b20. I will discuss those passages later. 
138 The two problems are interrelated, so in what follows I will often move back and forth from talking 
about the one to talking about the other. 
139 Kraut (1989, 132). See also Pangle (2003, 228 n2), Kahn (1981, 22-23), McKerlie (1991, 90-91), 
Annas (1988, 1-2), Whiting (2006), and Pakaluk (1998,166). 
The crucial implicit premise seems to be this: If a certain feature makes X 
desirable for someone to perceive and Y has that same feature, then Y is 
also desirable for him to perceive. Relying on this premise, Aristotle 
moves from the fact that perceiving one's own being is desirable (if one is 
virtuous) to the conclusion that it is also desirable to perceive the being of 
one's friend. 140 
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This interpretation provides a possible explanation for Aristotle's appeal to the 
value of higher-order perception: The fact that the perception is "higher-order" is 
irrelevant. What matters is that a person perceives something that is good. In the case of 
one's own existence, the perception of oneself as good is by its very nature a higher-order 
perception, but it is not the fact that it is higher-order that makes it valuable. What makes 
it valuable is the goodness of what is being perceived, and the pleasure that comes from 
perceiving it. In the case of the existence of one's friend, once again there is something 
that is good (the existence of one's friend), and there is pleasure found in perceiving it. 
In this way, my friend's existence is worth choosing in the same way that my own is 
worth choosing - namely for the reason that they are both good, and perceiving each of 
them is pleasant. On this interpretation, then, there is no appeal made by Aristotle to the 
value of higher-order perception qua higher-order. He only raises the point that we 
perceive that we perceive because it allows him to claim that perceiving a good is 
pleasant, which supports his claim that my own existence and my friend's existence are 
choiceworthy to me in the same way (they are both good, and they are both pleasant to 
perceive). 
Simple and straightforward as this interpretation of the argument is, there are 
strong reasons to doubt its viability. Aristotle is doing much more than observing a 
similarity between self-love and friendship, between the value of one's own existence 
140 Kraut (1989, 141). Cf. Burnet (1900, 430: §1O). 
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and the value of one's friend's existence. To see this, we have to look at the final step of 
the argument and Aristotle's use of ovvalo8aveo8al, and also what immediately 
precedes that step. Consider once more the two steps that immediately precede the 
conclusion of the argument from nature: 
9) In just the same way that one's own existence is worth choosing, one's 
friend's existence is worth choosing. (1170b7-8) 
10) One's own existence is worth choosing because of the pleasure found 
in perceiving oneself as good. (1170b8-9) 
Now, these claims permit Aristotle to conclude that the existence of one's friend is 
choiceworthy because of the pleasure found in perceiving one's friend as good, and to 
use the ordinary verb aio8aveo8al for 'perceiving'. Such a conclusion appears natural, 
and on the Kraut-reading, this is basically all that Aristotle is trying to say - that since 
both my existence and my friend's existence are good, it is pleasant for me to perceive 
both my existence and his. But what Aristotle actually concludes is very different. 
Observe the conclusion once more: 
11) ovvato8aveo8at expa Bei Kai TOU q>IAov chI EaTIV, TOVTO Be YlvolT' 
av EV T4l ov~fjv Kai KOlvwveiv AOYWV Kai Blavolas. 
There must be a shared perception of one's friend, that he exists, and 
this occurs by their living life together and sharing in discussion and 
thought. (NE IX.9 1170bl0-13) 
I will now show that this is simply too rich and complex of a conclusion for its only 
meaning to be that we take pleasure in perceiving (aio8aveo8al) our friends just as we 
take pleasure in perceiving ourselves, and that in this sense the two are choiceworthy in 
the same way. I offer the following reasons in support ofthis claim: 
First, notice that the conclusion contains a normative component (Bei). While it 
looked like Aristotle was going to conclude with a descriptive claim about what makes 
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the existence of one's friend choiceworthy (which is all the Kraut-reading requires), he 
instead concluded with a prescription. 141 Second, notice Aristotle's claim about shared 
living (ov~ilv) - the claim that avvalo8aveo8al of one's friend comes about through 
living together and sharing in discussion and thought. Shared living entails not 
necessarily sharing the same home (as 'living together' might imply), but strictly entails 
the sharing of an active life. It is to take the activities that are constitutive of one's own 
life and to engage in those activities together with a friend. 
Whatever existing is for them, or that for the sake of which they choose 
living- in this they wish to engage in with their friends. For this reason, 
some friends drink together, others play games together, still others take 
exercise and hunt together, or even philosophize together - each group 
spending their time together on whatever thing in life they are most fond 
of. For because they wish to live life with their friends, they do these 
things and share them with those with whom they intend to live. (NE 
IX.12 1172al-9) 
Suppose Aristotle had only meant to convey the point that we take pleasure in perceiving 
(aio8avea8al) our friends just as we take pleasure in perceiving ourselves. Why, then, 
would he have needed to stress the importance of living together and the continual 
sharing in conversation and thought? It does not take much, after all, to simply perceive 
a friend. It certainly does not require the kind of intimacy and constancy implied by 
Aristotle's conception of shared living. This is what makes Kraut's translation of the 
conclusion a faulty one: 
Therefore, one must also perceive that one's friend exists; and this would 
come about through living with him and sharing in conversation and 
thought. (Kraut 1989, 141) 
By treating avvalo8aveo8al as if it were just aio8aveo8al, Kraut has Aristotle 
recommending surgery for something a simple aspirin would take care of. Living with a 
141 I will say more about this point later. 
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friend and sharing in conversation and thought with him would surely make it easy to 
perceive him, but so would spending twenty minutes with him cleaning the garage. 
But what exactly does avvala6avea6at mean as Aristotle uses it here? As 
mentioned earlier, the prefix 'avv' presumably indicates shared activity, as with other 
verbs like av~iiv (shared living), so a neutral and prima facie translation is "to share in 
perception (with another person)". Aristotle's use of this term occurs in both the 
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, and in both treatises the term is used in the context 
of why the self-sufficient person needs friends. Some have tried to make sense of the 
Nicomachean passage in question by looking to the corresponding Eudemian passages in 
which Aristotle uses avvalO6avea6al,142 But I think that this is a faulty strategy, and that 
the two treatises provide for a contrast in this respect, not a comparison. In the Eudemian 
Ethics, Aristotle uses avvalO6avea6al in a way congenial to the neutral translation given 
above to denote different perceivers perceiving the same things together. But in the 
Nicomachean passage in question, the term is used to denote a kind of self-awareness (or 
so I shall argue ),143 
The term occurs twice in the Eudemian Ethics. At the start of EE VII.12, 
Aristotle takes up the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship, noting how both 
sides of the argument - the side that says that the truly self-sufficient person will have no 
need of friends, and the side that says that friends are necessary - have some merit. He 
142 E.g. Kosman (2004), Osborne (2009). 
143 Sorabji (2005 v.l, 159) thinks that it clearly has this meaning in IX.9: "But in the Nicomachean Ethics 
at l170b4-5, Aristotle clearly uses it [the verb sunaisthanethai] for self-awareness, and probably also a few 
lines later at b 1 0, if awareness of the friend's existence in the course of living together and sharing words 
and thoughts flows from awareness of one's own activities as shared." 
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then suggests that the aporia may be solved if we "ascertain what life is in its active 
sense and as end" (BfjAov Be Aa13000l T( TO i;fjv TO KaT' Evspyelav, Ka! ~S TSAOS): 
q>avepov ovv OTI TO aia8avea8al Kat TO yvwp(i;elv, G:laTe Kat TO avi;fjv 
TO avvala8avea8al Kat TO avyyvwpli;elv EaT(v. eaTI Be TO aVTOO 
aia8avea8al Kat TO aVTOv yvwp(i;elv aipeTc':naTOv EKaaTctl, Kat Bla 
TOVTO TOO i;fjv lTCIOlV eJ.lq>VTOS ti ope~IS: TO yap i;fjv Bei Tl8sval YVWOIV 
Tlva. 
Clearly it is perceiving and knowing, with the result that shared living is 
shared-perceiving and shared-knowing. And knowing oneself, and 
perceiving oneself, is most choiceworthy for each, and for this reason the 
desire of life innate in everyone. For it is necessary to regard living as 
some kind of knowledge. 144 
The second occurrence of the term is at 1245b20-24: 
Kat TO i;T)Teiv tiJ.liv Kat evxea8al TTOAAOVS q>(AOVS, clJ.la Be Asyelv ~s 
ou8ets q>(AOS ctl TTOAAOt q>(A01, clJ.lq>W AsyeTal op8ws. EvBexoJ.lsvoV yap 
TTOAAOis avi;fjv clJ.la Ka! avvala8avea8al ~s TTAelOTolS 
aipETwTaTov: ETTe! Be xaAeTTWTaTOv, EV EAaTTOOlv clvaYKT) TtlV 
Evspyelav Tfjs avvala81\aews eTval. 
As to our seeking and praying for many friends, while we say of the 
person with many friends that he has no friend, both are said correctly. 
For if it is possible to live with many people and to share in perception 
with many people at the same time, it is most choiceworthy that these 
should be as many as possible. But since that is most difficult, it is 
necessary for the activity of sharing in perception to exist among fewer. 145 
In both cases, the translation "sharing in perception" is apt, for Aristotle is claiming 
nothing more than that friends perceive the same things together with each other. If 
living for me consists in perceiving, then shared living with another consists in perceiving 
with him. 
But this shows that Aristotle's use of avvala8avea8al in NE IX.9 is very 
different, for in that passage avvalaBavea8al takes as its direct object one's friend - TOO 
144 EE 124424-27, my translation. 
145 MI· Y trans atlon. 
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f'\ "" 146 (N'D I 9 1 <plI\OV OTl ecrTlv .u X. 170blO). Here crvvolcr8avecr8ol denotes an action that one 
person performs on another, not an activity that one engages in with another. This is why 
the simple translation "to share in perception with another" is unsatisfactory for the 
Nicomachean passage. 147 Let <p stand for the activity denoted by crvvatcr8avecr8at. 
There is a difference between the following two claims: 
1) A must <p with B. 
2) A must <p B. 
It is the second claim that Aristotle makes in NE IX.9. 
But what exactly does it mean to crvvatcr8avecr8at another person? This, in part, 
depends on how we understand the 'crvv' in crvvolcr8avecr8at, what we take it to be 
modifying. Taking the standard meaning of the prefix as "with" or "together", the 
sentence could mean one of the following: 
M1: Aristotle is saying that the good person must perceive his friend's 
existence together with his friend. A and B perceive B's existence 
together. 
M2: Aristotle is saying that the good person must perceive his friend's 
existence together with his own existence. A perceives both B's existence 
and A's existence at the same time. 
M2 makes the most sense and is widely agreed upon by commentators to be the meaning 
of the sentence, as is revealed by a number of translations. 148 While M1 provides for a 
146 A paraphrase of this might be "the friend's life". 
147 Notice in EE 1245b20-24 the use of the dative lTOAAOis in EvBexollEvoV yap lTOAAOis ovl,;nv CIlla Kat 
ovvalo8aveo8al indicating that the ovv in ovvalo8aveo8al should be taken with it to mean "perceiving 
with many people". This does not happen in the NE passage, as ovvOlo8aveo8al takes a direct object, 
indicating that we have to understand the ovv differently. 
148 A telling sample: "He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this 
will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought" (Ross - in Barnes 1984, 
1850). - - "In that case, he needs to be concurrently perceiving the friend - that he exists, too - and this will 
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possible reading, no one has argued for it, and it does not follow from the premises of the 
argument. 
Let us now tum to the prescriptive force of the conclusion, and to Aristotle's 
claim that perceiving one's own existence at the same time as one's friend's comes as a 
result of shared living. Let us use Rowe's translation as a guide: 
In that case, he needs (SET) to be concurrently perceiving the friend - that 
he exists, too - and this will come about in their living together, 
conversing, and sharing their talk and thoughts. 149 
What needs to take place is that A perceives his own existence at the same time as he 
perceives B's. This implies that it is not enough that A perceives B's existence and 
nothing more. The exhortation to shared living supports this, since merely perceiving 
someone can occur sufficiently without the sharing of life. But it is still somewhat 
unclear why it is necessary to perceive both the being of one's friend and one's own 
being at the same time. What purpose does the simultaneity serve for the argument? 
And furthermore, it seems possible to perceive one's own being and the being of one's 
friend simultaneously without the constancy and intimacy implied by shared living, so 
there is still the question of how to make sense of Aristotle's exhortation to shared living, 
given its place in the argument. 
To answer these questions, we should focus our attention once more on the 
reasoning of the two steps of the argument that immediately precede the conclusion: 
come about in their living together, conversing, and sharing their talk and thoughts" (Rowe 2002, 238) - -
"He must, then, perceive his friend's being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live 
together and share conversation and thought" (Irwin 1999, 150) - - "Therefore we ought to have a 
sympathetic consciousness of the existence of our friend, and this can arise by means of living together 
with him, and sharing words and thoughts with him" (Grant 1885, 305) - - Early in the paper I used 
Pakaluk's translation because it is neutral between Ml and M2: "Hence there must also be a shared 
perception of his friend, that he exists, and this would occur by their living life together and sharing in 
discussion and thought" (Pakaluk 1998, 39). 
149 Rowe (2002,238). 
9) In just the same way that one's own existence is worth choosing, one's 
friend's existence is worth choosing. (1170b7-8)150 
10) One's own existence is worth choosing because of the pleasure found 
in perceiving oneself as good. (1170b8-9) 
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As previously mentioned, these two premises set the stage for a claim about the way in 
which the existence of one's friend is choiceworthy. The fact that the conclusion states 
that there is a need to perceive one's friend's existence at the same time as one's own 
strongly suggests that such 'simultaneous perception' is what makes it the case that one's 
friend's existence is choiceworthy in the same way as one's own. This is why Aristotle is 
justified in inferring step 11) from steps 7) - 10). When A is able to perceive B's 
existence simultaneously with his own existence, the two are choiceworthy to A in the 
same way. 
I propose, then, a slightly different way of interpreting the meaning of the 
conclusion. I still follow Rowe et al. in interpreting the 'crvv' in crvvotcrSavecrSai as 
conjoining the existence of one's friend with one's own existence. However, I interpret 
"perceiving one's friend's existence simultaneously with one's own" as equivalent to 
"perceiving one's friend's existence and one's own existence together as one." This is 
the appeal to the "single soul". Consider the following passage from the Eudemian 
Ethics: 
For the friend wants, if possible, not merely to feel pain along with his 
friend, but to feel the same pain, e.g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if 
that could be, as closely as possible. The same words are applicable to 
joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign 
of friendship. Further, we say about friendship such things that friendship 
is equality, and true friends a single soul. (Eudemian Ethics 1240a36-
1240b9) 
ISO This claim is qualified in the text by lTapalTATJo[t.)S. I shall later discuss the difficulties this poses. 
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Analogously to the claim about pain, I think that Aristotle would want to claim that the 
friend wants not merely to perceive his own existence along with his friend's existence, 
but to perceive the two as the same existence. 
Obviously this is a strong reading of the conclusion. But there is a great 
advantage in interpreting the conclusion in this way. Namely, it makes better sense o/the 
argument from nature. The appeal to higher-order perception no longer presents a 
difficulty, the use of crvvatcr8avecr8at is no longer obscure and mysterious, and 
Aristotle's exhortation to shared living makes a lot more sense. If to crvvolO8avecr801 
one's friend means to perceive the existence of one's friend and one's own existence 
together as one, then perceiving a friend's existence is the same as perceiving one's own 
existence, and therefore perceiving a friend's existence is a higher-order perception. In 
other words, to make my friend's perceiving the object of my perception is, in a way, to 
make my own perceiving the object of my perception. When I crvvolO8avecr8at my 
friend, I have a higher order perception of the existence that is ours. We can therefore 
make better sense of Aristotle's peculiar obsession with higher-order perception on this 
interpretation. One's own existence is choiceworthy, in large part, due to the value of 
higher-order perception, and Aristotle insists that one's own and one's friend's existence 
are choiceworthy in the same way. This is why it matters that to perceive a friend is, in a 
way, to perceive oneself. 151 Such 'simultaneous perception' is that at which the best kind 
of friendship aims. 
This interpretation, in addition, is well supported by Aristotle's claims regarding 
nous in De Anima 111.4. I noted earlier that Aristotle's claim at DA 429a25 that nous is 
151 "Therefore, to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know a friend to know 
one's self' (EE 1245a35). 
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not actually any real thing before it thinks is closely paralleled by certain claims in NE 
IX.7 and IX.9: "It is by our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting" 
(NE IX.7 1168a6-8); and "living seems to be strictly perceiving and thinking" (NE IX.9 
1170aI9). I claimed that Aristotle held that friendship has a crucial role to play in self-
actualization. Now we may say what that role is. If nous can only actualize itself by 
becoming something else, and it is only in gaining awareness of this, its object, that it can 
gain awareness of itself, naturally the question arises of what happens when one nous 
apprehends another nous, as in the case of friendship. As Stem-Gillet notes, it can be 
inferred that friendship involves the "noetic conflation of the friends' selves". J52 I would 
add that the conflation results in a single actuality - the substance of Aristotle's "single 
soul". Aristotle is claiming that friendship has a crucial role to play in self-realization, 
but not in the kind of way that provides grist for the mill for those who think that 
Aristotelian friendship is fundamentally egoistic. I'd prefer to call it wegoistic. In 
friendship, it is not that I use my friend to actualize myself, or that he uses me to actualize 
himself. Rather, through joint activity, it is a single self that is actualized. And in 
perception, when one friend engages in the activity denoted by the verb avvata8avm8at, 
he perceives the existence of that single self. 
Furthermore, it makes much more sense on this interpretation that Aristotle would 
immediately appeal to the importance of shared living (avt;iiv). I posed this question 
earlier: If Aristotle had only meant to convey the point that we take pleasure in 
152 For an alternative view on the role of nous in friendship, see Kahn (19S1), who argues that the nous that 
Aristotle speaks of in NE IX.4 and IX.S is the same as the active-nous of the notoriously cryptic De Anima 
111.5 passage, in which Aristotle posits the existence of an active, universal nous which is causally 
responsible for the thinking of each of us without being essentially identified by its relationship with us. 
For pointed criticisms of Kahn's view, see Benson (1990, 6S), and Pangle (2003, 240 n1S). 
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perceiving (alOeaVeOeOl) our friends just as we take pleasure in perceiving ourselves, 
why would he have needed to stress the importance of living together and the continual 
sharing in conversation and thought? Merely perceiving a friend does not require the 
kind of intimacy and constancy implied by Tc';l av~fiv Kat KOlvwvelV AOYWV Kat 
5lavo(as (1170bll).153 
But to perceive one's own existence and the existence of one's friend together as 
one - that takes precisely the kind of time, intimacy and constancy required by shared 
living and shared conversation and thought. It is this shared living that provides for the 
metaphysical fact of oneness, which makes sunaisthanesthai possible. Aristotle repeats 
this point in IX.12: 
KOIVwVta yap i) <plAta, Kat WS' lTPOS' eaVTOV EXel, OVTW Kal lTPOS' TOV 
<p(AOV' lTepi atrrov 5' i) a'iOellOlS chI EOTIV aipeT1'), Kai lTepi TOV <p(AOV 
5ri' i) 5' Evepyela y(veTOl mJTfiS' EV Tc';l av~fiv' ~OT' eiKoTwS' TOVTOV 
153 Irene Liu, in correspondence, suggests that I may be unnecessarily restricting myself by confining the 
meaning of aisthanesthai and sunaisthanesthai to physical perception, a point Professor Morrison has also 
once brought up in conversation. [Liu has written on this topic. See Liu (2010).] She writes: 
"Do you mean literally seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. a person? Is it a kind of (for lack of 
a better word) physical perception of a physical thing? I ask this because it seems to me 
that a clarification of what it means to simply perceive oneself or a friend would go some 
ways towards elucidating what it means to jointly perceive. Indeed, the physical 
conception of perception seems also to be implicit in your understanding of sunaisthesis. 
For instance, you claim that sunaisthesis must be done at the same time, presumably 
meaning that the friends must be physically together. But is this what you mean? If it is, 
I wonder whether you're unnecessarily restricting yourself. Your suggestion seems to be 
that joint perception is a temporally- and spatially-bounded physical act. But living 
together, as you say, is a much richer concept than simply living in the same house, say. 
In that case, why restrict yourself to simultaneity (and physical proximity)? Aristotle 
seems to be nudging us away from that conception when he denies that our living 
together is like grazing cattle." 
In response: I don't intend to restrict myself to physical perception, but I do think that physical perception 
deserves very special emphasis in the argument. Here is why - and I actually don't think that Aristotle is 
nudging us away from that conception when he denies that our living together is like grazing cattle. At the 
very start of NE IX.12, Aristotle gives a brief recap of the central claims of the argument from nature 
(1l71b30-1172a), and he says that for friends, just as for lovers, seeing (TO opCiv) is the most precious 
form of perception and that it is through seeing that love exists and comes to be, and he links this up with 
av~iiv. This does not mean that there are not other kinds of perception denoted by aisthanesthai. but just 
that seeing is the most important. It is true that living together is a much richer concept than simply living 
in the same house (or pasture in the case of those grazing animals Aristotle is so fond of referencing), but I 
have always taken that point to follow from the fact that living together involves sharing in discussion and 
thought. 
E<p(eVTal. (NE IX.12 1171b32-35) 
For friendship is holding things in common, and as a friend is related to 
himself, so is he also to his friend; but in his own case the perception that 
he exists is worth choosing; hence also in the case of his friend· but its 
. , 
actualIty comes about through their living life together; so naturally they 
aim at this. (NE IX.12 1171b32-35) 
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Again he makes the point that in order for the existence of one's friend to be 
choiceworthy in the same way as one's own, shared living and activity must take place. 
And this time he refers to what results from shared living as an Evepyela. Only through 
shared living can the noetic conflation - the Evepyela of the single soul - be sustained. 
And this is precisely why friends "aim" at av~fiv - because it provides for the possibility 
of ovvalo8aveo8al, thus making it so that one's friend's existence is choiceworthy in the 
same way as one's own. The argument from nature, then, makes a strong appeal to the 
idea that friends are a kind of unity - a "single soul", as Aristotle puts it. In the next 
section, I explain just what kind of unity this is. 
2.3. Unity. Reciprocal Shaping. and the Metaphysics of the Single Soul 
It was argued in section 2.1.2 that according to Aristotle, the virtuous person is a 
self in the fullest sense because the non-rational part of his soul agrees with his rational-
part. So for Aristotle, to be a self in the fullest sense is to be a kind of unity - a psychic 
unity in the sense that nous rules the appetites and in addition the appetites are in full 
agreement with nous. 154 This 'unity' aspect of selfhood, for Aristotle, has important 
154 In contrast, base people are not unities due to psychic conflict. Those who suffer from weakness of will 
"abandon themselves" (NE VII.8 1151al), while the vicious are "at odds with themselves" (NE IX.4 
1166b7). Since we have determined that Aristotle thinks that base people are still selves, we should read 
those remarks in quotations as meaning that base people abandon their true selves, or the selves that they 
ought to be caring for but are not caring for. It should also be noted that Aristotle creates trouble for 
himself by describing the vicious person in this way, for the description conflicts with that of the vicious 
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implications for friendship and his view that friends are a single soul. As we saw in 
Chapter II, Aristotle derives friendship to others from friendship to oneself in IXA. Self-
love is the model on which friendship is based. With respect to unity, the point is that 
just as the good person is a kind of unity unto himself, so is the best type of friendship a 
kind of unity unto itself. Just as the good person "agrees with himself' and "desires the 
same things with his entire soul", so do good people who are friends - other selves to one 
another - agree in the same way, and desire the same things in the same way. 
As Benson notes, the way to draw the analogy is not: as the parts of the soul are 
related in the individual, so the separate persons are related in friendship. Rather, the 
analogy is: "as the rational part of the individual is to his non-rational part, so the united 
rational parts of the partnership are to its united non-rational parts" (1990, 54). I agree 
with Benson that what underlies the reflexive relationship of the good man to himself is 
"a certain psychic structure, a relationship between elements which are defined by their 
functions in the life of the organism," and that "in friendship two individuals become 
united in such a way that they embody a single psychic structure of this kind, 'a single 
soul'" (1990, 54). The question to be raised now is: In what sense of "one" are these 
souls one? I shall show that we can find in Aristotle's discussions of unity in 
Metaphysics Delta and Iota a description of the very sense of unity that applies here. 
2.3.1. Types of Unity in Metaphysics I:l & I 
In Metaphysics Delta, Aristotle's philosophical dictionary, Aristotle distinguishes 
between two broad classes of things called "one" Citv): 1) that which is one by accident 
person in VII.8. In that chapter, Aristotle says that the intemperate person "is not prone to regret, since he 
abides by his decision when he acts. But every incontinent is prone to regret" (NE VII.8 l150b30-3l). For 
good discussions of this problem, see Martin (1990) and Pakaluk (2002). 
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(KaTCx aVIl!3e!3TJKos); 2) that which is one by its own nature (KaS' a\JTo).ISS For two 
things to be one by accident is for one of them to be a substance and the other to be a 
quality (and so, an accident) of that substance. Aristotle gives his standard example of 
'musical' being predicated of 'Corsicus'. Musical Corsicus is one with Corsicus 
"because one of the parts in the formula is an accident of the other, i.e. musical is an 
accident of Cor sic us" (Met. 8.6 l015b24-25). Aristotle calls this kind of unity accidental 
because Corsicus would still be Corsicus even ifhe were not musical (Met. 8.9 l017b32-
1018a2). 
Accidental unity cannot be the kind of unity Aristotle has in mind when he says 
that friends are one. Clearly he does not construe the friendship relation between two 
individuals as an instance of the substance-accident relation, for that would mean that one 
friend is an accident, the other a substance, and the one friend an accident of the other. 
Such a construal would be anathema to Aristotle's insistence that character-friendship is a 
friendship between equals. To call one friend the substance and the other the accident of 
that substance would subordinate the friend-as-accident to an inferior role. We must, 
then, examine what Aristotle has to say about the things that are one by nature. 
With respect to the things that we call one by nature, Aristotle begins his 
discussion by claiming that anything continuous is one, and offers as an example a 
bundle of pieces of wood held together by glue (Met. ~.6 1016b32). Still more oneness is 
found in those things that are continuous by nature and so by nature have one movement 
ISS Met. 1::..6 l015b16-17. 
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and cannot have any other, like anns and legs (Met. 1:1.6 l016a3-6).156 In these cases, the 
entity has unity in virtue of its body being continuous. In another sense, an entity is 
called one in virtue of its matter not differing in kind and being indivisible in kind. 157 So, 
"wine is said to be one and water is said to be one, qua indivisible in kind; and, on the 
other hand, all juices, e.g. oil and wine, are said to be one, and so are all things that can 
be melted, because the ultimate substratum of all is the same; for all of these are water or 
air" (Met. 1:1.6 l016a2l-24). And in another sense, those things that are one in genus 
(yevos) are said to be one. Horse, man, and dog - Aristotle says - are one because all are 
animals (Met. 1:1.6 l016a26). Finally, things are one when the fonnula which states the 
essence of one is indivisible from the fonnula which states the essence of the other 
(1016a32-l016b5). Aristotle's first example of this seems to be of a single individual 
which can grow larger or smaller and yet remain the same individual, the idea being that 
the fonnula which states the essence (0 Aeyos 0 TO Tl Tjv elVa! Aeywv) of him when he 
is large is the same as the fonnula which states the essence of him when he is small. Qua 
h d d . f d· . . d· 158 man, e oes not a mIt 0 IVISIon, an so IS one man. 
In a summary statement, Aristotle then claims: 
The things that are primarily called one are those whose substance (ovola) 
is one - and one either in continuity or in fonn (E'(OE1) or in fonnula 
(AeYe:+»; for we count as more than one either things that are not 
156 The things that are continuous by nature, Aristotle says, are more one (\.HIAAOV EV) than the things 
continues by art. This shows that Aristotle thinks that unity comes in degrees, an important point that I will 
draw heavily on later when describing the unity offriendship. 
157 Met. 8.6 IOI6a18-20. 
158 I follow Kirwan's commentary in making these points about what it means to be one in fonnula (1993, 
138). 
continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those whose formula is not 
one. 159 
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I follow Kirwan (1993, 138) in reading this passage as saying that substance is used in 
three senses, and that the primary unities are things whose bodies are one in continuity, 
whose matter is one in kind, or whose what-it-is-to-be is one in formula. 160 
Aristotle's paradigm case of unity seems to be of a single entity, like an individual 
human being, a house, an arm or a leg. A man, for instance, is continuous; his matter is 
one in kind, and the formula that states his essence is indivisible and unchanging. 
Aristotle must have this kind of case in mind when he, apparently in summary, later 
identifies 'one in number' as a category of unity (1016b31-35). In that apparent 
summary, he says: 
Again, some things are one in number (cipI8\lov), others in form (ETBoS), 
others in genus, others by analogy;161 in number those whose matter is one 
(cipl8\lctJ \lEV WV Ti vAn), in form those whose formula is one, in genus 
those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those 
which are related as one thing is to another. The latter kinds of unity are 
always found when the former are, e.g. things that are one in number are 
one in form, while things that are one in form are not all one in number. 
Kirwan (1993, 139) finds this paragraph "intrusive" since it conflates 'one in form' with 
'one in formula' and adds that things numerically different may be the same in form, 
which was previously glossed over. Aquinas, in his commentary, says that here Aristotle 
is giving "another way of dividing unity, and this division is rather from the viewpoint of 
159 Met. 11.6 l016b7-11. 
160 As Kirwan (1993, 138) notes, those things that are one in genus are probably meant in a secondary 
sense to fall under those things whose matter is one in kind (eidos). Aristotle says anything that is one in 
genus "is in a way similar to that in which the matter is one" (l 0 16b27). 
161 I will have nothing to say in the main text about analogical unity. Aristotle does not say very much 
about it. X and Y and one by analogy of they are related to some unified thing Z. It is clear that Aristotle 
thinks that friends are a unity by some analogy to the unity found in the individual person, but surely to just 
leave it at that would be question begging. 
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logic" (V. L.8:C 876). At any rate, this passage is important because in it Aristotle 
recognizes that oneness is applicable not just to a single entity, but also to a plurality of 
entities, since two entities can be one in form but not one in number. We can ask in what 
sense a single entity is one with itself, and we can also ask in what sense two entities are 
one with each other. So, in the primary sense of unity - Socrates is one with himself. In 
presumably a secondary sense, Socrates is one with Aristotle insofar as both are the same 
in kind (both are rational animals), and insofar as the formula which states the essence of 
Socrates is the same as the formula which states the essence of Aristotle (again, both are 
rational animals). 
Of these senses of unity, none of them describes the unity that is friendship. 
Clearly friends cannot be one in number, so this sense of unity must be ruled out as a 
possible application to friendship. So, friends are not a single substance, whether in the 
sense of one continuous thing, one material thing, or one thing whose essence is 
indivisible. Friends are two people, and they're not literally held together by glue.162 
Nor are they a single piece of flesh. As Aristotle is reported by Diogenes to have said, 
the "single soul" dwells in two bodies. We should therefore not attribute to him the view 
that there is some deep and mysterious metaphysical sense in which friends are a single 
substance and not numerically distinct. And as should be clear, unity in genus cannot be 
the unity that is characteristic of friendship. Horse, man, and dog - Aristotle says - are 
one because all are animals (Met. 8.6 1016a26). Obviously this is too weak to be the 
kind of unity that Aristotle has in mind for friendship, for it would mean that being 
animals is what essentially makes for the friendship between my friend and me. But 
162 Even if they were, being held together by glue could hardly be the essence of friendship. 
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surely it is more than that. And for this reason, we cannot say that two numerically 
distinct friends are one in the sense of possessing the same formula which states their 
essences. This, too, would be too weak, for it would mean that "being rational animals" 
is what essentially makes for friendship between my friend and me. This does not suffice 
to distinguish a friendship from other associations and relationships. 163 
Fortunately, there is another sense of unity found in both books Delta and Iota 
that is applicable to friendship. In il.9, Aristotle discusses sameness (TaVTOTTJS). Just as 
he did with oneness, he draws a distinction between accidental sameness and by-nature 
sameness, and he then claims: 
Ta Se KaS' atlTa ooaXWOlTep Kat TO EV: Kat yap wv Ti vATJ ~(a tl e'(Sel tl 
apIS~C:;> TallTa AeyeTal Kat WV Ti ouo(a ~ia, ~OTe cpavepov chi Ti 
TaVTOTTJS EVOTTJS T(S EOTIV tl lTAelovc.uv TOO elval tl chav xpiiTal WS 
lTAeioO"lv, oTov chav AEY'J aUTO aVTC:;> TaUTOV: WS SVOt yap xpiiTal 
aUTC:;>. 
Things are said to be the same by their own nature in as many ways as 
they are said to be one; for both the things whose matter is one either in 
kind or in number, and those whose substance is one, are said to be the 
same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a kind of unity of the being of either 
more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, 
i.e. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two. (Met. 
h..9 IOI8a8-l0) 
So, we can ask of a single entity whether and in what sense it is the same, and we can ask 
of a plurality of entities whether and in what sense they are the same. This gets repeated 
at Met. 1.3 1054a33-1054b3, where Aristotle says that "the same" has several meanings 
163 In addition, though he recognizes at Met. 1:1.9 1018a6 that two numerically distinct pieces of matter can 
be the same in kind, he can't mean that two friends are a unity in the sense that they share the same kind of 
matter (i.e. both friends are flesh and bone, and so one in that way). If that were the case, then all flesh-
and-bone humans would have to be considered friends. 
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and that we sometimes mean "the same numerically", so ''you are one with yourself'; 
other times we mean the same only in formula, so equal straight lines are the same.164 
Aristotle, then, treats sameness as a kind of unity.165 He thinks that ways to be 
qualitatively the same are ways to be one. This is confirmed in Met. 1.3, the chapter in 
which Aristotle attempts to explain the various ways in which the one (TO EV) and the 
many (Ta lTOAAa) are opposed. There he tells us that the same (TmiTo), the like 
(OJ.lOlOV), and the equal (iaov) belong to the one,166 while the other (hepov), the unlike 
(aVoJ.lOlOV), and the unequal (avlaov) belong to the many.167 These same concepts are 
discussed in the remainder of 11.9, and here I would like to focus on Aristotle's 
discussion of the ways in which things are called other (hepa) and like (OJ.lOla).168 
hepa Be Mynal C!)v ii Ta e'iB." lTAeiw ii Ti VA." ii 0 AOYOS Tiis ova(as. 
Things are called other if either their kinds or their matters or the formulae 
of their substance are more than one. (Met. 11.9 1018alO-ll) 
164 "We call a thing the same if it is one both in formula and in number, e.g. you are one with yourself both 
in form and in matter; and again, if the formula of its primary substance is one, e.g. equal straight lines are 
the same ... " (1054a34-b2) 
165 See Kirwan (1993, 150). Cf. Aquinas (X. L.4:C 1999). 
166 See Met. 1.3 1054b30. He uses the phrase eOTI SE TOO !lEV eves to express this point. This may be a 
partitive genitive, indicating that the same, the like, and the equal are "parts of the one". He uses the same 
sort of genitive to say that the other, unlike, and unequal belong to the many: TOO SE lTArj6ovs. 
167 According to Aquinas' understanding of Met. 1.3: " ... those things are the same which are one in 
substance; those things are like which are one in quality; and those are equal which are one in quantity" (X. 
L.4:C 1999). This is tricky and bound to be misleading, because two numerically distinct substances can 
still be one in kind. So, Socrates and Aristotle are the same insofar as they are both rational animals, but 
insofar as they are numerically distinct, they belong in the category of other. 
168 He also discusses the senses in which things are called different (SlClcpopa), which also comes up in 
10ta.3. Interestingly, the unlike (avo!lolov) is quickly glossed over in both Delta.9 and lota.3. In Delta.9, 
Aristotle just says that the uses of 'unlike' correspond to the uses of 'like' in the last sentence of the 
chapter. 
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One inference licensed by this passage is that two individuals (say, two friends) may be 
called "other" insofar as they are numerically distinct.169 But as we have seen, mere 
numerical distinctness does not preclude the possibility of unity. So, just because two 
friends are O:AAOI or ETEPOl170 does not mean that unity cannot exist among them. 
What that unity consists of, I claim, is given in Aristotle's discussion of the like: 
O~Ola AeYETal Tel TE lTelVTlJ TaVTO lTElTovS6Ta, Kat TO: lTAefw TaVTO: 
lTElTovS6Ta ft ETEpa, Kat WV Ti lTOI6TT)S ~Ia: Kat KaS' ooa aAAOIOVOSal 
Ev5eXETal T&V EvaVTiwv, TO\hwv TO lTAEiw EXOV ft KVplc.:lTEpa O~OIOV 
TOlhct:>. 
Those things are called like which have the same affections 171 in every 
respect, those which have more affections the same than different, or those 
whose quality is one. And that which shares with another thing the greater 
number or more important of the attributes (each of them one of two 
contraries) in respect of which thin~s are capable of altering, is like that 
other thing. (Met. 8.9 1018a15-19)1 2 
Several senses of likeness are presented in this passage, some with more clarity than 
others. 173 But one sense of likeness that is perfectly clear from this passage is this: 
sameness in affections. Aristotle's view is that two numerically distinct beings are 
unified insofar as they are o~Ola, and are o~ola insofar as they share the same affections, 
169 See Aquinas (V. L.12:C 913). 
170 hEPOS aUTOS is used once in NE IX.9 in the claim that the friend is another self; the remaining 
occurrences of the other-self claim use aUos autos. 
171 I slightly amend Ross' translation here by using "affection" as a translation of TIETTov90Ta. He uses 
"attribute" . 
172 Cf. Met. 1.3 1054b4-14: "".Other things are called like if the qualities they have in common are more 
numerous than those in which they differ - either the qualities in general or the prominent qualities ... " 
173 There would seem to be five: Two things are ollola, according to Aristotle, if: 1) they have all the same 
characteristics; 2) most of their characteristics are the same; 3) they have one (and only one) and the same 
quality; 4) most of their potentially alterable characteristics that are one of two contraries are the same; 5) 
of the more important potentially alterable characteristics that are one of two contraries, they share all of 
them. The first three are pretty clear. 4) and 5) are difficult and unclear. The example Aquinas gives of 5) 
is this: "For example, garlic, which is hot and dry, is said to be more properly like fire than sugar, which is 
hot and moist" (V. L.12:C 920). 
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or at least most of the same affections. It is significant that Aristotle uses TTETTov8oTa to 
express what might also be translated as "attribute" or "quality" in this context.174 It is a 
word that he uses in the context of friendship too. The beneficiaries from NE IX.7 are 
"those having been treated well" (TOVS EV TTETTov8oTas), and they are contrasted with the 
benefactors who make them well (oi EV TTETTOlTJKOTES). As we shall see, it this kind of 
unity - affective unity - that is characteristic of friendship. 
Friends of the best kind, according to Aristotle, share the same traits, 
characteristics, qualities, etc., and their unity consists in this. Now, this may sound 
unimpressive right now, for one might think that the kind of unity needed to solve the 
problem of motivation in the way that I have suggested Aristotle solves it is much 
stronger than mere sameness in traits. I aim to assuage this worry in the next section. 
The notion of unity that I have identified in Metaphysics Delta in this section is 
buttressed and significantly strengthened by Aristotle's argument in NE IX.7, and also by 
key passages in NE IX.12. The unity that I claim is characteristic of friendship is the 
result of a certain kind of process that I call reciprocal shaping - a process that has 
important normative consequences. 
2.3.2. Affective Unity and Reciprocal Shaping inNE IX.7&12: Introductory Remarks 
As noted in Chapter II, in NE IX.7 Aristotle seeks to explain why benefactors 
seem to love their beneficiaries more than their beneficiaries love them. Some seek to 
explain this phenomenon by likening benefactors and beneficiaries to creditors and 
debtors: " ... when loans are made, debtors wish that their creditors did not exist, but 
174 Ross uses "attribute". 
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lenders go so far as to provide for the safety of people indebted to them, so too 
benefactors wish their beneficiaries to exist with the intent of gleaning favors, whereas 
the latter have no concern with making repayment" (NE IX.7 1167b21-25). Aristotle 
rejects this explanation and claims that the paradigm more suited to the nature of a 
benefactor and his beneficiary is that of a maker and his work. If the work were to come 
alive, it would not love its maker as much as its maker loves it. "This is the sort of thing, 
then, that the case of benefactors is in fact like: that which has been treated well (TO EV 
lTElTOv8oS) is their work; thus they cherish this more than the work does its maker" (NE 
IX.7 1168a3-5). And the explanation of this is as follows: 
1) Existing is, for everyone, worth choosing and 10vable.175 
2) It is by our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting. 
3) The work is, somehow, its maker in actuality. (evEpYEf<;x OE 0 lTOlrlOaS 
TO EPYOV EOTI lTWS') 
4) Hence, he is fond of his work - for the reason that (OIOTI) he loves 
existing. And this is natural, because what he is potentially, his work 
reveals in actuality. (NE IX.7 1168a5-8) 
One question we have not quite asked yet is: Why compare the relationship of 
friends to the relationship of a maker and his product? It seems like a faulty comparison, 
as it relegates one friend to a superior and the other to an inferior role. 176 But the 
friendship of those alike in virtue is supposed to be one of equality. The comparison to 
maker and product, however, is one of the most powerful comparisons that Aristotle 
makes in his account of ph ilia. What Aristotle does not particularly emphasize in IX. 7, 
175 Aristotle is being slightly inconsistent here, for he elsewhere denies that the base person's existence is 
worth choosing (NE IX.4). So, not everyone's existence is worth choosing. 
176 And, as Pakaluk notes, the sort of regard that craftsmen typically have for their products "is different in 
kind from the devotion they have to persons" (1998, 187). 
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but what no doubt still holds true, is that friendship involves reciprocity.177 What we 
must keep in mind about the argument of IX. 7 is that in a friendship, each friend is at 
once both benefactor and beneficiary, both the maker and the made. From my own point 
of view, I am mere potential, while my friend is me in actuality. But from my friend's 
point of view, he is mere potential, while I am him in actuality. As I shape the identity of 
my friend and the good-making features of his life, simultaneously he shapes mine. This 
is reciprocal shaping, the process by which friends become affectively unified - a single 
soul. 
Friendship truly is about, according to Aristotle, shaping and being shaped by and 
coming to be like each other. 178 Further confirmation of this is found in NE IX.12: 
ylVETat OVV it \leV TWV cpaVAc:.uv cplAla \lOX8TJPcX (KOIVc:.uVOVOl yap 
cpaVAc:.uv cX(3e(3alol OVTES, Kai \loX8TJpoi Be ylvovTal O\lOIOV\lEVOI 
clAAtlAOIS), it Be TWV eTTlEIKWV eTTlEIKtlS, ovvav~aVO\levTJ Tars o\lIAlaIS· 
BOKOVOI Be Kai (3EATlovs ylvEo8al eVEpyovVTES Kai BIOp8ovVTES 
clAAtlAOVS· cllTO\lcXTTOVTal yap lTap' clAAtlAc:.uv oTs clpeOKOVTal, 88EV 
"eo8Awv \leV yap alT' eo8AcX". (NE IX. 12 1172al1-14) 
And so it happens that the friendship of bad people is bad. For they share 
bad things and are unstable, and they become thoroughly bad in coming to 
be like each other (O\lOIOV\lEVOI). But the friendship of good people is 
good, since it continues to develop as they associate, and they seem to 
become even better people through their activity by mutual correction, 
since they copy each other in what they find pleasing, which is the source 
of the saying, 'noble things from noble men'. (NE IX.12 1172all-14)179 
What happens when bad people become friends? - Reciprocal shaping: both friends 
coming to be like (O\lOlOV\lEVOI) each other. Obviously we can see why this would be a 
177 See NE VIII.2 1155b27-1156a6. 
178 Konstan's very awkward translation of alios autos as "another selfsame" is actually quite appropriate 
(see Konstan 2001, 198). 
179 Cf. NE VIII.5 1157b21-25, where it is implied that "enjoying the same things" is necessary for 
friendship. 
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bad thing among the base, but it is of course a fine and proper thing among good people, 
for they come to be like each other in goodness of character. The key terms in the above 
passage - EVEPYOVVTES, 810p8oVVTES, CxTTO~aTTOVTat - poignantly evoke how friends 
mold and sculpt each other's character and come to be like one another ("they copy each 
other in what they find pleasing"), something to be expected over the course of sharing 
their lives with each other in a friendship.180 And living together with a friend provides 
for, as Aristotle says, a "training ground for virtue" (yivOITo 8' av Kat clO'KT]O'iS TIS TfjS 
apETfjs EK TOV O'vsfjv TOYS aya8oys).181 
The fact that the unity is reciprocally shaped is quite crucial, for it is not merely 
sameness in character traits that epitomizes friendship. It is also, crucially, the fact that 
friends mold those traits into each other over the course of shared living. It is by this 
molding that each friend shapes his own self into the other. As a result of this reciprocal 
shaping, friends develop mutually shared interests, viewpoints, etc. that only could have 
developed from such reciprocal shaping as it took place in their friendship.182 In this 
way, friends owe the value of their lives to each other. So while friends are numerically 
separate, the eudaimonia of one friend is not separate from that of the other. 183 
180 Burnet (1990, 436) notes that 6:1To~.l(hTOVTal "is properly used of wax taking the impress of a seal." 
Grant (1885, 311) translates: 'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like.' 
181 NE IX.9 1170all-12. He actually attributes this saying to Theognis, but he clearly agrees with it. 
182 That the shaping is reciprocal is significant, as I have been stressing, for it shows why the friendship of 
unequals is unequal. In a father-son relationship, for Aristotle, the shaping only goes one way (father to 
son). 
183 Given just how strong of a conception of friendship this is, and how it culminates in IX.9, it is worth 
mentioning that in the very next chapter - IX.l 0 - Aristotle raises the question of how many friends one 
can and should have. He doesn't give a number, but comes very close to saying that ifthere is a number, it 
might just be one. He compares friendship to romantic love (epo:v), noting that romantic love is for one 
person (NEIX.IO 1171aI2-15). 
135 
2.3.3. Three Kinds of Shaping 
In this section I attempt to flesh out the notion of reciprocal shaping and elaborate 
on its significance. There are many ways in which we may understand Aristotle's claim 
that friends "seem to become even better people through their activity (evEPyovVTES) by 
mutual correction (Slop8ovVTES), since they copy each other in what they find pleasing 
(cnrolloTTovTal)" (NE IX.12 1172all-14). I suggest that it implies three different kinds 
of shaping: Simple, Complex, and Evaluative. I explain each of these in what follows. 
(i) Simple Shaping 
Simple shaping is just the passing on of a character trait from one friend to 
another. John has, say, trait A and Sally has trait B. After reciprocal simple shaping, 
John has A and B and Sally has A and B. Suppose John loves the game of tennis while 
Sally loves the game of baseball. Through the friendship, John comes to love baseball, 
and Sally comes to love tennis. This sort of shaping is significant, and important, and 
contributes to the formation of affective unity, but it is not the only sort of shaping that 
happens in a friendship. 
(ii) Complex Shaping 
Complex shaping happens when the traits that each friend has interact with each 
other in such a way that new, mutually shared, traits are formed. So, together through 
ovsiiv, John and Sally develop a love for things that each of them might have had no real 
interest in before. Together, they arrive at views about social, moral, political, religious, 
etc. matters that neither of them really held previously. These shared features develop 
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spontaneously, though surely because of the traits that each brought to the friendship at 
its inception, and because of the shaping that took place over time. 184 
Complex shaping is significant because it strengthens the actual unity and the 
feelings of unity that exist between friends. If simple shaping were all that existed 
between friends, then it would possibly be easy for each friend to draw a sharp distinction 
(implicitly or explicitly) between the ways in which he has shaped the other, and the 
ways in which the other has shaped him. Although simple shaping makes for shared 
traits, it does not do it in the same way as complex shaping. With simple shaping, John is 
responsible for Sally's new trait X. But with complex shaping, both John and Sally are 
equally responsible for their new traits Y and Z, traits that are themselves partly the result 
of the previously existing traits interacting. This creates for greater unity and greater 
feelings of unity between friends and makes it more difficult to distinguish between the 
ways in which one has shaped the other and the ways in which the other has shaped 
oneself. It starts to be and feel more like the mutual creation of a new, shared self. 
(iii) Evaluative Shaping 
Evaluative shaping does not entail the shaping of traits into a friend, but rather 
entails shaping the value that some trait has to a friend. It is when I take an active role in 
helping my friend come to truly understand, or to better understand, the value that his 
various activities and pursuits have to him. Evaluative shaping may pertain to the traits 
184 There is obviously the question of just how much sameness needs to exist between friends for it to be 
the case that they are a single soul. I address this question in section 3.2 after showing how the single-soul 
view solves the problem of motivation. 
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that arose from simple shaping, and also the traits that arose from complex shaping.18s 
Suppose Dave, a musician, has a friendship with Boyd, a novelist, and let's grant that 
some simple shaping has occurred so that Boyd has acquired a love of music and Dave 
has acquired a love of literature. Each may now play an active role in helping the other 
come to understand the value that music and literature has in his life. Due to Boyd's 
influence, Dave has a better understanding of his own valuing of music and why it is 
important to him. Likewise - Boyd, because of Dave's influence, has a better 
understanding of his own valuing of being a novelist and why it is important to him. So 
now, music gives value to Dave's life in a new kind of way, in a way that he owes to 
Boyd. Likewise, being a novelist now gives value to Boyd's life in a new kind of a way, 
in a way that he owes to Dave. And most importantly, evaluative shaping leads both 
Dave and Boyd to realize that their respective pursuits are more valuable when shared. 
Because evaluative shaping may pertain to any and all of the traits that exist in a 
friendship, it fuses through the entire friendship and binds the value of one life to another. 
We ought to think of the single soul, then, as a reciprocally shaped affective unity. 
What happens as a result of this reciprocal shaping is that there exist good-making 
features of my life that lowe to my friend, and good-making features of my friend's life 
that he owes to me, and good-making features of each of our lives that we owe to each 
other, and that therefore there exist good-making features of the friendship and life that 
we share, features for which we are both responsible. We can say of those features that 
"they are ours" and not merely "these are mine and those are yours" precisely because of 
18S It may also pertain to traits that were not shaped at all, a point I will discuss later when considering 
certain objections. 
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the fact that they have been reciprocally shaped. This bundle of reciprocally shaped 
features is what we are, qua friends. 
The most significant of the traits to be reciprocally shaped are those character 
traits that are the virtues themselves. Thus, friendship provides a "training ground for 
virtue", as Aristotle c1aims.186 Sharing in conversation and thought leads to, among other 
things, the right conception of the mean in a given set of circumstances and a shared 
conception of the good life. This may seem problematic if we think that Aristotelian 
character-friendship requires the pre-existence of virtue in friends. But this is not a 
serious problem. The road to complete virtue is a long one, and Aristotle thinks that 
friendship is a necessary part of that journey. Aristotle importantly distinguishes between 
"natural virtue" (n cpVOlKn apETrl) and "complete virtue" (KVpicuS apeTTi) (NE VI.l3 
1144bl-1145al). Someone who has natural virtue is disposed to be virtuous, but he lacks 
understanding (vovs) of what makes something a virtue and of what makes actions right 
in the context of their circumstances (NE VI.13 1144b12-17). Natural virtue and a 
commitment to virtue may need to pre-exist in each friend, but it is the friendship itself 
that takes each friend to complete virtue. Otherwise, what "training ground" for virtue 
could friendship provide? 
In the next section I attempt to probe deeper into the metaphysics of the single 
soul. In particular, I attempt to elaborate on the claim that friends "mold their selves" 
into one another. This is true in a literal sense, but it does not imply that friends are 
numerically one. As well, I anticipate certain other objections to be discussed in Section 
3 when I show how the single-soul view solves the problem of motivation. 
186 NE IX.9 1170all-12. 
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2.3.4. The Metaphysics of the Single Soul 
Because affective unity explicitly countenances numerical distinctness between 
friends, my view should able to avoid certain metaphysical worries that would result from 
the view that friends are, say, a single substance. So questions of the sort: "If I am at my 
computer, but my friend is playing tennis, am I actually playing tennis?" should not pose 
serious concern. Yet, I claim that friends mold their selves into one another, and I take 
seriously Aristotle's claim in the IX.7 argument that my friend is the actualized me. At 
this point, it would be worthwhile to discuss Aristotle's use of qualifiers like lTWS and 
lTapalTATlaiws in the key claims of key passages we have discussed. Consider once 
more the NE IX.7 argument. 
I) Existing is, for everyone, worth choosing and lovable. 
2) It is by our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting. 
3) The work is, somehow, its maker in actuality. (evepyeJc;x 8e 6 lTOlnaas 
TO epyov eOTI lTWS·) 
4) Hence, he is fond of his work - for the reason that (816TI) he loves 
existing. And this is natural, because what he is potentially, his work 
reveals in actuality. (NE IX.7 I 168a5-8) 
Step 3) of the argument, and the conclusion 4), are particularly crucial here. Take 3): 
evepyeJc;x 8e 6 lTOlrlaas TO epyov eOTI lTWS. The Greek does not make entirely clear 
whether TO epyov should be read as a predicate nominative or as an accusative direct 
object of 6lTOlnaas. Ifwe read it as an accusative direct object, the sentence would have 
to be translated, "The person making the product exists in actuality, as it were." As 
Pakaluk notes, this would not support the inference to 4) - that the maker is fond of his 
work because what he is in potential, the work is in actuality. So I have treated TO epyov 
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as a nominative, reading the eOTI as copulative, thus translating, "The product is its maker 
in actuality, as it were.,,187 
But there is an important question of how exactly to understand the "as it were" 
part of that sentence - the lTCUS in evepye~c;x 8e 0 lTol11oas TO epyov eOTI lTCUS at IX.7 
1168a5-7, and for that matter also the lTapalTAlloicuS in Ka80lTep OVV TO a\JTOV eTval 
aipETOV eOTIV EKOOT'tl, O\/TCU Kat TO TOV cpiAOV, TllTapalTAT\oicuS at IX.9 1170b7-8. In 
each of these sentences, we have Aristotle making very strong claims: 1) That my friend 
is me actualized, and 2) that my friend's existence is choiceworthy in the same way as my 
own existence (which would make sense, since he is me actualized). That he qualifies 
these statements with lTCUS and lTapalTAT\o(cuS might cause one to think that he does not 
mean those claims as strongly as they sound. That Aristotle makes use of those qualifiers 
is, I think, an indication that he is aware of just how strong his claims are, and that he 
does mean to limit their meaning but is perhaps unsure at this point exactly how to 
articulate and explain fully what he means. 188 I think that we should read those qualifiers 
as limiting the meanings of the claims, but only in the following sense: the qualifiers 
preserve numerical distinctness between friends. That is, we should read each of them as 
saying: " ... but this does not mean that friends are not numerically distinct. They are still 
numerically distinct." So, while friends are the same in a way, there is also a way in 
which they are not the same, which is that they are numerically distinct. Importantly, we 
find a very similar usage of lTCUS in EE VII. 12: "Therefore, to perceive a friend must be 
in a way (lTCUS) to perceive one's self and to know a friend to know one's self' (EE 
187 My rendering is not uncommon, and is supported by the following translations: Pakaluk (1998), Irwin 
(1999), Ross (in Barnes 1984), Broadie and Rowe (2002). Burnet, in his commentary, also understands the 
sentence to mean that the product is the producer actualized (1900, 420). 
188 Credit goes to Professor Mackie for suggesting that the point be put in this way. 
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1245a35). Here is an elaborate translation of Trc...>s as it occurs in that sentence: "In a 
way, but not in a way that suggests that friends are numerically one." 
But if those claims do not imply numerical oneness, we must then explain how 
exactly they ought to be read. Just what do they mean? The account of reciprocally 
shaped affective unity answers this question. To begin, let us take the claim that my 
friend is the actualized me. It was argued in section 2.1 that a person is most of all his 
thinking part - his nous - and that this means that nous is most of all the self. Nous, it 
was shown, requires other beings in order to actualize itself. If a human life is essentially 
a life of reasoning and thinking (which it is, for Aristotle), then nous must engage with 
the outside world in order to actualize its potential - in order to become what it is. As 
Aristotle says, "It is by our actuality that we exist, since we exist by living and acting" 
(NE IX.7 1168a6-8); and "living seems to be strictly perceiving and thinking" (NE IX.9 
1170aI9). When nous lives and acts and thinks and perceives with a friend - with 
another nous - something happens that is both cognitive and ethical, namely - reciprocal 
shaping. Every kind of shaping - simple, complex, and evaluative - requires nous. It 
requires thinking and reasoning, reasoning practically, and judging with a friend. This is 
why Aristotle emphasizes sharing in conversation and thought and that sunaisthanesthai 
results from it (NE IX.9 1170bll). When I convince my friend that, say, some course of 
action is the right course of action to take, or that some activity is truly valuable and that 
he ought to engage in it, his character changes in a way for which I am (partly) 
responsible. 
In this way, my nous - my self - has been actualized in him. My reasoning and 
thinking activity and its results are visible in full bloom in him. He is not the same as me 
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numerically, but he is my noetic extension (and, importantly, I am his189). He is my 
actuality in the following sense: There are certain things that he will do, certain things 
that he will like, certain ways in general that he will behave, because of the way I have 
shaped him. In that way, it is as if I am doing those things, liking those things, and 
behaving in those ways too, because they are things that have resulted from my reasoning 
too. This will not hold true of everything that we do and like. It is not because of my 
character friend, for instance, that I am sitting at the desk rather than lying on the couch. 
But I am perpetually in a state in which, potentially, I can do something that I only would 
have done as a result of being shaped by my friend - something that I only would have 
done qua noetic extension of my friend. This is why Aristotle sees fit to compare friend 
and friend to maker and product, and to claim that the later is the former. So while TTWS 
may limit the meaning of the claim in the sense of not implying that my friend and I are 
numerically one, the claim is still quite strong. Once reciprocal shaping creates for 
affective unity, the perceptual claims in NE IX.9 and EE VII.12 become easier to 
understand. Since we possess that unity, it is easy to perceive my friend and myself 
together as one, as if a numerically single self (NE IX.9). Perceiving my friend is, in a 
way, to perceive myself, since my friend is my noetic extension (EE VII.I2). As the 
author of the Magna Maralia says, 'just as when we wish to see our own face, we do so 
by looking in a mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain 
that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self' 
(MMII.lSa20-24). And all of this is true vice versa, i.e. true of my friend with respect to 
me. 
189 All of this holds vice versa, a point that must be kept in mind. 
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There are, I recognize, some remaining problems with this account that have not 
yet been addressed. There are two main problems, both very closely related and probably 
better seen as parts of a single problem. I have not committed the foregoing account to a 
view about just how many features need to be reciprocally shaped in order for two people 
to count as friends. The account so far might seem to have the implication that friends 
need to be almost exact replicas of each other as far as personality traits, characteristics, 
and affections go. This would seem problematic because it seems a) undesirable, and b) 
at any rate not possible. And besides - and this is the second closely related problem - a 
friendship would seem to only occupy a part of a person's life, not all of it. My account 
seems to treat a friendship as if it must be the one essential feature of a human being. 
Those problems are intimately related to how the single-soul view goes about 
solving the problem motivation. It will be better to address them once we see exactly 
how the single-soul view solves the problem. 
3. Solving the Problem of Motivation 
The single-soul view is able to reconcile two intuitions that we have about 
friendship that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, friends are supposed to have 
a disinterested concern for each other as distinct, separate beings. Friendship is supposed 
to have that purely other-regarding flavor that Annas and Whiting tried hard to read into 
Aristotle's account. Friendship is not supposed to be selfish. But on the other hand, true 
friends are dearly close to one another in a way that undermines the first intuition. True 
friends think of themselves as connected in a way that undermines both purely other-
regarding feelings and thinking of friends as distinct and separate. This is why, on my 
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view, Aristotle recognizes the validity of both the self-regarding and the other-regarding 
motive when we act on behalf of our friends. And I have put forth the account of 
reciprocal shaping as what explains the fact that friends think of each other as so 
connected and not distinct and separate. 
Some commentators on Aristotle have, in one way or another, highlighted 
Aristotle's view that friends are a kind of unity in an effort to show that he regarded the 
dichotomy of egoism and altruism as a false one. Thus Sherman writes: "For if 
friendship extends the self, then one is not so much sacrificing oneself, as acting in the 
interests of this new extended self' (1987, 608). Similarly, Price writes: "One and the 
same act may count as contributing, as a constituent and not a cause, to the eudaimonia of 
two persons. It is this possibility that grounds Aristotle's ideal of friendship. In that it 
dissolves the obstinate dichotomy between egoism and altruism, it may attract us" (1990, 
106).190 The view that I argue for in this chapter is found to some degree in the work of 
these commentators, insofar as all of these commentators appeal to the idea of 
Aristotelian friends as a kind of unity. I have tried to make explicit just what type of 
unity that is, and I now want to explicitly draw out its motivational implications. 
In the effort of drawing out those implications, let us distinguish between the 
following kinds of attitude that one might have toward his friend in a friendship. Each of 
these attitudes provides an answer to the question: "Why do you love and benefit your 
friend?" 
1. The I-Attitude: My happiness includes the happiness of my friend, and so 
my happiness requires that I love and benefit my friend. 
190 See also Kahn (1981,39) and Madigan (1985). 
2. The Non-I Attitude: Friendship requires of me that I love and benefit my 
friend with no thought of how that relates to my own happiness. 
3. The I and Non-I Attitude: My happiness requires that I love and benefit 
my friend, and also friendship requires of me that I love and benefit my 
friend independently of how that relates to my own happiness. I love and 
benefit him both for my sake and for his sake. 
4. The We-Attitude: I conceive of my friend and I as a unit that loves and 
benefits itself. When I benefit my friend, what motivates me is the 
thought that this is what we need, with the ''we'' being irreducible to what 
I need and what my friend needs separately. We give no thought to the 
idea that we are distinct and separate, for we are not. We are a single soul. 
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We recognize the first three of these attitudes from the solutions to the problem of 
motivation that we considered in Chapter II. So, the I-Attitude is that which is present in 
the constitutive solution, the Non-I Attitude in unintentional self-love, and the 'I and 
Non-I Attitude' in overdetermination. 
Now, one way of solving the problem of motivation via the account of the single 
soul is by arguing that the account of the single soul justifies the I-Attitude. I have 
claimed, after all, that the single-soul view can be thought of as providing a foundation 
for the constitutive solution. The problem of motivation, recall, arises when we ask how 
self-regarding and other-regarding motives are related when they coexist in a person. 
According to the constitutive view, the two motives converge such that a friend is valued 
for his own sake precisely insofar as he is valued as an essential constituent part of one's 
own happiness. This was found to be morally objectionable, because it committed 
Aristotle to the seemingly unpalatable view that friends essentially are constituent parts 
of the happiness of each other. As Milgram griped: "It seems to me that self-love is 
playing too great, and the wrong kind of, a role. As Robert Frost puts it in his poem, 
'Hyla Brook': 'We love the things we love for what they are' - not for what we have 
146 
made them" (1987, 376). But we see now that Aristotle can plausibly respond that 
Milgram's objection is confused. For Aristotle argues that, in and through friendship, we 
are precisely what we have made each other to be. So, one answer to Pakaluk's query191 
of how loving a friend on account of the friend being one's own energeia can be 
compatible with loving him on account of himself is simply that my friend is, qua friend, 
my own energeia, so by loving him insofar as he is that, I am loving him for what he 
But I think that the single soul view implies an even better answer than that. 
What I want to argue is that the account of the single soul that I have given is what both 
explains and justifies the existence of the We-Attitude. In doing this, it can still be 
thought of as providing a foundation for the constitutive solution for the following 
reason: It explains how the eudaimonia of each friend becomes mutually shaped by each 
friend and intertwined with the eudaimonia of the other. But since there is that shaping 
and intertwining, it's the We-Attitude that should be present rather than the I-Attitude. 
And Aristotle does think that the We-Attitude will be present, for friends perceive the 
being of each other together as one (ovvato8aveo8at). They cognize themselves as a 
unit. 
3.1. 'We', 'Ours', and 'Us' 
Due to the reciprocal shaping that has occurred over the course of shared living, 
the self of each friend has been made by both friends. And because of this, each friend 
191 Pakaluk (1998, 187). 
192 Remember that we are no longer working with the standard sense of valuing something for its own 
sake. Rather, for Aristotle, to value X for its own sake - for itself - is to value X for what X is. 
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can say of both his and his friend's numerically distinct but qualitatively identical self, 
"This is ours," or "This is us." To make this clearer, imagine two friends, Sam and Max, 
and suppose that they are reciprocally shaped affective unities. Now, suppose Sam has 
the following attitude: "I love Max only on account of the fact that he is what I have 
made him to be, only on account of his being my actuality. And I love him for his own 
sake - for himself - since he is what I have made him to be." I make two claims about 
this: 1) As a matter of fact, Sam won't have this attitude because of the nature of 
reciprocal shaping; 2) Sam would not be justified in having this attitude because of the 
nature of reciprocal shaping. 
Why won't Sam have that attitude exactly? If the only kind of shaping that had 
taken place between Sam and Max were simple shaping, then he very well might have 
that attitude. He might, then, love Max only insofar as he has made Max like him. But 
this is where complex and evaluative shaping come into play. The traits that arise from 
complex shaping are new traits that did not pre-exist the friendship - traits that each 
friend had an equal part in forming. But they develop out of the interaction of the 
character traits already present in each friend, traits many of which were the result of 
simple shaping. Now the boundaries of the ways in which Sam has shaped Max and the 
ways in which Max has shaped Sam begin to be blurred, for as Sam shapes Max' 
character, he does so in part based on how he had already been shaped by Max (and vice 
versa), who had done so in part based on how he had already been shaped by Sam, who 
had done so in part based on how he had already been shaped by Max, ad infinitum. The 
friendship begins to be and feel more like "we" and less like an "I" and "you". And this 
is intensified by evaluative shaping, for it is through that kind of shaping that friends 
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begin to realize that they owe the value of their lives to each other. This explains why 
Sam won't have the I-Attitude, but rather will have the We-Attitude. 
But not only does reciprocal shaping explain why Sam will have the We-Attitude, 
it justifies his having that attitude as well. For as Sam shapes Max's character, it is in a 
way Max's actuality coming back at Max himself to shape him, and vice versa. And in 
this way, each self is the actualization of both Sam and Max. So as Sam gazes at Max, he 
cannot just say, "That's me, and that's why I love Max." That would show a lack of 
awareness of what he truly is, and of what Max truly is. What he really ought to say is, 
''That's us, and that's why we love us." As Sam loves Max on account of Max being his 
own actuality, he must recognize that Max is not merely that. Since Sam is the actualized 
Max, Max is the actuality of both Sam and Max. And since Max is the actualized Sam, 
Sam is the actuality of both Max and Sam. 
I offer an analogy to illustrate the previous point: two notes on a piano merging to 
form a chord. So, suppose C and E decided one day to become friends. C has now 
shaped E so that E has become the chord - the major third - CEo And vice versa - E has 
shaped C so that C has also become the chord CEo But the chord that is formed now 
makes a new sound, a sound that is not reducible to each individual note. The sound of 
CE is not reducible to the C-ness of CE, nor is it reducible to the E-ness of CEo Yet, each 
note remains. So now we have two numerically distinct entities: the CE that was 
originally C, and the CE that was originally E. Call these CEc and CEE• The point 
relevant for the case of Sam and Max is that CEc would not be justified in loving CEE 
merely insofar as CEE has C-ness. Since they have each become the whole chord, the 
notes must love each other on account of that, if indeed they love what each truly is. In 
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the same way, Max and Sam now love each other on account of the whole self that is 
present in both of them that they have each created. It is a whole self that is irreducible to 
the pre-friendship Max and the pre-friendship Sam, and what accounts for this are all 
three kinds of shaping of reciprocal shaping. 
What I have argued is that the recognition that I am what my friend has made me 
to be just as much as he is what I have made him to be places a sort of constraint on my 
motivation when valuing and benefiting him. With all three kinds of shaping, the 
recognition causes us to have the We-Attitude - to think of ourselves as a unit that loves 
and benefits itself, with no thought of separation or distinctness. We perceive our beings 
together as one (avvala6avea6al). But it also justifies that attitude since each friend can 
say of both his and his friend's numerically distinct but qualitatively identical self, "This 
is ours," or "This is us." In this way, reciprocal shaping creates for a kind of we-desires 
in friendship. In order to see this, it will be helpful to first consider Bernard Williams' 
distinction between I-desires and non-I-desires.193 The propositional content of any 
desire, whether 'I' or 'non-I', is given by spelling out the desire in the form 'I want that 
p '. For an I-desire, p is filled in by some 'I' or related expression ('my', etc.). For a non-
I-desire, p is not filled in by any 'I' related expression. For example: 'I want that my 
happiness be fulfilled', is an I-desire, whereas 'I want that my friend prosper', is a non-I-
desire. As Williams explains, for the egoist, there can be no non-I-desires that do not 
depend on some I-desire. For the altruist, there can be independent non-I-desires.194 
Aristotle's view, when it comes to friendship, is not that all non-I-desires depend on 1-
desires, nor is his view that friendship requires independent non-I-desires. Rather, when 
193 Williams (1973, 260-1). 
194 Williams is speaking ofthe psychological theses of egoism and altruism here, not the normative theses. 
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I desire that my friend prosper, I think of this desire as our desire - as the desire of the 
unity that is us. Now, in a way, friends project this onto the relationship, since friends are 
not numerically one. But there is something real that underlies it and justifies the friends' 
thinking of it in that way. I elaborate on this in what follows. 
Here is how we get a kind of ''we-desires'' out of reciprocal shaping. Suppose 
Sam desires that Max prosper. This is a desire that Sam has as a result of the reciprocal 
shaping that has taken place in his friendship with Max. It is a desire he would not 
possess had Sam not shaped him in the way that he did. Sam must recognize this, and 
because Sam knows that to value something for itself is to value it for what it is, he must 
value himself on account of him being Max's actuality. He therefore must recognize that 
his desire that Max prosper is not just his desire, but Max's desire as well. In what sense 
is it also Max's desire? In a rather strong sense, for I am not merely talking about a 
desire-type here, but the very token desire that Sam has that Max prosper. This very 
token desire is also Max's desire in the sense that it is a desire that Max would have, and 
it is a desire that Sam has only because of how he was shaped by Max. That is, it is a 
desire that Sam has in virtue of being the actualized Max. It is a desire ofthe numerically 
distinct self (Sam) that has been created by both Max and Sam, and it is a desire that 
would not exist if not for the fact that the numerically distinct self that is Sam had not 
been created by both Max and Sam. Furthermore, it is a desire for the well-being of the 
numerically distinct self (Max) that has been created by both Sam and Max. Reciprocal 
shaping, therefore, countenances The We-Desire Principle: 
Let A and B stand for reciprocally shaped friends. 
Let cp stand for the desire that B prosper. 
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Suppose A <p's (A desires that B prosper.) 
<p is a We-Desire iff: 
i) <p is also B's desire 
ii) <p is also a desire that A prosper. 
i) is true iff: 
1) A is B's actualized self. 
2) <p is a desire that B would have. 
3) A has <p because of how he has been shaped by B. 
ii) is true iff: 
1) B is A's actualized self. 
In this way, when I desire that my friend prosper, we desire that we prosper. 
I want now to reconsider the passages from Chapter II that originally seemed to 
be morally objectionable. Consider once again the argument of IX.4, which attempts to 
justify Aristotle's conditions for friendship. He justifies them by claiming that those 
same conditions are found in the virtuous person's relation to himself, and that a friend is 
another self. Here, again, is the argument: 195 
1. Each of the features of friendship belongs to the good person in relation 
to himself. (T4"J Sf) lTPOS av-rov EKaaTa To\TrUlV \J1TaPXElV T4"J E1T\ElKET) 
2. The good person is related to his friend just as he is related to himself. 
(lTPOs Se TOV <piAoV eXElV WalTEp TTPOS a\1T6v) 
2a. (Premise in support of 2). A friend is another self. (eaTl ~ 0 
<piAoS aAAos miT6s) 
3. Conclusion: The features of friendship under consideration are the 
correct ones, and those to whom these features belong are friends. (Kai it 
<plAia To\TrUlV ETval Tl SOKEI, Kai <piAOl oTs TaOS' \rrrapKEl) 
By calling attention to the gar in 2a, I argued in Chapter II against Annas that the other-
self claim must be doing more than just restating premise 2. Rather, it explains the truth 
of premise 2. But this created a problem, for it seemed that according to this argument, 
195 NE IX.4 1166a29-34. 
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what motivates me to value my friend is the fact that I see myself in him. This a) seems 
narcissistic and objectionable, and b) is incompatible with valuing a friend for his own 
sake. 
But if we read the other-self claim in IX.4 as anticipating the single-soul view 
developed in IX.7, IX.9, and IX.12, the objectionable features of the argument may be 
dissolved. Notice how both 2 and 2a appear again in the argument from nature in IX.9. 
But in that argument, Aristotle adds to those claims with his appeal to the value of 
higher-order perception, and with his claim that one must perceive one's own existence 
and the existence of one's friend together as one (ovvalo8aveo8al). If what it means for 
friends to be other selves to one another is for them to be a reciprocally shaped affective 
unity, then it is not that I value my friend because it is a way of valuing myself, because 
after all, these are ourselves that we have formed. I am as much "self' as I am "other 
self', and because of this when I value my friend, it is the mutually formed unity that is 
valuing itself. 
At the beginning of IX.8, Aristotle asks whether the virtuous person should love 
himself or someone else most of all, and without qualms concludes that he should love 
himself most of alL In support of this claim, he offers basically the same argument that 
he gave in IX.4 - that the features of friendship are so because they are found in the 
virtuous person's relation to himself. 
But a friend is most of all someone who wishes, or someone to whom are 
wished, good things for that person's sake, even if no one will know; but 
these belong most of all to a person in relation to himself; and so all the 
remaining things by which a friend is defined, since we have said that it is 
from oneself that all the characteristics of friendship extend additionally to 
others. And all the proverbs agree, for instance, 'a single soul' 196, 
196 Diogenes Laertius reports of Aristotle that: "To the query, 'What is a friend?' his reply was, 'A single 
soul dwelling in two bodies'" (D.L. 5.20). 
'friends' things are in common', 'friendship is equality', and 'the knee is 
closer than the shin' - since all of these would apply most of all to a 
person in relation to oneself. For he most of all is a friend to himself; so 
he should also love himself most of all (NE IX.8 1168b3-11; my 
emphasis). 
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Now, just because I love myself most of all does not mean that I cannot therefore love 
someone else independently of the love that I have for myself.197 Still, the above passage 
does not rest comfortably in an account of friendship, and one cannot deny that in the 
above passage Aristotle makes it seem as though when push comes to shove, the virtuous 
person will favor his own interests over those of his friend. But if Aristotle envisions the 
best kind of friendship as a reciprocally shaped affective unity, as I have argued, then the 
claim that the virtuous person should love himself most of all is innocuous, for in loving 
himself most of all, he is loving the self that is the actuality of both he and his friend. He 
must love his other self as much as he loves himself. 
But Aristotle's remarks in IX.8, particularly where he claims that the agent 
benefits his friend because he prefers doing what is noble (lealon) might seem 
problematic for different reasons. The relevant passage is 1169aI8-30 where Aristotle 
describes what motivates the virtuous agent to act on behalf of his friend, especially the 
final four lines of the passage: 
Kal XPrl\..laTa lTP001VT' av s<p' it) lTAe(ova Arl'VovTal oi <p(AOI' ylvETal 
yap Tcil \..leV <pIA,+> XPrl\..laTa, av-rcil Se TO KaA6v' TO Sn \..lEl~OV aya80v 
savTcil alTOVE\..lEI. 
197 On this point see McKerlie (1998, 543), who is quite comfortable with claiming that Aristotle's view is 
that (a) the virtuous person cares for himself more than he cares for his friend, but that (b) the concern he 
has for his friend is independent of the concern he has for himself, and (c) though he cares for himself 
more, he will sacrifice himself for the good of his friend. The problem here is not so much with (a) 
combined with (b), but with (a) combined with (c). If Aristotle endorses (a) and (c), he owes us an 
explanation for the truth of (c). If the explanation is that such sacrifices are really self-loving acts since the 
agent attains the kalon, which is clearly what it is, then such sacrifices are not really sacrifices. 
And he gives up money on condition that his friends receive more, since 
the friend gets money, but he gets what is noble; thus he assigns the 
greater good to himself. 
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The problem here is that Aristotle appears to be saying that I help my friend because of 
something I want to achieve for myself. In addition, it might seem that he is clearly 
distinguishing between the interests of one friend and the interests of the other friend in a 
way that undermines the possibility of a we-desire. He speaks, after all, of the agent 
assigning the greater good to himself (TO 5n ~ei~ov aya80v saUTe';> alTOVe~el). This 
claim - that the agent assigns the greater good to himself when he comes to the aid of his 
friend - is underwritten by a passage in IX.7: 198 
a~a 5e Kai T~ ~ev evepyeTlJ KaAOV TO KaTCx TnV lTpa;IV, waTe xa(pelV 
EV c1> TOVTO, Te';> 5e lTa86vTl ov5ev KaAOV EV Te';> 5paaaVTI, aAA' e'ilTep, 
au~q>epov: TOVTO 5' llTTOV ti5v Kai q>IAT)T6v. 
And at the same time, for the benefactor, what is in accordance with his 
action is noble; as a consequence, he takes pleasure in the person in whom 
this [is found]; but for the one treated well, there is nothing noble in the 
agent, but if anything, something advantageous; yet this is less pleasant 
and less lovable. (NE 1166a9-12) 
This passage, along with IX.S, gives the impression that Aristotle thinks that the virtuous 
agent grants a certain priority to, and acts for the sake of, a good that is independent of, 
separate from, and other than the friend's good. But I do not think that the passages in 
question need have this implication. 
First we must note that in the IX.S passage above, Aristotle is not distinguishing 
between two different reasons why one might come to the aid of a friend. That is, he is 
not saying one reason is that the friend needs the aid, while the other reason is attaining 
the noble, and then coming firmly down on one side saying that the agent benefits his 
friend because he wants the noble for himself. A closer reading shows that Aristotle is 
198 As noted by Pakaluk (1998, 183). 
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highlighting a different contrast. The men ... de construction in ylVETal yap Te';> \leV 
cplActJ Xpn\laTa, miTe';> Be TO KaA6v' clearly does denote a contrast, but it is not 
contrasting different reasons or motives for performing the same action. That is, 
Aristotle is not implying that the agent could be motivated to help his friend simply 
because his friend needs the money, but instead is motivated to help his friend out of a 
desire for nobility. Rather, Aristotle is making the point that the agent prefers helping his 
friend to keeping his own money. We may grant that the virtuous agent's end is nobility, 
but we ought to distinguish between what counts as a means to that end and what counts 
as constitutive of that end. The act of benefiting a friend, I would argue, is constitutive of 
nobility rather than an instrumental means to nobility. So, yes, the agent assigns himself 
the greater good rather than assigning himself the inferior good of money. But that 
greater good just is the noble securing of his friend's well-being, and it is this that the 
agent prefers. 
Also, just after noting that the agent prefers nobility to all else in the IX.8 passage, 
Aristotle says: EvBeXETal Be Kat TTpa~elS Te';> cplActJ TTpoieo8al, Kat eTval KaAAIOV TOO 
atlTOV TTpa~al TO a'lTIOV Te';> cplActJ yeveo8al. "It is possible to give up actions too, for a 
friend, and it is possible that it be nobler to become the cause of a friend's acting than to 
act oneself' (NE IX.8 1169a32-35). For the most part, commentators have taken 
Aristotle in this sentence to be making the simple point that when the agent has an 
opportunity to do something virtuous, he can forgo the opportunity and let his friend take 
on the action instead. The sentence might have that implication, but it surely has another 
implication that is easy to overlook, namely that simply by being the cause of a friend's 
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acting nobly, one achieves nobility.199 When I come to the aid of my friend and give him 
the money that he needs (to stick with Aristotle's example), simultaneously he is the 
cause of my acting. This provides for an amendment to the IX.7 passage just quoted, for 
it turns out that there can be something noble in the benefactor (the "agent") for the 
beneficiary (the "one treated well"), rather than just something advantageous.2oo 
There is a difficulty in understanding the passage in this way, for we may rather 
want to say that the friend who needs the money provides the occasion for the 
benefaction of the other friend, not that he is the cause of the benefaction. But given the 
virtuous person's attitude toward nobility, and given that character-friendship is between 
two virtuous individuals, I think there can be times when the beneficiary should be 
thought of as the cause rather than the mere occasion. Consider what Montaigne has to 
say about this. In his essay "Of Friendship", Montaigne speaks at length of the kind of 
friendship he had with Etienne de la Boetie. He too thinks that true friends are a kind of 
unity, so much so that he arrives at a view even more extreme than the one I am 
attributing to Aristotle: 
So the union of such friends, being truly perfect, makes them lose the 
sense of such duties, and hate and banish from between them these words 
of separation and distinction: benefit, obligation, gratitude, request, 
thanks, and the like. Everything actually being in common between them 
- wills, thoughts, judgments, goods, wives, children, honor, and life - their 
relationship being that of one soul in two bodies, according to Aristotle's 
199 Grant (1885,300) and Stem-Gillet (1995, 121) only recognize the first implication. Pakaluk (1998), 
Irwin (1999), Joachim (1951), Burnet (1900), and Broadie and Rowe (2002) have nothing to say about the 
implications of the claim. 
200 See Price (1990, 117) for a similar view: " ... the activity of each part can be viewed as the exercise at 
once of a capacity of his own, and of a capacity (whether similar or complementary) of the other's; hence 
the activity of each is not only himself, but also the other, in action." 
very apt definition, they can neither lend nor give anything to each other. 
(Pakaluk 1991, 194io1 
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As you can see, Montaigne does not even think that the notion of "benefit" meaningfully 
applies to the kind of friendship he is talking about. 
However, Montaigne goes on to say that if, in the friendship he speaks of, one 
could give to the other, "it would be the one who received the benefit who would oblige 
his friend. For each of them seeking above all things to benefit the other, the one who 
provides the matter and the occasion is the liberal one, giving his friend the satisfaction of 
doing for him what he most wants to do" (Pakaluk 1991, 195). What I understand 
Montaigne to be saying here is that I become the cause of my friend's giving precisely 
insofar as I make myself the matter and the occasion for my friend's giving. I see no 
reason why this idea cannot be applied to the IX.8 passage. 
To sum up, when one friend acts on behalf of another and sacrifices money for the 
sake of his safety, there are two things we must note about this action: 1) The friend is 
not primarily after nobility and only secondarily seeking the well-being of his friend. 
Rather, it is the noble securing of the well-being of his friend that he desires. 2) Aristotle 
should allow that the beneficiary, in being the occasion of the benefaction, is in a way the 
cause of it, since he gives his friend the satisfaction of doing what he most wants to do. 
In this way each friend shares in the nobility of the action, since Aristotle holds that it is 
noble to be the cause of one's friend's virtuous actions. The IX.8 passage, therefore, 
need not have the implication that one numerically distinct friend fails to properly value 
the other. 
201 For the record, even among friends who may be a single soul, I do not endorse the having of wives and 
children in common. 
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3.2. The Separateness of Persons Objection 
I return in this section to the set of problems that I anticipated at the very end of 
Section 2. First, how much affective unity does the foregoing account require? This has 
not been made clear, and it might seem that it requires near one hundred percent 
sameness in traits and properties. Second, my interpretation of Aristotle seems to treat 
friendship as if it encompasses the entirety of a friend's life, when clearly friendship 
makes up just a part of a friend's life. We see objections like this voiced by Benson, who 
accuses Aristotle of neglecting a distinctively valuable aspect of friendship: 
The aspect I mean is the separateness of persons, the fact that friends 
remain, however close they become, individuals with particular ends as 
well as joint ones, whose shared subjective viewpoint with its single 
personal perspective (the 'single soul') is the more or less precarious 
achievement of conversation and joint activity... The friends remain, 
within the relationship, intact individuals, and the significance of this 
intactness for the friendship needs to be recognized. Aristotle does not 
deny the fact or its significance; he just does not have anything to say 
about it. In dwelling on the oneness of friendship he loses sight of its 
manyness.202 
Perhaps the best way to put this objection is that no matter how close friends become, no 
matter to what extent there is actually a "single soul", there is and always will be 
important aspects of each friend that are positively separate from and have nothing to do 
with the friendship, and that these separate aspects must be respected. 
Let us begin with the first question of just how much sameness is required for 
affective unity, whether it actually requires full and complete sameness in characteristics, 
traits, qualities, affections. Does my account require that there be no difference at all 
qualitatively between friends? The answer is 'no', although I think Aristotle would say 
that complete sameness is the ideal. According to the view I have attributed to Aristotle, 
202 Benson (1995,64-65). 
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there exist good-making features of my life that lowe to my friend, and good-making 
features of my friend's life that he owes to me, and good-making features of each of our 
lives that we owe to each other, and that therefore there exist good-making features of the 
friendship and life that we share, features for which we are both responsible. We can say 
of those features that "they are ours" and not merely "these are mine and those are yours" 
precisely because of the fact that they have been reciprocally shaped. This bundle of 
reciprocally shaped features is what we are, qua friends. Aristotle's view is that we desire 
to love and benefit our friends purely in virtue of these features - that because of these 
features such desires can be construed as we-desires according to the We-Desire 
Principle, and that these features justify the existence of the We-Attitude. 
This view allows that there can be good-making features of my life that have 
nothing to do with my friend, and vice versa. Of course, these features probably cannot 
be very many, and they certainly cannot be of a certain sort. That is, a virtuous person 
cannot be character-friends with a base person. How much sameness exactly must there 
be? Any number or percentage I could answer with would be somewhat arbitrary. The 
account of likeness in Metaphysics Delta 6 says that two things are like if they have more 
affections the same than different, so we should at least say that friends must have mostly 
the same affections. But then what about those features and parts of friends that remain 
different and not at all mutually shaped?203 
One very important fact to keep in mind is that even the differences between 
friends - even the traits that did not come about from simple or complex shaping - are 
still susceptible to evaluative shaping. For instance, suppose Chris and Marlo have a 
203 See Williams (1981,15-16), who criticizes Aristotle for not valuing difference. 
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reciprocally shaped affective unity, but that one big difference that exists between them is 
this: Chris is a philosopher and has always been immersed in the arts, while Marlo is a 
scientist and has always been immersed in math and science. Each has always been 
skeptical of the profession of the other, since before they were friends. Chris has thought 
that science is too rigid and cannot bring itself to ask the truly important and interesting 
questions about Being, while Marlo has thought that philosophy is too speculative, too 
averse to empirical study, and unable to answer any question at all. Over the long course 
of their friendship, as they live their lives together, neither truly comes to assume the 
values of the other with respect to their professions. Chris never comes to value science 
as Marlo does, and Marlo never comes to value philosophy as Chris does. However, they 
do become less hostile than they originally were and they do become more educated 
about and appreciative of the profession of the other. 
But more importantly, as they attempt to mutually shape each other, although they 
do not succeed completely, what happens as a result is this: Chris, because of Marlo's 
attempted shaping, has a better understanding of his own valuing of philosophy and why 
it is important to him and what makes it different from science. Likewise - Marlo, 
because of Chris' attempted shaping, has a better understanding of his own valuing of 
science and why it is important to him and what makes it different from philosophy. So 
now, philosophy gives value to Chris' life in a new kind of way, in a way that he owes to 
Marlo. Likewise, science now gives value to Marlo's life in a new kind of a way, in a 
way that he owes to Chris. So it is possible that even differences become subject to 
evaluative shaping. 
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But that possibility may never come to fruition. The differences may remain 
differences and may never even be subject to evaluative shaping, and there is a worry that 
Aristotelian friends will not value these differences in the right kind of way. It is true that 
the account of the single-soul I have given places little evaluative importance on these 
differences. Insofar as A and B are friends, those differences are accidental. For A and B 
to be friends is for them to have a certain amount of mutually shaped sameness between 
them, and A and B value each other primarily because of that sameness. That does not 
mean that the differences cannot be valued. Even though A cannot stand one of B IS 
favorite pastimes - the opera, he will accompany B to the opera on occasion because it 
makes B happy. He will care that B IS operatic desires are fulfilled. But this caring flows 
entirely from the fact of their mutually shaped unity in their other respects. 
Aristotle would, therefore, disagree with Nussbaum when she says: "The object of 
philia must be seen as a being with a separate good, not as simply a possession or 
extension of the phi/os; and the real phi/os will wish the other well for the sake of that 
separate good" (1986, 355). Aristotle's first response would be to say that the essential 
activity of friendship - shared living and reciprocal shaping - makes it so that there is no 
"separate good". But in response to the rejoinder that the remaining differences must be 
disinterestedly respected as a separate good, Aristotle must bite the bullet and say "false". 
This brings us to the second and closely related objection that the proffered 
account of the single-soul seems to treat friendship as if it encompasses the entirety of a 
friend's life, when clearly friendship makes up just a part of a friend's life. Of course, the 
thought goes, friends have "separate goods". The idea that they could become so much 
the same that they have so few differences and thereby have no genuine "separate goods" 
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is erroneous. In response to this objection: Because Aristotle thinks that the te/os of 
friendship is shared living, which allows for sunaisthanesthai, he very much does think 
that friendship encompasses, if not the entirety, a very large portion of one's life. Surely 
this is why in NE IX.l 0 he raises the question of how many friends one can and should 
have. He doesn't give a number, but comes very close to saying that if there is a number, 
it might just be one. He compares friendship to romantic love (epCiv), noting that 
romantic love is for one person (NE IX.10 1171aI2-15). Is it absurd to think that friends 
could ever be this close to one another? Maybe today it is, and maybe in Aristotle's day, 
there was more time for friends to engage in shared activity. But just because we might 
find it absurd does not make it absurd. Assuming two friends spent as much time 
together as required by Aristotle's conception of shared living (cru~Tiv), I don't find it to 
be absurd at all that such constant involvement with each other would make for precisely 
what Aristotle thinks it would make for. Montaigne, as we have seen, certainly did not 
think it absurd, and he found his friendship with la Boetie to be illustrative of Aristotle's 
defmition of friends as a single soul dwelling in two bodies. Also, it is worth pointing 
out that scientific studies linking friendship to good health show that it is not uncommon 
for lifelong companions to die within months of each other, which to me suggests that 
some friends do achieve something close to the kind of unity I've attempted to explain.204 
But there is another way to put this objection that makes it stronger. My account 
claims that friends are essentially what they have made each other to be. I have been 
careful to say that a friend is, qua friend, what he has been made to be by his friend. The 
204 I learn this from a footnote in Liu (2010), who cites the following: Parker-Pope, T. (2009) "What are 
friends for? A longer life", The New York Times, April 20. The article cites several recent studies, e.g., 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health (2005, 59, pp. 574-79), New England Journal of 
Medicine (2007,357, pp. 370-79). 
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objection, therefore, would claim that to aim at the good of a friend qua friend is not 
enough, for Aristotle says that we care for our friends for what they are, and he contrasts 
this with the "accidental" valuing of the friendships of pleasure and utility (NE VIII.3). 
My account, the objection goes, must therefore be committed to the claim that "Socrates" 
and "Socrates the friend of Glaucon" is a by-nature unity and not an accidental unity, but 
that claim is clearly false for Aristotle. So, on my account, friends do not value each 
other qua human beings. They only value each other qua friends. 
This objection, though instructive, poses no threat to the solution to the problem 
of motivation given in this chapter. While it is true that Aristotle thinks that character-
friends value each other for what they are, he cashes this out in terms of valuing someone 
for his character. As he says in NE VIII.4: "The friendship of good people alike in virtue 
is complete, since they similarly wish good things to each other as iood (OilTOI yap 
Taya6a O\lo(cus ~OVAOVTal aAATtAOlS U aya6oi), and they are good in their own 
right. ,,205 He does not think that valuing someone for what he is means valuing him 
independently of valuing what is good and virtuous about him.206 And I have argued that 
it is Aristotle's view that, in a friendship, the features of each friend that make up their 
respective goodness and virtue are reciprocally shaped and unified. So, the fact that my 
account claims that friends value each other qua friends does not lead it into any 
inconsistency with Aristotle's text. 
As Montaigne wrote of his friendship with la Boetie: "In the friendship I speak of, 
our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that 
205 1156b5-6; my emphasis. 
206 In fact, he thinks that if a friend should become terribly vicious, one should dissolve the friendship. See 
NEIX.3. 
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joined them, and cannot find it again. If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that 
this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was 1.,,207 
This quote strikes me as refreshingly Aristotelian. It is that blending and mingling of 
souls that I have tried to give an account of in this chapter and explain how it makes for a 
unique solution to the problem of motivation. To consider one last objection: it might be 
thought that the numerical distinctness of friends has more important implications for 
Aristotle than my account allows. It might be thought that numerical distinctness makes 
possible a very robust distinction between the virtuous agent's good and the friend's 
good, since the virtuous agent's synchronic and diachronic persistence as an enmattered 
form can generate needs and interests for the virtuous agent that are distinct from the 
friend's needs and interests as an enmattered form.208 
I agree that numerical distinctness makes possible a robust distinction between the 
virtuous agent's good and the friend's good. I think that Aristotle recognizes this 
possibility as well, and that he is aware of the difficulties that numerical distinctness 
poses for ideal friendship. Thus, he writes in the Eudemian Ethics that although a friend 
is another self (aAAos atIT6s), still a friend is a separate self (aUTOS 5IatPETOS) (EE 
VII.12 l145a30-35). But I believe that Aristotle sees this numerical distinctness as 
something to be overcome, in a way. Or rather, if numerical distinctness can make 
possible a robust distinction between the agent's good and the friend's good, Aristotle's 
view is that we need to limit that possibility as much as possible. The way to do this is 
through avl,;fjv. Thus he writes, immediately after claiming that a friend is a separate 
self, "Therefore, to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know 
207 In Pakaluk (1991, 192). 
208 I thank Matthew Walker for pressing me on this point at the 2010 Eastern AP A. 
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a friend to know one's self' (EE VII.12 l245a35); And he claims at NE IX.9, as we've 
seen, that the agent must perceive his own being and his friend's being together as one 
(cruvata8avea8at) and exhorts friends to av~iiv - all efforts to limit the damage that 
numerical distinctness can do. 
Ethics: 
I call our attention one more time to the single-soul passage from the Eudemian 
For the friend wants, if possible, not merely to feel pain along with his 
friend, but to feel the same pain, e.g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if 
that could be, as closely as possible. The same words are applicable to 
joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign 
of friendship. Further, we say about friendship such things that friendship 
is equality, and true friends a single soul. (Eudemian Ethics l240a36-
1 240b9) 
I interpret this passage to mean the following: Ideally, I want to feel the same pain that 
my friend feels, when he is in pain. Ideally, I'd like to share the same central nervous 
system as he. Ideally, we would be a single-soul in the extremely literal sense of being a 
single enmattered form. But we're not. And since we're not, we want to approximate 
that ideal "as closely as possible". Reciprocal shaping gives us that approximation. It 
may not make friends into a single enmattered form, but it does make We-Attitudes and 
We-Desires possible. Incidentally, that friends are a single soul in the reciprocally 
shaped sense also might explain why Aristotle thought that the dead person's eudaimonia 
could be affected by what happens to his friends who survive him.209 
4. Conclusion: Self-Sufficiency and Friendship 
209 See NE 1.11. 
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In this final section, I consider the merits of Aristotle's attempted resolution of the 
aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship, and also how the argument from nature 
relates to the two other arguments in IX.9 - the arguments from self-awareness and 
pleasure. The aporia is as follows: On the one hand, "they say that the divinely happy 
and self-sufficient people have no need of friends, since 'good things are theirs'. Since 
they are self-sufficient, they stand in need of nothing else" (NE IX.9 1169b5-7). But on 
the other hand, "it seems absurd, when attributing every good thing to the happy person, 
not to assign him friends, which are considered the greatest external goods" (NE IX.9 
l169b9-ll). And besides, since it is in our nature to live together, it would be absurd to 
make the happy person a solitary individual (NE IX.9 l169b17-l8). 
The source of the aporia seems clear: friends are quite obviously valuable, yet 
since happiness was defined in terms of self-sufficiency and a self-sufficient person has 
no needs, it seems that the happy person does not need friends. But it is actually unclear 
what Aristotle takes to be the main question of the aporia. He does, of course, 
unequivocally conclude that we need friends. But is he asking whether it is really the 
case, as one half of the aporia claims, that a human being can be both solitary and happy? 
If so, then he must be trying to show that the road to happiness is necessarily though 
friendship. Alternatively, he might be asking whether the life of a person who already 
has friends can stay as good or even be better if the person lets those friendships go. 
Even if the answer to this question is 'no', it is consistent with the claim that a person can 
be both solitary and happy, at least a person who has never formed a friendship based on 
character.210 
210 Kosman (2004) thinks that the question Aristotle poses is why we require friends even when we are 
happy. Cooper (1980,317-18) and Stern-Gillet (1995, ch. 6) take Aristotle to be asking whether having 
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The two arguments in IX.9 that precede the argument from nature - the argument 
from self-awareness and the argument from pleasure - show that it is the first question he 
has in mind. They show that his primary concern is to disabuse us of the notion that 
someone can be both solitary and happy. The argument from self-awareness proceeds as 
follows: 
1) Being happy consists ofliving and being active. (1169b31-32) 
2) The activity of a good person is good and pleasant for him. (1169b32-
33) 
3) The actions of one's friend are both good and one's own. (1169b35-
70al)211 
4) The actions of one's friend are pleasant to a good person. (from 2 and 
3). 
5) We are better able to observe our neighbors than ourselves. (1169b33-
34) 
6) Observing the good actions of a friend is a better way of observing 
one's own good actions. (from 3 and 5) 
7) If he chooses to observe actions that are both good and his own, the 
good person will need and seek friends. (from 1-6) 
Step 5) is a very important step in this argument, for it shows that Aristotle thinks that the 
solitary person is going to have a difficult time engaging in a certain valuable activity. 
He thinks that there is something valuable that we get out of observing actions that are 
both good and oiKEIas. I have interpreted the argument strongly by translating OiKEIaS as 
"one's own" rather than just "familiar", so that the argument makes clear that the agent 
seeks self-awareness. This, I would argue, is required by step 5) combined with 
friends is a necessary condition for eudaimonia. Osborne (2009) is not clear, it seems to me, about which 
question she takes Aristotle to be asking. 
211 I read lines 1169b31-70al as saying that there are two things that are pleasant by nature - what is good, 
and what is oikeion. I read the sentence O:\lcpw yap EXOVCH Ta Tij CPVOEI ti8ea at 1170al to mean that the 
actions of good people who are friends have both things that are pleasant by nature. 
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Aristotle's doctrine that a friend is another self. But we don't need to interpret the 
argument this strongly to get the desired result. For the point is that there is something 
that the good person must do in order to be happy (namely observe actions that are good 
and oikeias) that he either cannot do, or cannot do properly in a solitary state. Therefore, 
he needs friends. 
In the argument from pleasure, a simpler argument, Aristotle notes that many 
people think that friends are necessary in order to live pleasantly. He agrees, claiming 
that "the life of a solitary individual is difficult, since it is not easy to be continuously 
active on one's own; yet with different persons, and in relation to others, it is easy" 
(1170a5-8). Just as with the argument from self-awareness, Aristotle here takes the main 
question of the aporia to be whether someone can truly be both solitary and happy. His 
answer is 'no'. Happiness, he thinks, requires the cultivation of friendship. 
But the argument from nature must take the second question - whether a life can 
stay as good or be better without the friendships one already has - to be the main 
question of the aporia. For, that argument already assumes that a friendship has been 
formed, and from that it argues that friends bear a certain relation to one another that 
makes them choiceworthy to each other. It is a single being (einai) that is shared in the 
best kind of friendship; so to lose a friend would be the equivalent of, in a way, losing 
one's own being. But the argument, on its own, does not show that a solitary person who 
never formed a friendship cannot attain eudaimonia. It does not address the solitary 
person at all, but addresses the person who already has a friend. Yet Aristotle seems to 
think that the argument shows that a solitary person cannot be happy. His final statement 
on the aporia, a statement clearly based on the argument from nature, is the following: 
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"But anything worth choosing for a divinely happy person needs to belong to him, or else 
in that respect he will be in need. So then, anyone who is to be happy will need friends 
who are good (Senael apa Tcil evSQ\~ovnaovTI q>IACUV alTovSalcuv)" (1170bI6-20). 
More formally: 
1) Anything worth choosing for the good person needs to belong to him, 
or else in that respect he will be in need. 
2) A friend is worth choosing. 
3) The good person needs friends. 
This argument is problematic for a number of reasons? 12 Step 2) needs to specify that a 
friend is worth choosing for someone who already has a friend, because the argument 
from nature simply does not show that a solitary person who has never formed a 
friendship ought to form one. Yet Aristotle still concludes that anyone who is to be 
happy (notice the use of the future participle Tcil evSQ\~ovnaovTI) must have excellent 
friends. But all that strictly follows is that anyone who is to remain happy must maintain 
his excellent friendships. 
Now, we could be more charitable to Aristotle and say that he is simply using 
different arguments to answer different questions. The arguments from self-awareness 
and pleasure show that we need to form friendships, and the argument from nature shows 
that we need to maintain friendships. One potential problem for this line of defense is 
that the arguments from self-awareness and pleasure also seem to show that we need to 
maintain our friendships so that we maintain our happiness. If happiness requires 
212 For one thing, the first premise seems clearly false. Just because something is worth choosing for me 
does not mean that I need it - that my self-sufficiency requires it. The first premise seems to commit 
Aristotle to the following thesis: If there is a reason to X, then I need to X. But just because there is a 
reason to do something does not mean that I need to do it. Perhaps if there is an overriding reason to X, 
then I need to X, but that is not what the argument says. 
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observing actions that are both good and one's own (oikeias), and friendship provides the 
best means to this, then it follows that I need to both form and keep a friendship. The 
argument from nature, then, seems somewhat gratuitous. But it is not gratuitous for the 
very reason that it appeals to the single soul, and in so doing helps solve the problem of 
motivation as well as the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship. 
After all, the arguments from self-awareness and pleasure offer nothing but self-
regarding reasons for why we need friends. As we saw in Chapter II, some scholars -
like Annas and Whiting - try to deny altogether that the virtuous agent acts for these 
reasons when he seeks friends and benefits them. Others, like Kraut, argue that "to 
initiate a friendship is to set one's motivation into flux, so that self-interested reasons are 
eventually supplemented by, and sometimes outweighed by, altruistic reasons" (Kraut 
1989, 138). On each of these views, the reason Aristotle appeals to the argument from 
nature is that it shows that there are other-regarding reasons that make friends 
choiceworthy. For Annas and Whiting, those reasons are meant to replace the self-
regarding reasons of the arguments from self-awareness and pleasure; for Kraut, they are 
meant to "supplement or outweigh" them. But each of those views relies on an 
interpretation of the argument from nature that we refuted in section 2.2.1 which itself 
relies on an interpretation of the relation between self-love and friendship in Aristotle that 
we refuted in Chapter II. As I have argued, the import of the argument from nature is that 
in the best kind of friendship I perceive my own existence and my friend's existence 
together as one. On this view, friendship is neither selfish nor selfless. I value my friend 
not because I see it as a way of valuing myself, but nor do I value him independently of 
valuing myself. Rather, Aristotle's view provides for the possibility of we-valuing. It's 
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not that I value my friend on account of him being me, and it's not that he values me on 
account of me being him. Rather, we value us, since we have both been made by each of 
us. 
As it turns out, we can read Aristotle as appealing to the arguments from self-
awareness and pleasure for why we need to make friends, and to the argument from 
nature for why need to keep our friends. That having been said, I don't see how it can be 
avoided that Aristotle's virtuous agent seeks friendship for entirely self-regarding 
reasons. But I don't see this as a problem. The argument from nature shows that once a 
friendship is formed, self-regarding reasons become the reasons of an expanded self - of 
the we-subject.213 And as Aristotle says, while the desire for friendship comes quickly, 
friendship itself takes time (NE VIII. l156b32). But at any rate, it is not the case, as 
Kraut claims, that Aristotle's view is that self-interested reasons are eventually 
supplemented or outweighed by altruistic reasons in friendship; nor is it the case, as 
Annas and Whiting claim, that Aristotle's virtuous agent is not motivated by self-love at 
all. Rather, the self is expanded to include the friend in such a way that issues of egoism 
and altruism need not arise. 
213 Stem-Gillet seems to take issue with this. She claims that "since self-awareness cannot occur in the 
absence of an object of cognition, neither can the specific kind of self-realization brought about by 
friendship be aimed at from the friendless state. Aristotelian agents therefore simply could not seek virtue 
friends in order to secure a good they would be unable even to conceive in their absence" (1995, 141); cf. 
Flakne (2005, 51-59) and Osborne (2009, 351-352; 359-362). Suppose you are an ethically virtuous person 
with lots of external goods, but that you have no friends. An equally ethically virtuous acquaintance of 
yours (an acquaintance, not a friend) runs into you at the local coffee shop and starts telling you about this 
great character-friendship he has formed and goes into great detail about the specific kind of self-realization 
brought about by friendship. Isn't it possible that you would then have some idea of what your 
acquaintance was talking about and be curious enough to go out and pursue some friends in order to see 
what that specific kind of self-realization is like? 
IV 
Virtue and Happiness 
Since happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we 
must examine virtue; for that will perhaps also be a way to study happiness better. (NE 
1.13 1102a5-7) 
1. Introduction 
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This chapter examines the problem of motivation as it arises in the case of virtue 
and happiness. As we did with the problem in the case of friendship, we will consider 
each of the three possible solutions: Unintentional Self-Love, Overdetermination, and the 
Constitutive Solution. Sections 2-4 will be devoted to each possible solution, and it will 
be shown that of the three, it is the constitutive solution that ought to be attributed to 
Aristotle. Section 5 examines how the constitutive solution treats the well-being of other 
people who are not friends in relation to the virtuous agent. 
In the remainder of this introductory section we shall take a closer look at the 
main passages that give rise to the problem. The place to begin is the function argument 
of NE 1.7, which is where we first learn about eudaimonia 's relation to virtue. The 
function argument begins with the claim that a being's good, or well-being, or - its 
flourishing - resides in its function, or characteristic activity (epyov) (NE 1.7, 1097b23-
30). This activity, being characteristic, is also our end (TEAOS). If a human being has a 
characteristic activity, then his or her flourishing will consist in somehow performing this 
activity. According to Aristotle, the characteristic activity of a human being is "some sort 
oflife of action of the part of the soul that has reason" (NE 1.7, 1098a3-4). Reasoning, 
then, is the human function. 
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But it cannot be the mere performance of the function that constitutes one's 
flourishing. It has to be the good performance of the function. In other words, the 
function must be performed well (TO EU) (NE 1.7, 1098a8-15). So in order for a human 
being to flourish, he has to engage in good reasoning. He must reason well, which means 
that he must reason in accordance with virtue (KaT' apETrlv). This is how virtue comes 
into play in relation to happiness. Virtue is the state (e;lS) that provides for the wellness 
of the performance of the function. Now, Aristotle thinks that the soul has both a rational 
and non-rational part. In the fully virtuous person, the non-rational part listens to and 
obeys the rational part (NE 1.13 l102bI4-1103all). That is, the temperate person not 
only knows, via his rational part, that he ought not drink that fourth beer. In addition, his 
appetitive desires want no part of that fourth beer. In contrast, the merely continent 
person knows he shouldn't have that fourth beer, but he has to fight off his appetitive 
desire to drink it. The virtues of character, for Aristotle, are strictly speaking virtues of 
the non-rational part of the soul - the part that shares in reason by being able to listen to 
and obey it (11 02b26-30). If a person has the virtue of temperance, then he will not only 
know how many drinks he ought to consume, but he'll also experience no inclinations 
that compete with his knowledge of how many he ought to consume. His inclinations 
will agree with his knowledge. In this way, the virtues of character provide for excellent 
functioning. The particular virtues of character that Aristotle recognizes are: Courage, 
Temperance, Generosity, Magnanimity (Pride), Mildness, Friendliness, Truthfulness, and 
Justice. Since these virtues make for good functioning, they make for eudaimonia, and in 
this way virtue and happiness are linked, for Aristotle. 
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We can therefore see why Aristotle would think that the virtuous agent has a self-
regarding motive to pursue the virtuous life. Since performing virtuous actions nurtures 
and maintains the excellent condition of one's soul, which is what one's eudaimonia 
partly consists in, one motive the agent has to perform a virtuous action is that 
performing it is beneficial from the standpoint of his own eudaimonia. But of course, we 
are also told that virtuous actions must be chosen for themselves (01' mho), and that 
those who do not choose virtuous actions for themselves do not count as virtuous (NE II.4 
1105a32; VI.12 1144 a13-20). Yet both motives, Aristotle thinks, are at play in the 
virtuous agent, as is made clear by this pivotal passage: 
Tl~TlV oe Kat i)OOVTlV Kat VOVV Kat TTaoav apETTlV aipOV~Eea ~ev Kat 01' 
mho (~lleEVOS yap aTTo~a[vovToS EAO[~Ee' av EKaOTOV mhwv), 
aipOV~Eea oe Kat Tfis Evoal~ov[as XOPlV, Ola TOVTWV vTToAa~~ovovTES 
EVOat~ovnOElV. 
Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose 
because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had 
no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, 
supposing that through them we shall be happy (NE I. 7, 1 097b 1-5). 
Henceforth I will at times refer to this passage as simply "the 1.7 passage". How we 
solve the problem of motivation in the case of virtue and happiness, as we shall see, 
hinges on how we interpret this passage. 
Before we consider the possible solutions, there is one point that ought to be made 
concerning the eudaimonist axiom, a point that was rehearsed in Chapter I section 3.2. It 
is common to interpret Aristotle's eudaimonism agent-relatively, according to which the 
agent's ultimate end is his own eudaimonia. 214 But there are some who think that 
214 E.g. Field (1921, 109), Hardie (1968, 331), Allan (1952, 138), Ross (1923, 208; 231-32), Gottlieb 
(1996). In addition: Ackrill (1980, 15-33), Engberg-Pedersen (1983, ch.l), and Kraut (1989, chs. 2 & 4). 
Though as Politis (1998, n31) points out, the latter three commentators construe agent-relative 
eudaimonism so weakly that it becomes hardly distinguishable from agent-neutral eudaimonism. Kraut 
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Aristotle's eudaimonism ought to be understood agent-neutrally, according to which the 
agent's ultimate end is someone's eudaimonia.215 On some occasions, it might be his 
own, and on others it might be another person's eudaimonia, and on others perhaps even 
the eudaimonia of the polis. It might be thought, and some have thought, that if 
Aristotle's eudiamonism is understood agent-neutrally, then there really is no problem of 
motivation in the case of virtue and happiness.216 But this is false, and it is important to 
see why. 
Suppose we understand Aristotle's eudaimonism agent-neutrally, according to 
which we choose virtue for the sake of happiness in the sense that we always choose it 
for the sake of someone 's happiness. Even if this were true, it would not follow that the 
agent never chooses virtue for the sake of his own happiness (he counts as "someone" 
after all). On the agent-neutral interpretation, the I. 7 passage is, at least potentially, more 
problematic, for it sets up at least two potential conflicts rather than just the one we have 
focused on: 1) For those virtuous actions aimed at the eudaimonia of someone else, the 
I. 7 passage contrasts choosing those actions for themselves with choosing them for the 
sake of someone else's eudaimonia. 2) For those virtuous actions aimed at our own 
eudaimonia, the I. 7 passage contrasts choosing those actions for themselves with 
choosing them for the sake of our own eudaimonia. The point is, interpreting Aristotle's 
eudaimonism agent-neutrally by no means gets rid of 2), and it is 2) that I wish to focus 
(1989) is a good example. He thinks that Aristotle's view is that the agent's ultimate end is his own 
contemplative activity, but goes to great lengths to argue that Aristotle also thinks that the agent will often 
sacrifice his own contemplative activity (see pages 309-311 for Kraut's response to an important 
objection). 
215 E.g. McKerlie (1998), Morrison (2001). 
216 See Whiting (2002, 281). 
176 
on. However, whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is agent-neutral or agent-relative will 
become an important question when we consider to what extent the constitutive solution 
allows for the agent to have a proper concern for the good of others. This will be 
discussed in section 5, and the nature of Aristotle's eudaimonism will be addressed in 
section 5.1. 
Let us now take up the various possible solutions to the problem. 
2. Unintentional Self-Love 
itself: 
We will once again begin by assuming the standard meaning of choosing X for 
1) X is valued and chosen independently of how X contributes to one's 
own happiness. 
2) X is taken as something that, by itself, provides a reason to promote it. 
As we saw in the case of friendship, unintentional self-love denies that the agent is 
motivated by his own eudaimonia. For the sake of clarity, here are the main interpretive 
claims again, slightly amended to account for the fact that we are now considering the 
case of virtue: 
Cl) Whenever Aristotle seems to endorse self-regarding motives, he's 
merely saying that some people tend to be motivated in that way as a 
matter of psychological fact. He is not (they claim) endorsing those 
motives, and his view is that the virtuous agent chooses virtue for its 
own sake and for no other reason. 
C2) According to Aristotle, one's own eudaimonia can only be achieved if 
one is not consciously aiming at it; it can only be achieved if one 
chooses virtue for its own sake and for no other reason.217 And so, for 
this reason, self-love (according to Aristotle) causes the agent to 
217 Whiting (2002). This is similar to the sophisticated consequentialist position according to which 
someone will do a better job of maximizing utility ifhe develops dispositions to not try to maximize utility. 
See also Homiak (1981,640 & 650) and Kraut (1989, 137-138). 
eventually develop a disposition to value virtue for its own sake. In 
this way self-love is said to explain what the agent does without 
motivating the agent. 
C3) Because by being virtuous the agent does attain something good for 
himself, he can be said to act for the sake of his own happiness from 
an outside perspective. It is only in this third;gerson-perspective sense 
that he acts for the sake of his own happiness. 18 
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We may begin by immediately ruling out C 1) as a possible interpretation of the 1.7 
passage. On C 1), we would have to read Aristotle in that passage as saying that people, 
as a matter of psychological fact, tend choose virtue for the sake of happiness, but the 
virtuous agent ought only choose virtue for its own sake. That is simply wrong?19 
Aristotle says plainly that we choose virtue both for itself and for the sake of our own 
happiness.22o 
As for C2), we may reject it for the same reasons we rejected it in Chapter II in 
the case of friendship, but also for two additional important reasons that deserve to be 
recognized. If Aristotle thinks that the agent's own eudaimonia does not provide him 
with a motive, what are we to make of his claim in the 1.7 passage that we choose virtue 
for the sake of happiness (TfjS Ev8all..lOv(as Xaplv)? Whiting, the main proponent ofC2), 
recognizes the difficulty here, and claims that her account requires her "to read this 
218 Annas (1988) and Whiting (2002 and 2006). 
219 And in truth, I do not know of anyone who argues for this claim in the case of virtue and happiness. 
Annas and Whiting, we have seen, argue for it in the case of friendship. 
220 Some have argued that what Aristotle means by saying that we choose virtue both for itself and for the 
sake of happiness is that on some occasions we choose virtue because it contributes to our happiness, and 
on other occasions we choose virtue for its own sake. The motives are independent of each other, and the 
virtuous move back and forth from acting on the one to acting on the other. E.g. Kenny (1965-6, 28). 
Gottlieb (2009, 138) wrongly attributes this view to Kraut (1989). She does not cite any page numbers. It 
is clearly not Kraut's view. His view, as will be discussed, is that "an act can be done for two independent 
reasons: to benefit others and to benefit oneself." As noted in Chapter II, this interpretation concedes to 
someone like Annas or Whiting the incoherence of something being chosen simultaneously for its own sake 
and for the sake of something else. The 1.7 passage suggests that, and beckons us to see how, it is not 
incoherent to simultaneously choose X both for itself and for the sake ofY. 
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passage as saying that we choose virtue for the sake of eudaimonia simply in the sense 
that we recognize that virtue will contribute to eudaimonia (which is how I must take dia 
touton hupolambonontes eudaimonesein) even though this is not our ultimate reason for 
choosing it" (2002, 286 n26). But the passage cannot be taken in this way, for Aristotle 
says, after all, that we choose it (aipovIlE8a) for the sake of eudaimonia. And 
furthermore, given that it is the main aim of the Ethics to show us how to hit the target -
how to achieve the ultimate goal - it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle thought that the 
only way to hit that goal was to not aim at it. If Aristotle actually thought this, it's 
something he ought to have mentioned to his audience, since he is trying to teach them 
how to become good and hit the target. But he never mentions it. He never even hints at 
it. The only evidence Whiting provides that Aristotle might think this is the simple fact 
that he claims that virtue must be chosen for its own sake, which strikes me as a question-
begging move. 
C3) need not be entertained since there are no good reasons to think that it is 
Aristotle's view that the virtuous agent does not aim at his own eudaimonia when 
performing virtuous actions. We cannot just take the fact that there are conceptual and 
moral difficulties that arise from Aristotle's endorsement of both motives to entail that he 
must not have really endorsed one of those motives. We should abandon unintentional 
self-love, then, as a way of getting Aristotle out of the problem of motivation in the case 
of virtue. 
3. Overdetermination 
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According to the overdetermination solution, virtuous actions have two 
independent sources of value. One of those sources of value is the agent's own 
eudaimonia. The other source of value is the action itself?21 And so, virtuous actions 
have value on this view a) because they in some way contribute to the agent's 
eudaimonia, and b) simply in virtue of being virtuous actions. Each of those sources of 
value generates the two motives we have been dealing with, and those motives are 
independent of each other in virtue of being generated from two independent sources of 
value. To choose the action for its own sake is to choose it just because it is a virtuous 
action, while to choose the action for the sake of eudaimonia is to choose it because it in 
some way contributes to eudaimonia. Just as in the case of friendship, the strategy then 
relies on counterfactuals in order to solve the conceptual and moral difficulties. 
Much of the work that was done in Chapters I and II may be utilized here. We 
may conclude for the same reasons that we did in Chapter II that, regarding how one may 
lack a motive, the counterfactuals must be understood in terms of the circumstantial lack 
and not the desiderative lack. For on the desiderative lack interpretation, we would in 
effect be asking what the agent would do if he was a different kind of agent than the one 
expressly described by Aristotle. This is unhelpful. What we want to know is what the 
virtuous agent - the one described by Aristotle - would do if his circumstances changed 
in a way that prevented him from having one of those motives. 
And because the 1.7 passage, the only textual evidence for the overdetermination 
solution in the case of virtue and happiness, so clearly countenances only one of the 
counterfactual scenarios (S 1), we may focus solely on that one. Aristotle says that we 
221 This view is found in Kraut (1989, 137-138) and Gottlieb (2009, 138-141). 
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choose the virtues for themselves, "since we would choose each of them even if it had no 
further result (~lleevos yap eXlTo!30(VOVTOS eAo(~ee' av EKOOTOV ov-rwv)". It is quite 
easy to understand this claim to mean that we would choose virtue even if we knew that 
our own eudaimonia would not be promoted by so choosing. Recently, Paula Gottlieb 
has recommended that we take this claim at "face value" in order to understand how 
virtue is chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of happiness. As she puts it: 
Aristotle himself explains that we choose virtue, honor, and the rest for 
their own sake because we would still choose them even if they had no 
further result, but we also choose them for the sake of happiness because 
we believe that through them we shall be happy. An analogy may be 
helpful. Just as an athlete chooses to run a race just to participate but also 
in the hope of winning first prize, but would still choose to run even if 
there were no prizes, so the good person will desire virtue both for its own 
sake and for the sake of the happiness it will bring, even if it turns out, by 
some misfortune, not to bring happiness. She will not want happiness by 
any other means. Both running a race and virtue have something to be 
said for them in their own right, but that does not mean that at the same 
time they cannot be chosen for other reasons toO.222 
Whether we should attribute this view to Aristotle depends on two closely related 
matters: 1) Does Aristotle think that there could be circumstances in which the agent is 
effectively prevented from having the motive to choose virtue for the sake of his own 
eudaimonia? That is, does Aristotle think that there could be circumstances in which 
virtue provides no eudaimonic benefits? 2) Are there alternative and better ways of 
understanding the claim in the 1.7 passage that Gottlieb says we should take at "face 
value"? I will now argue that the answer to the questions posed in 1) is 'no', and in 2) 
'yes'. 
The main problem for the overdetermination solution is this: Aristotle defines 
happiness as virtuous activity in the function argument. Eudaimonia consists in the 
222 Gottlieb (2009, 140). Cf. Whiting (2002, 286 n27): " ... we would choose virtue even if nothing 
(including eudaimonia) resulted from it. .. " 
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actualization of our capacities for virtue, and because of this, whenever we actualize 
those capacities there cannot help but be eudaimonic benefits?23 So, to ask what the 
agent would do if choosing a virtuous action were not a way of achieving his own 
eudaimonia would be to ask a nonsensical question, for it would basically be to ask what 
the agent would do if choosing a virtuous action were not a way of actualizing his 
capacity for virtue. But the eudaimonic benefit provided by a virtuous action is internal 
to the action itself. Eudaimonia consists not in some further result of the actualization of 
the agent's essential capacities, but in that actualization itself. For this reason, it is a 
mistake to read the 1.7 passage in the way that Gottlieb recommends. When Aristotle 
says that we would choose virtue even if it had no further result, we should not 
understand eudaimonia to be one of the things included in those results, for eudaimonia 
is not characterized in terms of results - not the kind of consequence connoted by the verb 
cnTo!3aivEIV. Rather, Aristotle's claim that we would choose virtue even if it had no 
further result should be understood much in the same way that we understood his claim 
that true friends value each other even when there is no utility or pleasure that results 
from it. As we saw in the case of friendship, Aristotle distinguished character friendship 
from the friendships of pleasure and utility by the fact that character friends do not value 
223 See Whiting (2002, 286), who recognizes this fact with some dismay since she wants Aristotle's agent 
to not have any self-regarding motives at all. She considers the possibility that the agent's motivation is 
overdetermined - that we can say that the agent chooses virtue both for itself and for the sake of his own 
eudaimonia, but that the motive to choose virtue for itself would suffice on its own. But she concludes that 
because of what happiness is for Aristotle, the appropriate counterfactuals could not be spelled out: "For to 
the extent that the virtuous agent's beliefs about her eudaimonia track her beliefs about what is worth 
choosing for itself, one cannot easily resolve the question by asking whether she would continue to regard 
choosing virtuous actions for themselves as worthwhile if she did not regard doing so as a component of 
her eudaimonia. For part of what it is for her to think this worthwhile in the relevant sense is for her to 
regard it as a component of her eudaimonia. So while she can certainly recognize that having and 
actualizing the capacity for virtue is a component of her eudaimonia, it seems unlikely that this recognition 
can play any role in her deliberative or motivational economy" (2002, 286). 
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each other for primarily instrumental reasons. But, this did not mean that character 
friends do not value each other for eudaimonic reasons. 
We should understand the I.7 passage similarly. There are certain things - things 
like money and reputation - that virtue tends to instrumentally promote. We do value 
virtue partly for these things, but we value it for itself more because even if money or 
reputation could not be promoted by choosing virtue, we would choose virtue anyway. 
But there is an eudaimonic benefit in choosing virtue under those circumstances since 
eudaimonia primarily consists in virtuous activity, and we make the decision on that 
eudaimonic basis. It is important to see that it is not just by coincidence that the 
circumstances can never prevent the agent from having an eudaimonic motive, for 
Aristotle. It would be a rather amazing coincidence if virtue always happened to 
instrumentally further our interests; but Aristotle does not think that virtue only 
contributes instrumentally to eudaimonia. What he does think is that virtue provides 
eudaimonic benefits that are internal and intrinsic to what virtue is. This strongly 
suggests that he does not think that the value virtue has in itself is independent of its 
eudaimonic value, which indicates that he does not accept the standard meaning of 
valuing virtue for itself. And so we are strongly pushed in the direction of the 
constitutive solution. 
Before taking up the constitutive solution, it is worth mentioning that the 
overdetermination solution is much easier to square with Aristotle's text for those who 
think that Aristotle identifies eudaimonia exclusively with theoretical contemplation.224 
When Aristotle says that moral virtue is chosen for the sake of happiness, these scholars 
224 See Chapter I sec. 3.3. 
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read him to mean that moral virtue can instrumentally promote contemplation?25 Indeed, 
this is what Aristotle must mean if he really does identify eudaimonia exclusively with 
contemplation, for moral virtue surely is not a component of contemplation itself. It is 
easier to fit S 1 into this interpretation of Aristotle, for surely there are circumstances in 
which moral virtue does not instrumentally lead to contemplation. Surely there can be 
circumstances in which the virtuous agent's choice of moral virtue ends up taking away 
from the contemplative activity in which he could have engaged. In these circumstances, 
the agent is prevented from having the motive to choose virtue for the sake of his own 
eudaimonia (contemplation), and the motive to choose virtue for its own sake suffices for 
the action?26 
4. The Constitutive Solution 
According to the constitutive solution, virtue is chosen both for itself and for the 
sake of eudaimonia insofar as virtue is chosen as an essential constituent part of 
eudaimonia.227 Central to this solution is the distinction between a constituent and an 
instrumental means, and the difference between aiming at something as a constituent part 
225 See Kraut (1989, ch. 3). 
226 This is precisely what Kraut thinks happens. Because Kraut thinks that all eudaimonic value is 
contemplative value, he thinks that things like moral virtue and friendship can have non-eudaimonic value 
- value that is independent of the agent's own contemplation. See Kraut (1989, chs. 2-3; 5.14). Cf. Van 
Cleemput (2006, 156). See Lear (2004, ch. 4 & ch.8 sec.5) for an opposing and minority point of view. 
She argues that morally virtuous actions are chosen for the sake of contemplation because they approximate 
contemplative activity, not because they are instrumental to it. Her view actually has strong similarities to 
Tuozzo (1995), who argues that contemplation constitutes "an indirect standard for virtuous action" (1995, 
131), and that morally virtuous actions promote contemplation by promoting "the internal, psychic 
conditions of theoretical contemplation" (1995, 144). 
227 See Bostock (2000, 14), Cooper (1987), Crisp (1994), Devereaux (1981), Keyt (1983 and 1989), Roche 
(1988), White (1990), Whiting (1986), Ackrill (1980, 29-30), Irwin (1999, 182), Wilkes (1978, 356 n.5). 
All of these authors think that virtue is a component of eudaimonia and not an instrumental means to it. 
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of some whole and aiming at it as an instrumental means to some further end. We 
defined this distinction in Chapter II section 4.1. So, someone who aims at virtue as a 
constituent part of his happiness and not just insofar as virtue has instrumental benefits 
can thereby be said to aim at virtue for itself. 
But this is not yet enough to get us what we want. Consider the following 
questions posed by Gottlieb as she criticizes the constitutive solution: 
Are there parts that are choiceworthy solely because of their contribution 
to some whole, and if so, what sense does it make to say that these are 
choiceworthy also for their own sake? Why are they not merely 
instrumentally valuable? By analogy, a blade is a part of a lawn-mower, 
but it does not follow that the blade is choiceworthy apart from its 
contribution to the lawn-mower, and if it is not so choiceworthy, what 
makes it choiceworthy for its own sake?228 
The worry here seems to be that choosing something/or itself means to choose it not only 
irrespectively of its instrumental benefits, but also irrespectively of its constitutive 
contribution to the whole of which it may be a part. This worry has to be overcome in 
order for the constitutive solution to truly work, because in order for constitutive solution 
to truly work, it has to show that the agent can and ought to have both the thought that he 
is choosing the virtuous action for itself and the thought that he is choosing it for the sake 
of his own eudaimonia. Otherwise, C3) of unintentional self-love would be a viable way 
of understanding Aristotle on the constitutive solution. C3) stated that: "Because by 
acting virtuously the agent does attain something good for himself, he can be said to act 
for the sake of his own happiness from an outside perspective. It is only in this third-
person-perspective sense that he acts for the sake of his own happiness." Because of the 
constitutive part-whole relation between virtue and eudaimonia, it will always be true 
228 Gottlieb (2009, 139-140). 
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that the agent benefits himself eudaimonically when he acts virtuously. But we do not 
want to say that he acts for the sake of his own eudaimonia merely in virtue of that 
fact. 229 So, in short, the constitutive solution must explain why choosing virtue for itself 
must not countenance choosing it irrespectively of its constitutive contribution to 
eudaimonia. 
In order to do this, the constitutive solution must assume that to choose X for 
itself is to choose it for those features of it that make it what it is - to choose it for what it 
essentially is. In Aristotle's technical vocabulary, to choose virtue for itself is to choose 
it for what it is Ka8' aVT6 ("in virtue of itself'). The first sense of Ka8' a\JT6 which 
Aristotle identifies in Metaphysics Delta is: 
EV \lEV yap Ka8' a\JTo TO TI Tjv eTval EKaoTCt>, oTov 0 KaAAias Ka8' 
a\JTOV KaAAlas Kat TO TI Tjv eTval KaAAic;x. 
The what-it-is-to-be of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself 
Callias and what-it-is-to-be Callias. (Met. 8.18 1022a25-27i30 
TO Ti Tjv eTval is also commonly rendered "essence". Worthy of note is that there are two 
ways of understanding the force of Kat in the above text. Kirwan (1993, 168) notes that it 
may mean "and anything else that answers the question 'what is it to be Callias'?" 
Otherwise, Kat is being used epexegetically and has the force of 'i.e.'. The first option 
should be preferred, since the 'i.e.' use of Kat is uninformative and redundant. We may 
ask, then, 'what is it to be virtue?' and truly answer that to be virtue is to be that which 
provides for the excellent functioning of one's soul. In this way, the hand analogy that 
we examined in Chapter II will be able to carry over nearly perfectly into the case of 
229 This is, of course, precisely what the proponents of unintentional self-love want to be true. 
230 Kirwan (1993, 168) notes that Aristotle's example is strange here since a more informative example 
would be "Callias is in virtue of himself a man". 
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virtue and happiness. There is good reason to think that Aristotle makes essentialist 
assumptions with his claim that we choose virtuous actions for themselves (Sl' ou-rci). 
Consider that he claims that true friends value each other for themselves - Sl' OVTOVS -
and that he clearly makes an essentialist assumption in his discussion of the difference 
between character-friendships and pleasure & utility friendships: 
Hence, those who love on account of usefulness, love on account of what 
is good for themselves; and those who love on account of pleasure, love 
on account of what is pleasant to themselves - and not in so far as the 
beloved is [what he is] (OUX U 6 qHAovllev6s eOTlv), but rather in so far as 
he is useful or pleasant (NE VIII.3 1156al0-16). 
In a friendship of pleasure or utility, a friend is not loved for ''what he is", but for 
something else. This is why Aristotle calls these friendships "accidental": "Hence, these 
friendships are so by accident (KOTCx oVll[3e[3TJK6s), because it is not as being the man that 
he is that the beloved is loved, but rather in so far as he provides something" (NE VIII.3 
1156a16-18). 
We should understand Aristotle's claim that we value virtue for itself in the same 
way that he claims we value our friends for themselves.231 Valuing virtue for itself 
231 I follow Kraut (1976, 236-238) and Whiting (2002, 274-276) in making this claim (Whiting herself 
followed Kraut - see 2002, n8). Much of what I will argue in the remainder of this section is found in 
Kraut (1976), I have discovered, who argues that for Aristotle, "virtuous acts must be chosen for what they 
are in themselves, that is, for their inherent properties, one of which is their being principal components of 
happiness" (239). Kraut, however, does not explore (not in the 1976 paper anyway) the moral implications 
of his interpretation for Aristotle's virtuous agent. Also, Kraut must have changed his view by the time he 
wrote Aristotle on the Human Good (1989), in which he argues that happiness = contemplation, and that 
virtuous actions have value and are chosen independently of their contribution to contemplation. It is 
instructive to compare Whiting (2002) and Kraut (1976) on the issue of the virtuous agent's motivational 
economy. They both model choosing a virtuous action for itself on Aristotle's account of loving a virtuous 
person for himself. They both think that to choose a virtuous action for itself is to choose it for those 
features of it that make it what it is. Kraut thinks that one of the essential features of a virtuous action is 
that it is a principal component of a happy life, and so grants that the virtuous agent has a self-regarding 
motive when acting virtuously. Whiting is unclear about whether she thinks that being a principal 
component in a happy life is an essential feature ofa virtuous action (though much of what she says implies 
it), and wants Aristotle's virtuous agent to not think at all about his own happiness when acting virtuously. 
See Whiting (2002, n8): "His [Kraut's] account stresses - in a way that I would want to resist - the priority 
of choosing a virtuous action for the sake of eudaimonia over choosing it for itself." But it is not clear that 
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means valuing it independently of those accidental features of it - like the fact that it 
tends to bring one a good reputation, or money, or whatever else it happens to be 
instrumentally useful for.232 Valuing and choosing virtue for itself means valuing and 
choosing it for those features of it that make it what it is. Valuing and choosing virtuous 
actions for themselves, then, means valuing and choosing them for those features that 
make them virtuous actions. Textual evidence that Aristotle holds this view about what it 
means to choose virtuous actions for themselves is found in his discussions of acting for 
the sake of the noble (TO KaA6v) in connection with both generosity and courage. We 
discussed the noble in Chapter 1 section 3.4, and the points raised there are relevant here. 
Aristotle's remark that the virtuous act for the sake of the noble is puzzling since he never 
gives a substantive account of the noble as he does for his many other key concepts. The 
remark is scattered throughout the Ethics. 233 What is clear from the passages in which he 
does discuss the noble is that choosing a virtuous action for the sake of the noble is just to 
choose it insofar is it is a virtuous action. Aristotle treats choosing virtuous actions 81' 
a\iToOs and choosing them TOO KaAOO EVEKa as basically the same. 
Consider the fact that Aristotle claims that if virtuous actions are not chosen for 
themselves, then the person choosing them is not truly virtuous (NE 11.4 Il05a32). He 
makes the same exact claim about the noble: 
Kraut's account stresses such a "priority". He does not think that choosing a virtuous action for itself is 
subordinate to choosing it for the sake of eudaimonia, but rather that it is the same as choosing it for the 
sake of eudaimonia. 
232 See Kraut (1976, 238). The superficial attractions of virtue are "the honors that are often bestowed 
upon the virtuous, the avoidance of disgrace and punishment, and all of the other external goods (favors, 
wealth) that a person might receive because others consider him virtuous." 
233 NE l1l5b12, 1116b3, l1l7b9, l1l7b17, 1119b15, 11120a23, 11 22b6-7. 
If someone gives to the wrong people, or does not aim at the noble but 
gives for some other reason (aAAa 8la TlV' aAATJV aiT(av), he will not be 
called generous, but some other sort of person. (NE IV.1 l120a28-29) 
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In addition, the doctrine of the mean in 11.6 states that virtue of character lies in a mean 
between a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. To be in the mean state is to be 
disposed to have certain feelings "at the right times, about the right things, towards the 
right people, for the right end, and in the right way," for this "is the intermediate and best 
condition, and this is proper to virtue" (NE 11.4 l106b21-25). Now consider the 
following passage: 
Actions in accord with virtue are noble and aim at the noble. Hence the 
generous person will also aim at the noble in his giving, and will give 
correctly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, at the 
right time, and all the other things that are implied by correct giving. (NE 
IV.1 1120a24-27, my emphasis) 
Aristotle implies in this passage that by giving to the right people, the right amounts, at 
the right time, etc., the virtuous person thereby aims at the noble in his giving. But the 
features of giving at the right time, to the right people, in the right amounts, are just the 
very features that make the action a virtuous action. Virtue and nobility, then, are 
fundamentally integrated with respect to moral motivation?34 An action's status as 
virtuous is inextricably tied to its status as noble, and vice versa. This is because the 
features that make an action virtuous are the same features that make an action noble. 
That being the case, the motive from nobility and the motive to choose the virtuous action 
for itself are the same, in Aristotle's view. 
But then why introduce the concept of the noble? I suggest that Aristotle does 
this in order to call our attention to the beauty of virtuous actions. Aristotle discusses the 
234 Rogers (1994a, 311) makes this point. 
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kalon in Metaphysics XIII.3 and says that it denotes order (T6:~IS), symmetry 
(O'VJ..lJ..lETp(a), and boundedness (TO WPIO'J..lEVQV) (1078a36-bl). While it may seem odd at 
first, the formal properties of order, symmetry, and boundedness lie at the heart of 
Aristotle's understanding of virtue. The mean, bounded by the extremes, ensures 
symmetry and boundness. And virtuous actions display order by being for the sake of the 
human good - eudaimonia orders them.235 
If Aristotle thinks that valuing and choosing virtuous actions for themselves 
means valuing and choosing them for those features that make them virtuous actions, 
then the hand analogy from Chapter II carries over quite well. To refresh our memory, 
that analogy went as follows: On Aristotle's view, a hand would not be a hand if 
detached from a body. Since being a part of a body is one of the features that makes a 
hand a hand (it is an essential feature), to care for one's hand for itself -for what it is - is 
to care for it insofar as it is a part of a body. So to consciously aim at the good of one's 
hand is, ipso facto, to consciously aim at the good of one's body (not merely from a third 
person perspective). A person could care for his hand under some other guise, I suppose. 
Someone with a strange sort of hand-fetish could care for his hand qua beautiful aesthetic 
appendage. But in Aristotle's language, such a person would not be caring for his hand 
insofar as it is a hand. Such a person would therefore not be caring for his hand for itself 
- for what it is. 
Analogously, one of the features of moral virtue that makes it moral virtue is that 
it makes for a good functioning human being, and good functioning is eudaimonia (NE 
I. 7 1098a3-15). In this way, virtue is an essential constituent part of eudaimonia. And 
235 See Lear (2006, 120-122). Allan (1971), Owens (1981), Rogers (1993), and Cooper (1999) have also 
drawn on these formal properties in order to make sense of the noble. 
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therefore, at least one essential feature of a virtuous action is that it actualizes the agent's 
capacity for moral virtue and so helps improve or maintain the excellent condition of his 
soul. Once again, this kind of actualization and soul-condition is precisely what 
eudaimonia is, according to Aristotle. So, in order to choose a virtuous action for itself -
for what it is - the agent must choose it at least partly because the action is constitutive of 
his own eudaimonia - because the action is the actualization of his capacity for moral 
virtue. In this way, virtuous actions are chosen for themselves precisely insofar as they 
are chosen for the sake of one's own eudaimonia. Someone who chooses a virtuous 
action entirely independently of its relation to eudaimonia actually does not choose the 
action for itself, it turns out. 236 
s. The Constitutive Solution and the Good of Others 
The constitutive solution clearly resolves the conceptual difficulty generated by 
the problem of motivation. X is chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of Y 
because "X for itself' and "X for the sake of Y" are not two independent reasons for 
action, but rather converge into a single reason, on the constitutive solution. What 
remains to be seen regarding the constitutive solution is whether it can adequately resolve 
the moral difficulty. That difficulty was that self-regarding motives seem to undermine 
other-regarding motives. For example, take the virtue of generosity (EAev8eploTT)S), and 
compare the following two agents, David and Jason. Suppose that they both have an 
236 It may seem as though Aristotle is expecting too much of the agent with respect to knowledge of what 
makes an action virtuous. If so, that is because of the sophisticated demands of being a phronimos - of 
having phronesis. The phronimos acts not just in accord with what makes the action right, but with 
knowledge of what makes the action right. See NE VI. 13 1144b26-28: eOTI yap ou IJOVOV Tt KaTa TOV 
op6ov Myov, aA~.' ti IJETa TOO op600 Myov e~ls apETIl eOTIV' op6os Be AOYOS lTEp\ TWV TOIOIJTCUV ti 
cpp6VTJOlS eOTIV. 
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opportunity to give a healthy sum of money to a local charity that will use the money to 
better the lives of children in serious need. Suppose both David and Jason see this 
opportunity and give the money. There are two thoughts each ofthem might have as they 
do this: 
Tl) "This is the virtuous thing to do." 
T2) "This is a chance to actualize my essential human capacities 
and achieve eudaimonia." 
Only Tl is motivating David, while Jason is motivated by both Tl and T2. Because of 
that, David seems to be the morally better agent in this case. 
According to the constitutive solution, Aristotle's response will be that someone 
motivated by Tl necessarily is motivated by T2, since to choose a virtuous action for 
itself is to choose it for its essential features. David, Aristotle will say, is actually the 
deficient agent and not Jason, since David does not fully understand what it means to 
choose a virtuous action for itself. But this response really does not do a very good job of 
answering the moral objection. Jason, after all, seems to have little to no regard for those 
whom his generous action actually benefits. They do not at all seem to factor into his 
decision-making. At least, if they do, it is entirely unclear how and in what way they do. 
And so, Aristotle should not rest his laurels on the above response, for someone who 
finds the moral objection persuasive may just as well say, "Well, so much for Aristotle's 
ethics then! It obviously has a serious moral deficiency." But rather than just leave 
things at this apparent impasse, we should explore the extent to which Aristotle and the 
constitutive solution to the problem of motivation have the philosophical resources to 
assuage the concerns of those who think that Aristotle's moral agent is overly self-
centered. The constitutive solution certainly does appear to make the agent very self-
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centered, for he seems primarily concerned with the actualization of his own capacities. 
The question is, then, to what extent can the constitutive solution do justice to the good of 
others who are not friends? Can the constitutive solution allow for Aristotle' virtuous 
agent to have a proper regard for other people? To put it in Kant's language, can 
Aristotle's agent - on the constitutive solution - regard and treat other people as ends and 
not merely as means? 
5.1. Agent-Neutral Eudaimonism? 
Now is the perfect time to return to the question of whether Aristotle's 
eudaimonism should be interpreted agent-relatively or agent-neutrally, for if the agent-
neutral interpretation is correct, then the moral worries just discussed may be nothing to 
worry about. Let's assume for a moment that the agent-neutral interpretation is the 
correct one. On this interpretation, when Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the ultimate 
end of action, he means that someone's eudaimonia is the ultimate end of action. This 
obviously provides for the possibility that it is Aristotle's view that the ultimate goal of at 
least some of our actions is the eudaimonia of another person, and if this is in fact his 
view, then it seems that the good of other people certainly figures into his ethics in an 
acceptable way. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, interpreting Aristotle's eudaimonism agent-
neutrally certainly does not preclude Aristotle from holding that some, even many of our 
actions are aimed at our own eudaimonia. If Aristotle's eudaimonism is agent-neutral, 
then when he says in the 1.7 passage that we choose virtue both for itself and for the sake 
of eudaimonia, he would in effect be distinguishing between two classes of actions: 
I) Virtuous actions aimed at one's own eudaimonia. These can be 
chosen both for themselves and for the sake of one's own 
eudaimonia. 
2) Virtuous actions aimed at the eudaimonia of someone else. These 
can be chosen both for themselves and for the sake of someone 
else's eudaimonia. 
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I have demonstrated that the constitutive solution shows how the actions in I) can be 
chosen both for themselves and for the sake of eudaimonia. Now, even if Aristotle's 
eudaimonism is agent-neutral, there is still the problem of how to explain the contrast in 
2) between choosing virtuous actions for themselves and choosing them for the sake of 
someone else's eudaimonia. But for now let's just assume that that problem can be 
solved. If Aristotle recognizes virtuous actions of the kind in 2), then he thinks that there 
are some virtuous actions that aim not at the eudaimonia of the agent performing them, 
but at the eudaimonia of the person on the receiving end of the action. 
Does he recognize such actions? One reason for thinking that he does is that, of 
the virtues of character that he recognizes, some of them seem to be straightforwardly 
other-regarding. Generosity and justice, for example, seem straightforwardly to aim at 
the good of other people. Generous actions aim at giving money to others, while justice -
Aristotle says - is "complete virtue in relation to another person (lTPOS ETEpOV)" (NE V.I 
I I 29b27). At the same time, there are some virtues that seem to be straightforwardly 
self-regarding, like temperance and magnanimity. Temperate actions aim at one's own 
physical health and well-being, while the magnanimous person - Aristotle's "great-
souled man" - is so called because of the rightful pride he takes in his own virtue. But all 
this just shows that Aristotle truly does recognize the distinction between I) and 2) 
above, and if he truly does recognize that distinction, then it would seem that he could 
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answer the moral objection to the constitutive solution. We would still need to explain 
how the actions in 2) can be chosen both for themselves and for the sake of someone 
else's eudaimonia, but for now we are assuming that an adequate explanation is 
available. 
At this point, we could take a closer look at the passages in Book I in which 
Aristotle discusses eudaimonia as the highest good and ultimate end of action, and 
determine if the agent-neutral reading is truly tenable. In truth, I believe that those 
passages are far more naturally read as specifying the agent's own eudaimonia as the end 
in question. Furthermore, Aristotle's definition of eudaimonia presents problems for the 
agent-neutral interpretation. Happiness is primarily one's own virtuous activity - one's 
own excellent functioning. Strictly speaking then, we really can only make ourselves 
eudaim6n. A cannot actualize B 's excellent functioning for him. A can promote B 's 
excellent functioning; he can provide for B in ways that make it easier for B to function 
excellently. But strictly speaking, B's excellent functioning is not something A can 
achieve solely by his own efforts, and the highest good Aristotle says is the good 
"achievable in action" (NE 1.4 1095aI7). But in fact, we need not take a closer look at 
those Book I passages to determine whether the agent-neutral interpretation in tenable. 
Whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is agent-relative or agent-neutral is something 
of a red herring in the current context. This may be much to our surprise given the 
distinction between I) and 2) above, but it is due to a simple fact. That fact is: regardless 
of whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is agent-relative or agent-neutral, it remains the case 
that virtuous actions have built-in eudaimonic benefits to the agent who performs them, 
and so always provide the agent with a self-regarding motive to perform them. Any 
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virtuous action - even a generous or just action - actualizes the agent's essential human 
capacities, which is that in which his eudaimonia primarily consists. Now, perhaps, you 
might say, Aristotle thinks that we sometimes should not aim at the actualization of our 
own capacities.237 That is, perhaps he thinks that for certain virtuous actions, our reason 
for choosing them should not be that they actualize our capacities for virtue and thereby 
maintain or improve the excellent condition of our souls. Maybe he thinks that for the 
seemingly other-regarding virtues, we must forget about the fact that we are actualizing 
our capacities by performing the actions entailed by those virtues, but for the seemingly 
self-regarding virtues it is permissible to choose them for the sake of our own 
actualization. 
But Aristotle cannot think that - not if to choose a virtuous action for itself is to 
choose it for those features of it that make it virtuous. And it is an essential feature of 
any virtuous action that it actualizes the agent's capacity for virtue. This, in essence, is 
the main problem, for this sense of "choosing a virtuous action for itself' applies in both 
1) and 2) above. Choosing a virtuous action for what it is entails choosing it for its 
eudaimonic benefits. This is why I said that the issue over Aristotle's eudaimonism 
being agent-relative or agent-neutral is something of a red herring, for even if he does 
think that we sometimes aim at the good of others, he does not think that we do this 
irrespectively of our own eudaimonia insofar as he holds that every virtuous action 
provides a reason to choose it because of its built-in eudaimonic benefits to the agent who 
performs it. 
237 This is Whiting's view (2002, 283). 
196 
Where does this leave us now? We seem to be left with the same morally 
unattractive picture of Aristotle's virtuous agent as someone who chooses to benefit 
others by performing a generous action ultimately for the sake of the actualization of his 
own capacities for virtue. It appears as though the agent wants to benefit others, but only 
insofar as benefiting others is a way of achieving his own eudaimonia. But I shall argue 
in the next section that the constitutive solution need not have this implication. To clarify 
what I shall show: It will remain the case that, according to Aristotle, the agent must be 
motivated by T2 whatever else. Because of this, the sort of Kantian objector I have in 
mind may not be entirely satisfied. However, just because the agent must be motivated 
by his own eudaimonia does not mean he must view benefiting others as a means to his 
own eudaimonia. The constitutive solution can countenance this. What we end up with 
is something that looks, on the surface, like overdetermination, but is subtly and 
interestingly different. 
5.2. Other-Regarding Features of Other-Regarding Virtuous Actions 
I have argued that to choose a virtuous action for itself, according to Aristotle, is 
to choose it for those features of it that make it the kind of action that it is. It is this 
conception of choosing a virtuous action for itself that will show why we need not accept 
the foregoing morally unattractive picture of the virtuous agent. The reason we need not 
accept it is, surprisingly, quite simple: there are other features of a virtuous action that 
make it the kind of action that it is other than that it is an actualization of the agent's 
capacity for virtue. In fact, there are essential features of certain virtuous actions that 
refer plainly to the well-being of other people. To choose a virtuous action for itself is to 
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choose it for these features too. As simple of a point as this is, it obviously needs some 
explaining. 
Consider justice, and just actions. I focus on justice because I think it provides a 
paradigm case of a virtue that aims in part at benefiting other people. The analysis I give 
of justice here I think can be applied to other Aristotelian virtues of character like 
generosity and courage that seem to have a strong other-regarding component. Justice, 
Aristotle says, is "related to another and does what benefits another (TIPOS ETEPOV EO"TIV· 
&AA~ yap Ta aV\lq>epovTo TIpaTTEI)" (NE VI. 1 1130a5-6)?38 Just actions aim at the 
proper distribution of benefits and harms by which the stability of the polis is maintained 
(NE VI.5 1132b31-33). The just person, through his just actions, aims at each person's 
(including himself) getting his fair share of beneficial and harmful things. "He does not 
award too much of what is choiceworthy to himself and too little to his neighbor (and the 
reverse with what is harmful), but awards what is proportionately equal; and he does the 
same in distributing between others" (NE VI. 5 1134a4-7). Conversely: "In an unjust 
action (TOU be abIKTl\loTOS) getting too little good is suffering injustice, and getting too 
much is doing injustice" (NE VI.5 1134a13-14). So, part of what makes some particular 
just action a just action is that the intended recipients of the action become properly 
benefited (or harmed, as it were). And conversely, what makes an unjust action an unjust 
action is that someone is not being properly benefited (or harmed). 
So, take some just action Q, which aims at properly distributing benefits among 
persons A, B, and C. Here are two essential features ofthis action: 
F 1: The action actualizes the agent's capacity for virtue. 
238 Because justice is complete virtue in relation to another, Aristotle says that it is supreme among the 
virtues (1 1 29b27). 
F2: Benefits are properly distributed by the agent among persons 
A, B, and C. 
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F 1 is a feature that Q has (and any virtuous action has) qua virtuous action. F2 is a 
feature that Q has qua just virtuous action. To choose the actionfor itselfis to choose it 
for each of these features. But here is the most central point that I wish make: When the 
agent about to perform the action considers F 1 and F2, his concern with F2 need not be 
for the sake of F 1. That is, the agent need not think of properly distributing benefits 
among A, B, and C as merely a means to actualizing his own capacities for virtue. Fl 
and F2 are two different features of the action that the agent recognizes as being essential 
to that action. F 1 provides the agent with a reason and motive to perform the action 
insofar as it is a virtuous action; F2 provides the agent with a reason and motive to 
perform the action insofar as it is a just action. These reasons are independent of each 
other in a way, and in a way they are not. They are independent of each other insofar as 
F2' s being an essential feature of the action does not depend on F 1 's being an essential 
feature of the action (and vice versa).239 They are not independent of each other insofar 
as they come from two features that are essential features of one and the same action. 
The reader may at this point be puzzled because it might seem that we have 
turned the constitutive solution into the overdetermination solution, which claimed that 
virtuous actions have two independent sources of value. There is, however, a subtle but 
very important difference between the two solutions, and it is crucial to see what that is. 
According to the overdetermination solution defended by Kraut (1989) and Gottlieb 
(2009), the value that virtuous actions have in themselves is independent of the value that 
virtuous actions have insofar as they contribute to the agent's eudaimonia. The motive to 
239 The virtuous agent will still of course have both. 
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choose the virtuous action for itself and the motive to choose it for the sake of one's own 
eudaimonia were independent motives on that solution. Which is why, on that solution, 
we sought for counterfactuals according to which the agent would still choose virtuous 
actions even if it in no way contributed to his own eudaimonia. Because the eudaimonic 
benefits of virtuous actions are internal and intrinsic to the actions themselves for 
Aristotle, we sought in vain. We discovered that the overdetermination solution was 
wrong because Aristotle holds that a virtuous action is chosen for itself precisely insofar 
as it is chosen as an actualization of the agent's capacity for virtue, and so precisely 
insofar as it is chosen for the sake of one's own eudaimonia. I am not at all changing or 
backing away from that claim right now. 
What I am claiming now is that for some virtuous actions, namely the other-
regarding ones like just actions, the motive to choose it for the sake of one's own 
eudaimonia and the motive to choose it for the sake of someone else's benefit are two 
independent motives, but that they both have their sources in what virtuous actions 
essentially are. Because virtuous actions are chosen for themselves by being chosen for 
the features that are essential to them, some of those actions (like just actions and others 
that are other-regarding) are chosen both because ofthe eudaimonic benefits they provide 
and because of the benefits they provide to other people. And to choose them in that way 
just is to choose themfor themselves. This is a logically coherent view, and it is perfectly 
compatible with the constitutive solution. As previously mentioned, this may not 
completely satisfy the Kantian-like objector who seeks purely disinterested motivation. 
But it does importantly show that the constitutive solution need not imply that benefiting 
others is viewed by the agent merely as a means to actualizing his own capacities. 
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At this point, someone might ask: "If virtuous actions are chosen for themselves 
by being chosen for all of these different things, what could it be to not choose a virtuous 
action for itself?" This is a good question. We addressed it earlier to some degree, but 
we ought to address it again more fully. To help us answer it, let us turn to a quote from 
Kraut's earlier paper (1976), before he apparently changed his view: 
The superficial attractions are the honors that are often bestowed upon the 
virtuous, the avoidance of disgrace and punishment, and all of the other 
external goods (favors, wealth) that a person might receive because others 
consider him virtuous. A good person will be attracted by these features 
of the moral life, but he cannot be attracted primarily or solely by them. 
Rather, he performs virtuous acts because of the intrinsic and unalterable 
features of the virtuous life ( emphasis mine). 240 
The italicized portion of Kraut's quote I would slightly amend to "because of what 
virtuous actions essentially are and because of what the virtuous life essentially is", 
though I think what he says is roughly the same. The point is - for at least some virtuous 
actions, some of those intrinsic features are self-regarding, and some are other-regarding. 
But those superficial attractions, i.e. the honors bestowed upon the just, the good 
reputations that just and virtuous people acquire by being just and virtuous, the way in 
which being just prevents one from being punished or disgraced, wealth; to choose 
virtuous actions for these things is precisely not to choose them for themselves. These 
are the things for which we can construct the appropriate counterfactuals. So, a virtuous 
agent - if he is virtuous - will still perform that just action even if it means, for whatever 
reasons, others will scorn him; even if it means he will lose money, etc. But he will do 
this both because of the eudaimonic benefits in so acting, and because those others who 
deserve to be treated justly will rightly benefit. 
240 Kraut (1976, 238). 
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If the analysis of just actions given above is accurate, it is reasonable to think that 
the same sort of analysis can be given for other virtues that seem to have a strong other-
regarding component. I have generosity and courage particularly in mind. Generosity 
aims at giving money to others, and for any generous action, part of what makes it a 
generous action is that there is a beneficiary who is given the right amount of money, at 
the right time, and for the right reasons (NE IV.1 1120a8-12; 1120a21-23; 1120b20-24). 
Courage aims at securing safety for others, and surely part of what makes a courageous 
action courageous is that it does, in fact, in some way secure safety for others. As for the 
more self-regarding virtues like temperance and magnanimity, they need not pose any 
special problem merely because they don't have an other-regarding component. I am not 
trying to show that Aristotle makes the good of others the most central part of ethics, as a 
theory like utilitarianism does (he clearly does not do this). I am just trying to show that 
we are not forced to accept a morally unattractive picture of Aristotle's virtuous agent 
according to which he only justly and generously and courageously benefits others 
because he sees it as a means to actualizing his own capacities for virtue. 
There is, however, one major objection that might be raised against how I have 
tried to show that we need not accept that morally unattractive picture. That objection is 
based on Aristotle's distinction between action (lTpa~IS) and production (lTOIT10lS). I turn 
to this objection in the next section. 
5.3. The Action Thesis 
Consider the following passages from NE VI: 
Text I: Slavola S' av-r11 ovgev KIVEi, aAA' ti EVEKa TOU Kat lTpaKTIKTI" 
aVTTJ yap Kat Tfis lTOlllTIKiiS apXEI: EVEKa yap TOU lTOIEi lTOS 6 lTOI6:W, 
Kat OU TEAoS aTIAws (aAAa TIPOS Tl Kat T1VOS) TO TI01T]TOV, aAAa TO 
TIpaKTOV· i] yap EUTIpa~ia TEAoS, ti 8' OPE~lS TOlhov. 
Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which is for 
the sake of something and which is practical; for this also rules over the 
productive intellect, since every one who produces produces for an end, 
and that which is produced is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only 
relative to something and of something) - only that which is done is that; 
for good action is the end, and the desire aims at this. (NE VI.2 1139a5-
b4i41 
Text II: Tfis J..lEV yap TIOltlOEWS ETEPOV TO TEAos, Tfis 8E TIpa~EWS OUK 
av E'lT]· EOTI yap au." i] EUTIpa~ia TEAoS. 
For production has its end in something other than itself, but action does 
not, since its end is acting well itself. (NE VI.4 1140b7 -8) 
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I label these passages Text I and Text II because I will refer to them as such later in this 
section. What Aristotle seems to be saying in these passages, and what many 
commentators have taken him to mean, is that action differs from production in that 
action does not aim at anything beyond itself, while production aims exclusively at a 
product. Furthermore, what the virtuous person desires as an end is not the results of his 
good acting (for that would be to think of his acting as a production), but rather just the 
good acting itself. As Politis (1998) does, let's call this "the action thesis". The action 
thesis states that the product of productive action cannot be an end of desire and that only 
non-productive action is the end of desire. 
If Aristotle endorses this thesis, it creates many problems for him, and also for the 
account of choosing a virtuous action for itself for which I have argued in the previous 
section. The main problem is that virtuous actions - such as generous, just, and 
courageous actions - seem to aim at bringing about good states of affairs. But the action 
thesis entails that, in performing a virtuous action, the agent does not aim at bringing 
241 Translation belongs to Politis (1998). 
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about a good state of affairs, for that would be to treat his action as a production, and 
productions aim at products, and products are not ends of desire.242 Rather, the action 
thesis entails that, in performing a virtuous action, the agent's only aim is good 
performance of the action itself (e\rrrpa~(a)?43 What makes this problem all the more 
acute is that in the above passages Aristotle does not merely say, like in the 1.7 passage, 
that we choose actions for two different reasons. Rather, the above passages seem to rule 
out that the virtuous agent aims at results beyond his actions. Aristotle says quite clearly 
that the end of action is just acting well itself. He does not say that we act both for the 
sake of acting well and for the sake of the results of acting. 
Irwin is particularly aware of the problems created by the action thesis: 
What does Aristotle mean by distinguishing action from production? He 
will face serious difficulties if he does not allow the same event to be both 
an action (insofar as it is done for its own sake) and a production (insofar 
as it is done for the sake of some end external to it). Many events that are 
virtuous actions, and as such decided on for themselves, are also 
productions; consider, for instance, a magnificent person's effort to have a 
suitable warship equipped.244 
As Irwin notes, one and the same event can be both an action and a production, as many 
events that are virtuous actions are also productions. My generous action of donating 
money to Oxfam is an event that is also a production insofar as it results in people getting 
242 Some commentators have even gone as far as to use the action thesis to interpret Aristotle in a strongly 
Kantian vein, according to which actions are not valued at all for their good consequences but rather only 
for the action's intrinsic features.242 Just as Kant thinks that "an action done from duty has its moral worth, 
not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon", so 
too on Aristotle's view, the thought goes, the moral value of an action depends not on results but rather on 
something internal to the action itself. E.g. Korsgaard (1996). 
243 As noted by Politis (1998, 354): "For it rules out that something other than action, but to be produced or 
brought about by action, should be an end of desire, e.g. a state of affairs." 
244 Irwin (1999, 242). See also Ackrill (1978, 213): "Commentators discussing this distinction often fail to 
face the real difficulty, that actions often or always are productions, and productions often or always are 
actions." 
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what they need. But even if Aristotle does allow that one and the same event can be both 
an action and a production, his view still seems to be that the agent cares primarily about 
the event qua action, not qua production. Aware of this, David Charles has analyzed a 
generous action, such as building a house with Habitat for Humanity, into two 
numerically distinct but concomitant acts - 1) the generous action, which is chosen for its 
own sake, and 2) the act of producing a house, which is chosen for the sake of providing 
shelter to the homeless, and then to treat the productive act as a means to the end of 
performing a generous action.245 But if this were the correct analysis, it would mean that 
the agent benefits others for the sake of performing generous actions, and then it really 
would appear that the agent benefits others ultimately for the sake of actualizing his own 
capacities (something we tried to avoid in section 4.1.2). 
Before addressing the question of how this problem may be solved, it is important 
to understand that the action thesis poses no problem whatsoever for my argument that 
virtuous actions are chosen both for themselves and for the sake of one's own 
eudaimonia. The reason for this is that one's own eudaimonia consists in one's own 
acting well. The eudaimonic benefits provided by virtuous actions are not things beyond 
the actions themselves, but rather are internal to the actions. The action thesis only poses 
a problem for my argument that virtuous actions can be chosen both for themselves and 
for the sake of the good states of affairs that they bring about - states of affairs in which 
other people are benefited. 
245 Charles (1986, 119-144). Whiting (2002) claims that this "gets things exactly the wrong way round. 
The virtuous agent performs generous actions for the sake of benefiting others; she does not benefit others 
for the sake of performing generous actions or even for the sake of exercising her generosity." On my 
reading, the agent performs a generous action both for the sake of exercising his generosity, and for the 
sake of benefiting others. 
20S 
I believe, however, that the Book VI passages above have been misinterpreted. 
That is, I do not think that they endorse the action thesis because I do not think that they 
endorse the claim that the virtuous agent ought not to be concerned with the results of his 
actions - the particular ends at which his actions aim. To show this, we should focus first 
on Text II and pay close attention to its context in NE VI.S. This is the chapter in which 
Aristotle sets out to define what practical wisdom is (cppOVTJOlS). He also says in this 
passage what practical wisdom is not, namely that it is not science (ETTlcrrti~TJ) and it is 
not craft knowledge (TEXVTJ). That it is not craft knowledge is especially what causes him 
to say that action does not aim at anything beyond itself at 1140b7. A look at this chapter 
as a whole shows that Aristotle cannot mean that the agent ought not be concerned with 
the results of his actions. 
At the start of the chapter Aristotle claims that it is the mark of the practically 
wise man "to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself 
(lTept Ta a\JT~ aya8a Kat OV~cpEpOVTa), not about some restricted area - about what 
sorts of things promote health or strength, for instance - but about what sorts of thing 
promote living well in general" (NE VI.S 1140a2S-28). It is interesting what Aristotle 
takes to be an indication ofthis: 
oTJ~eiov S' chi Kat TOUS lTep( TI cppovl~ovS AEyo~ev, chav lTPOS TEAOS TI 
olTovSaiov ev AOY(OWVTal, WV ~rl EOTI TEXVTJ. 
A sign of this is the fact that we call people practically wise about some 
[restricted area] whenever they calculate well to promote some excellent 
end in an area where there is no craft. (NE VI. 1140a29-31) 
The fact that he calculates well in an area where there is no craft is crucial, for Aristotle 
will go on a few lines later to say that practical wisdom is not craft knowledge. The 
reason he gives for this is that "action and production belong to different kinds," 
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(1140b3-4) and that "production has its end in something other than itself, but action does 
not, since its end is acting well itself' (1140b7-8). 
But in the passage just quoted above (VI.5 1140a29-31) it seems that the 
practically wise person does try to promote a good end (TeAoS TI alTov8aiov), where the 
end is not simply good acting itself. Also, consider the examples Aristotle gives of the 
kinds of people he considers practically wise: 
That is why Pericles and such people are the ones whom we regard as 
practically wise, because they are able to study what is good for 
themselves and for human beings; we think that household managers and 
politicians are such people. (NE VI.5 1140b9-12) 
Could Aristotle actually think that Pericles, other politicians, and household managers do 
not aim at trying to achieve good results in their actions? Could he actually think that 
what makes them practically wise is that they aim at nothing beyond acting well - that 
they do not aim at good states of affairs? That is incredibly unlikely. In addition, 
consider the fact that Aristotle very closely associates practical wisdom with foresight 
(lTPOVOTJTIKTiV) and advantage (TO: aVllcpepovTa). Even some of the lower animals show 
signs of having some degree of practical wisdom, Aristotle thinks, at least "as many as 
appear to have a capacity for foresight concerning their own lives (oaa lTepl TOV aliTwv 
!3(OV ExovTa cpa(veTaI 8vvalllv lTPOVOTJTIKTiV) (NE VI.5 I 141a27-28). People like 
Anaxagoras and Thales, on the other hand, because they are ignorant about the things 
that are to their own advantage, lack practical wisdom: (810 ;4.va~ay6pav Kal 9aAiiv 
Kal TOUS TOIOVTOVS aocpous IlEV CPpov(1l0VS 8' ou cpaalv eTval, C>Tav 'i8c..:>alv 
aYVOOVVTas TO: aVllcpepovTa eavTois ... ) (NE VI.5 1141b3-7). These remarks strongly 
suggest that Aristotle thinks that the practically wise person is so-called precisely because 
he aims at advantageous outcomes and succeeds in achieving them. 
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But then we must detennine just what he means when he distinguishes practical 
wisdom from craft knowledge (TEXVll). He says that the practically wise are able to 
calculate well in order to promote some excellent end in an area where there is no craft 
(NE VI. 1140a29-31). One reason for thinking that practical wisdom cannot be craft 
knowledge is that, if it were craft knowledge, then there would or could be something 
like an instruction manual one could follow if one wanted to know how to hit the mean in 
some situation. So, if practical wisdom were craft knowledge, then when the statesman 
goes about detennining how to best secure the well-being of his polis, all he would have 
to do is consult the manual and follow the rules. But practical matters are not like this.246 
There are no steadfast general rules one can just apply to get the right answer, which is 
probably why Aristotle ultimately says no more than that the practically wise thing to do 
is whatever the actual practically wise person does. 
But Aristotle does not appeal to these reasons. Instead, the reason he gives for 
why practical wisdom cannot be craft knowledge is that action and production are 
different (1140b3-4). He then gives his definition of practical wisdom, and supports it by 
reference to the distinction between action and production: 
The remaining possibility, then, is that practical wisdom is a state grasping 
the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are 
good or bad for a human being. For (yap) production has its end in 
something other than itself, but action does not, since its end is acting well 
itself. (NE VI.5 1140b5-8) 
Here we find the statement of the action thesis, or so it seems. We have understood the 
last sentence of this passage to mean that the end of the desire of the practically wise 
person is nothing beyond his good acting, meaning that he is not concerned with results. 
246 The fact that practical matters are not like this is more than mere coincidence, for Aristotle. He thinks 
that practical matters are, by nature, not conducive to sweeping general principles that purport to guide 
correctly in all circumstances. See NE II.9 11 09b 13-26. 
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That sort of concern is for producers. But, I claim, we should not so understand that 
sentence. We should not understand it in that way for the reasons previously given, and 
also because it makes no sense as an explanation of the preceding sentence (yap). If 
practical wisdom is concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human 
being. then it is not merely concerned with action. It is also concerned with Ta 
Cxv8pWlTctJ Cxya8a Kat KaKCx. In the next section, I argue for a different and better way of 
understanding that sentence. 
5.4. Action and Production: An Alternative Interpretation 
"Production has its end in something other than itself, but action does not, since 
its end is acting well itself." I interpret this sentence to mean the following: Production 
succeeds purely, and solely, insofar as the product comes about. What occurred during 
the production does not matter so long as the product results. In this way, production has 
its end entirely in something other than itself. Action, on the other hand, succeeds not 
solely insofar as it brings about its intended result. The goal of an action is to bring about 
the intended result in a certain kind of way. When the intended result is brought about 
virtuously, we have good acting - E\l1Tpa~ia. This interpretation allows us to make better 
sense of the VI.2 passage quoted earlier, is supported by another passage not yet 
examined in VI.5, and generally makes much more sense given the surrounding context 
in VI.5. I turn first to VI.2. 
It will be helpful to once again quote the relevant passage in its entirety: 
SlaVOla S' a\ITTt ou8ev KIVEi, CxAA' Ii EVEKa TOU KatlTpaKTIKtl· aVTT) yap 
Kat Tiis lTOITlTIKiiS apXEI: EVEKa yap TOU lTOIEi lTaS 0 lTOIWV, Kat OU 
TEAOS CxlTAWS (CxAAa lTPOS Tl Kat TIVOS) TO lTOITlTOV, CxAAa TO lTpaKTOV' 
Ii yap EVTIpa~(a TEAOS, Ii S' OpE~IS TOVTOU. 
Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which is for 
the sake of something and which is practical; for this also rules over the 
productive intellect, since every one who produces produces for an end, 
and that which is produced is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only 
relative to something and of something) - only that which is done is that; 
for good action is the end, and the desire aims at this. (NE VI.2 1139a5-
b4) 
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Aristotle claims in this passage that practical intellect rules over productive intellect 
because producers produce for an end, and the product is not an unqualified end - it is not 
a TEAOC; ClTTAWC;. 
On my interpretation, I take Aristotle to primarily be making the point that it 
matters how we bring about our goals. A product as such - whether it is a house, or a 
state of affairs in which hungry people get fed - is not an unqualified end because it is 
possible to bring it about in a vicious or at an rate illegitimate way. A producer, qua 
producer, is only concerned with bringing the product into being. How he does so does 
not matter. This is why practical intellect must rule the productive intellect. This is why 
only "that which is done" (TTpOKTOV) is a TEAOC; CxTTAWC; - because praxis is concerned 
not merely with bringing about results, but with bringing about results virtuously.247 So 
when Aristotle says that "good action is the end and desire aims at this", he does not 
mean that the practical intellect is not concerned with bringing about results. It is 
247 Kraut (1976,234) claims that by calling actions unqualified ends and by denying that physical products 
are unqualified ends, Aristotle "surely has in mind his earlier distinction between those ends that are final 
or complete (teleion) and those that are not (I097a25-34). Such ends as 'wealth, flutes, and all 
instruments' fail to be final, Aristotle says, because they are desired only for the sake of other things; final 
ends are those that are desired for themselves. (And the most final end, happiness, is one which is always 
desired for itself, and never for the sake of something else.) So, a physical product is not an 'end in an 
unqualified way' in that it is never desired for its own sake." My reading is not necessarily in tension with 
Kraut's reading. The reason, I think, that products as such are not desired for themselves is that it matters 
how they are brought about. They can, in a sense, become unqualified ends if they are brought about in the 
right way. And when they are, it is the good action as a whole - the virtuous bringing about of an end-
that is desired for its own sake. 
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concerned with bringing about results, but its main concern is bringing about those results 
in the right way. 
If practical wisdom were merely craft knowledge, then it would not matter how 
the phronimos brings about his good ends. Consider this passage in VI. 5 : 
aAAa !lTlv TEXVTJS !lEV EOTIV apETTl, CPPOVrlOECUS 8' OUK EOTIV· Kal EV !lEV 
TEXVlJ 6 EKWV O:!lapTCxVcuv aipETwTEpOS, lTEpl 8E cpPOVTJOIV T1TTov, 
WOlTEP KallTEpl Tas apETCxs. 
Moreover, there is virtue [or vice in the use] of craft, but not [in the use] of 
practical wisdom. In a craft, someone who makes errors voluntarily is 
more choiceworthy; but with practical wisdom, as with the virtues, the 
reverse is true. (NE VI.5 1140b23-25) 
What is found in this passage, I believe, is one of Aristotle's main reasons for wanting to 
distinguish between action and production and for claiming that practical wisdom cannot 
be craft knowledge. If practical wisdom were merely craft knowledge, then our actions 
would be mere productions. If our actions were mere productions, then it would not 
matter how we brought about our ends, but only that we brought those ends about. For 
example, if practical wisdom were merely craft knowledge, it would be acceptable for the 
practically wise person to bring about good ends in bad ways. 248 Suppose you want to 
donate a large sum of money to Oxfam in order to benefit the underprivileged, but as a 
means to this you successfully rob a bank. If practical wisdom were merely craft 
knowledge, such an action would have to count as practically wise. But this cannot be 
right, Aristotle says, because the end of action is acting well, which means intending to 
bring about, say, a just result in a just manner. We need not understand EUlTpal;ia to 
mean acting well with no regard to the particular end one is trying to achieve. EUlTpal;ia 
248 Or bad ends in bad ways. 
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is an unqualified end for the virtuous agent because it involves not just acting, and not 
just results, but acting in the right way to bring about the right results. 249 
Aristotle, therefore, does not endorse the action thesis. Therefore, the 
interpretation previously argued for regarding what it means to choose a virtuous action 
for itself, is safe. In choosing to perform a generous action, the agent surely can aim at 
bringing about the intended result of that action. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that Aristotle holds that a virtuous action is chosen for itself by 
being chosen for its essential features. One feature of any virtuous action refers plainly to 
the agent's own eudaimonia. Since a virtuous action is an actualization of the agent's 
capacity for virtue, it is chosen for itself precisely insofar as it is chosen for the sake of 
the agent's eudaimonia. In addition, some virtuous actions have features that refer 
plainly to the good of other people, since some virtuous actions (but not all) are aimed at 
benefiting other people. A just action would not be a just action if not for the fact that the 
agent performing the action properly distributed benefits among certain others. It is 
logically compatible with the constitutive solution, therefore, that the agent chooses the 
action for this feature of it as well. But he does not benefit others merely as a means to 
actualizing his own capacities. 
249 As it happens, I have discovered that Broadie (2002, 368), in her commentary, basically shares my 
interpretation of the distinction between action and production. She writes: "The question governing 
production is 'What is the best I can do to achieve special end T?' whereas the question governing good 
action is 'What is the best I can do?' This does not mean (as is sometimes thought) that the wise agent 
does not seek means to ends, or does not act for the sake of ulterior objectives, or that he is concerned only 
with his action as opposed to its consequences ('action for its own sake'). Doing M-for-the-sake-of-O, and 
doing A-with-foreseeable-consequences-C, D, E are familiar kinds of doing (praxis), and he asks whether 
doing something like that is the best he can do." See also Broadie (1991, 202-212). 
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There will be some who will still find the picture we have ended up with morally 
unattractive. Some will object that, when the agent performs a virtuous action that aims 
at benefiting other people, the very presence of his thought that he is actualizing his own 
capacities and in that way achieving his own eudaimonia undermines and spoils his 
thought that he is benefiting others, and so undermines his moral worth.250 The agent 
might still be considered to have "one thought too many", as it were. It is at this juncture 
that the objector and Aristotle will have reached an impasse. Moral virtue is, by nature, 
something good for the agent who has it, according to Aristotle. One simply cannot 
strive to be virtuous without concomitantly striving to better one's own condition. As 
one astute scholar has remarked: "We may regard this as the corruption of morality; 
Aristotle regards it as its beauty.,,251 
250 Annas (1988, 12), Whiting (2002, 283-285). 
251 Rogers (1994, 302). 
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v 
Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, I first sum up the findings of the dissertation. 
Secondly, I suggest some ways in which the findings may lead to future work. Thirdly 
and lastly, I consider the problem of motivation purely as a philosophical problem, not as 
Aristotle's problem, and I consider the merits of each solution within this context.252 I 
conclude that while overdetermination does the best job of capturing the ways in which 
most people actually are motivated in their behavior, it is the solution I've attributed to 
Aristotle that is the neatest solution philosophically, and as well gives us something to 
aspire to. 
1. Summary of the Findings 
In summing up the findings of this work, let us deal separately with each case, 
first with friendship and then with virtue and happiness. As we have seen, Aristotle says 
that the virtuous agent values his friend for the friend's sake, and also for the sake of his 
own eudaimonia. In Chapter II, after examining the relevant passages, we rejected 
unintentional self love, which claims that Aristotle does not think that the agent is 
motivated to love and benefit his friend by self-interested reasons at all. The passages 
clearly affirm that Aristotle does think that we value our friends because of how they 
stand in relation to our own eudaimonia. We then considered the overdetermination 
solution and found that the best version of that solution claims that the motives are 
252 I thank Professor Sher for encouraging me to take this up in the concluding portion of the dissertation. 
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independent of each other, and that when the circumstances prevent the agent from 
having the self-regarding motive, the other-regarding motive suffices for action. But we 
found that Aristotle does not recognize such circumstances, which strongly suggested that 
he did not accept the standard meaning of choosing something for itself. We then 
considered the constitutive solution, according to which we value our friends for 
themselves precisely insofar as we value them as essential constituent components of our 
own eudaimonia. We found this view to be morally problematic because it did not 
respect the separate good of the friend. 
But then in Chapter III, we found that Aristotle's account of the single soul of 
friendship provided a much-needed foundation to the constitutive solution, while also 
going beyond that solution. Through the activity of nous in shared-living (cru~i1v), 
friends become reciprocally shaped affective unities. By becoming such unities, the 
respective eudaimonia of each friend does become intertwined in such a way that talk of 
a "separate good" is misplaced, for friends don't have separate goods. In addition, each 
friend is what the other has made him to be in a way that both explains and justifies 
having the We-Attitude, and in a way that makes for what we have called "we-desires" 
according to the We-Desire Principle. 
In Chapter IV, we took up the problem in the case of virtue and happiness and 
demonstrated once again that unintentional self-love and overdetermination were 
inadequate, and that Aristotle did not accept the standard meaning of choosing something 
for itself. We showed that the constitutive solution solved the problem and also that it 
was able to answer the objection that it created for a morally unattractive agent. Along 
the way, we showed that Aristotle does not hold "the action thesis" according to which 
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the agent does not aim at anything beyond his own acting. We ended up with a view 
according to which virtuous actions are chosen for the features that make them virtuous. 
One feature of any virtuous action refers plainly to the agent's own eudaimonia. Since a 
virtuous action is an actualization of the agent's capacity for virtue, it is chosen for itself 
precisely insofar as it is chosen for the sake of the agent's eudaimonia. In addition, some 
virtuous actions have features that refer plainly to the good of other people, since some 
virtuous actions (but not all) are aimed at benefiting other people. The agent therefore 
chooses the action for this feature of it as well, without the thought that he benefits others 
merely as a way of actualizing his own capacities. 
2. Future Research Questions 
One aspect of Aristotle's ethics that particularly stands out as a result of this work 
is the sharp distinction he draws between friends and non-friends. As noted in Chapter II 
section 2.3, Aristotle thinks that justice not only permits us to be partial to our friends, 
but also requires us to be partial to our friends. Why is it morally worse to harm a friend 
than a non-friend, and why do the prescriptions of justice carry more weight with respect 
to friends than with respect to non-friends? These are puzzling claims, ones that stand in 
stark opposition to the popular modem idea that ethics and impartiality go hand in hand, 
and ones that have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. One possible answer to 
those questions suggested by this dissertation is that because friends are other selves, we 
owe more to them. This would suggest that we owe more to ourselves than to others, 
according to Aristotle, which would be consistent with his claim at NE IX.S that the 
virtuous person loves himself most of all. 
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Related to the previous points, the dissertation raises questions about the status of 
friendship as a virtue. Is friendship a distinct character state (E~IS) just as generosity, 
courage, temperance and the like are distinct character states? I am inclined to answer 
'no' - that friendship is not a virtue in the same way as the others. It ought to be 
recognized that it is not even clear that actions taken on behalf of one's friends are 
virtuous actions at all in the technical sense. What I mean is, when one acts to benefit 
one's friend in the ordinary way that friends do (say, I offer to help my friend learn 
ancient Greek), it is not clear that any of the particular virtues of character are being 
manifested. Of course, one could be generous or just to a friend in the Aristotelian sense, 
but many if not most of the actions we take on behalf of our friends are not properly 
characterized as generous or just in that sense.253 Friendship itself, Aristotle says, is 
"some virtue" (apETf) TIS), or "involves virtue" (\lET' apni'is) (NE VIII. 1 1 I 55a4). I find 
the uses of TIS and \lET' to be significant, for Aristotle never actually says plainly that 
friendship is a virtue. 
Conversely, the kind of actions that we do take on behalf of our friends are 
typically not the kind of actions we would take on behalf of a non-friend. Aristotle 
recognizes no virtue of what we call benevolence, and the only arena where something 
resembling that seems to take place is friendship. Aristotle only mentions the importance 
of valuing another person for that person's sake in his account of friendship. It does not 
appear in his account of virtue of character. What appears there is rather the claim that 
virtue itself and virtuous action must be chosen for its own sake. This is why I have 
253 Generosity (EAEV8EpI6T11S) is strictly about the giving and taking of money, according to Aristotle. So 
to teach one's friend or anyone else how to read ancient Greek is not, strictly speaking, generous. 
217 
treated the two cases separately in this dissertation. But the nature of their separation 
may call for more exploration. 
Finally, I suggested at the very end of Chapter IV that Aristotle and his objector 
have reached an impasse at a certain point. The objector sees self-love as inherently non-
moral (or in some cases even immoral), whereas Aristotle sees self-love, properly 
construed, as central to friendship and virtue. What I have tried to do throughout the 
dissertation is uncover the philosophical commitments of Aristotle that explain his 
holding this view. In friendship, I've argued that Aristotle's view on the role of self-love 
in friendship does not have the morally objectionable implication that many believe it has 
because he thinks that true friends are a single-soul. And in the case of virtue, I've 
argued that because of what virtue is essentially, and because to choose virtue for itself is 
to choose it for what it is essentially (according to Aristotle), Aristotle therefore thinks 
that self-regarding motives are necessary. 
But we may even want more of an explanation for the impasse between Aristotle 
and his objector. And it may be the case that many of Aristotle's philosophical 
assumptions and commitments are driven by cultural-specific considerations having to do 
with convention and tradition, considerations that we modems do not share. Therefore, 
there may very well be room for discussion of the possibility that friendship and virtue 
are shaped by such considerations?54 
4. The Problem of Motivation (Briefly) Revisited 
254 I thank Professor Mackie for making this point salient to me. 
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It is a fine line that a historian of philosophy has to tread when treating a 
philosophical problem that arises in the text of a great figure such as Aristotle - a fine 
line between maintaining textual fidelity and attributing to the figure the views that may 
best get the job done of solving the problem. I have tried to the best of my ability to not 
let philosophical biases cloud judgment concerning which solution to the problem of 
motivation is most clearly Aristotle's. In this final section of the dissertation, I'd like to 
briefly consider the problem of motivation as the problem that it is rather than as 
specifically Aristotle's problem. Instead of taking the text as my guiding standard, I shall 
consider the merits of each solution purely in its own right. I will not separate the 
problem into two cases (friendship and virtue) as I did throughout the dissertation. I will 
rather consider the problem more generally to cover all actions that we take on behalf of 
others, whether friends, relatives, coworkers, acquaintances, or strangers. 
We'll start with unintentional self-love. This solution came in several varieties, 
and the only viable one to consider here is the sophisticated-consequentialist version 
according to which the best way to achieve one's own happiness is to not aim at it. To be 
happy, according to this view, one must not try to be happy and instead focus on making 
others happy. It is sometimes true that we do better at achieving our ends when we're not 
so consciously focused on achieving them. But to solve the problem, we need more than 
just for this to be true. What also needs to be true is that, by not having the self-regarding 
motive in this way (Le. not having that motive for the reason that the sophisticated 
consequentialist does not have it), the agent is thereby morally off the hook. It needs to 
be the case that because he does not have the motive in that way, he's no longer morally 
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blameworthy for being selfish. But sophisticated-consequentialist reasoning cannot get 
the agent off the hook. 
A person who decides to become a sophisticated consequentialist has come to 
realize that he is not doing a very good job of making himself happy. He seeks a better 
way, so he decides to try to rid himself of his motive to care for his own happiness. So, 
suppose he does this. Suppose he rids himself of the motive, and then starts to do a very 
good job of making himself happy. Does he come to realize that he's happy? Let's 
suppose he does. Then once he realizes that he's happy, does he realize how he made 
himself happy? Again, let's suppose he does. At that moment he must say to himself: 
"Well, this is working. I should continue not to be motivated by my own happiness so 
that I can continue to be happy." Surely such an agent cannot escape blameworthiness, if 
indeed it is blameworthy to help others ultimately for the sake of one's own happiness. 
This agent may perform particular actions from other-regarding motives, but his life is no 
doubt still guided overall by the self-regarding motive. I suppose it is possible that this 
agent will never quite realize that he's happy, and so will never consider how he has 
succeeded in making himself happy, but what is the point of making yourself happy if 
you never enjoy it? While being a sophisticated consequentialist may sometimes be good 
from a strategic point of view with respect to achieving one's own ends, it does not make 
for an adequate solution to the problem of motivation. 
I hold the overdetermination solution in higher regard, mainly for the reason that I 
think it adequately captures how most of us are motivated in everyday life. The world is 
complicated, and people are complicated, and there are not many phronimoi out there 
whose motives are so integrated and never waver. The best version of the 
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overdetermination solution is the one according to which both self-regarding and other-
regarding motives cause one act rightly, while other-regarding motives would suffice for 
action if circumstances prevented the efficacy of self-regarding motives.255 While the 
overdetermination solution is attractive given how well it captures common behavior, I 
think it has two problems that ought to be addressed. Consider the following case: 
Party1: Eugene is a first year Ph.D. student in the philosophy department 
at Harvard, and coming up in a few days is the annual start-of-the-year 
department party, hosted by the chair of the department. First year 
students are strongly urged to attend this party, because the department 
likes for there to be a strong rapport among the graduate students, and the 
party is a great way to get to know one's new colleagues. So Eugene feels 
the pull of being professionally obligated to go to the party, which gives 
him an other-regarding motive. But Eugene also knows that there will be 
free food at the party, and nothing is more enticing to a poor young 
graduate student than a free meal. This gives him a strong self-regarding 
motive to go to the party. 
I think the overdetermination solution can perfectly well take care of this case - a case 
that I think typifies many of our ordinary dealings and encounters. If Eugene were not 
motivated at all by the other-regarding consideration, then we would blame him, however 
mildly. But if it's the case that both motives contribute to getting him to go to the party, 
and also that it is the case that even if there were no free food at the party he would still 
go, then no harm, no foul. The other-regarding motive is the dominant one, and Eugene 
escapes blame. 
But now let's change the case a little bit: 
PartY: Eugene is a first year Ph.D. student in the philosophy department 
at Harvard, and coming up in a few days is the annual start-of-the-year 
department party, hosted by the chair of the department. First year 
students are strongly urged to attend this party, because the department 
likes for there to be a strong rapport among the graduate students, and the 
party is a great way to get to know one's new colleagues. So Eugene feels 
255 How this version of overdetermination solves the conceptual difficulty need not be rehearsed here. 
shall focus solely on the moral difficulty of the problem of motivation. 
the pull of being professionally obligated to go to the party, which gives 
him an other-regarding motive. But Eugene also suffers from recurring 
bouts of kleptomania. He likes to steal things. And he knows that the 
chair of the department happens to have a whole lot of money and a great 
big house out in the mansion district of town. He wants to go to the party 
in order to scope out the house and see if he can get away with stealing 
some valuables. This is his self-regarding motive. 
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Suppose both motives contribute to getting Eugene to go to the party, but that it is true 
that Eugene would still go to the party out of professional obligation even if the chair of 
the department lived in a shack and owned nothing of value. Still, it is clear that our little 
heist-master does not escape blame in virtue of the truth of that counterfactual. Now, 
why is this? The answer I think is clear: the self-regarding motive in this case is just too 
rotten for any amount of other-regarding concern to sufficiently dilute it. 
This is one problem, then, with the overdetermination solution - that it is futile 
when the self-regarding motive is especially bad. What this suggests is that it's not 
merely the truth of the counterfactual that is doing the work of dispelling the moral 
difficulty of the problem of motivation. The nature of the self-regarding motive matters 
too, perhaps just as much. The worse the self-regarding motive, the less effective the 
truth of the counterfactual will be. The better the self-regarding motive, the more 
effective the truth of the counterfactual will be. The overdetermination solution is 
therefore incomplete without a separate account of what it is that makes for adequate self-
regarding motives. 
There is a different problem I detect in the overdetermination solution that may be 
more serious. Asking the following question may state the problem: Why should the 
truth of the counterfactual even matter at all? Whatever the truth of the counterfactual 
suggests, the fact remains that in the actual case the agent does, in fact, have both 
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motives. Now, if it is assumed that self-regarding motives spoil other-regarding motives, 
why does the self-regarding motive not spoil the other-regarding motive just because of 
the truth of the counter-factual? The answer to this question would seem to be: because if 
the counterfactual is true, the self-regarding motive need not be present in the actual case. 
But is this a good answer? I think not. It seems to me that to say that the self-regarding 
motive need not be present does not explain why it does not spoil the other-regarding 
motive when it is present. Is the answer perhaps that the truth of the counterfactual 
suggests that the other-regarding motive is the stronger motive in the actual case? This 
was our working assumption in Chapter II. The matter was not explored further as it was 
determined that Aristotle's text did not countenance the overdetermination solution at any 
rate. But I don't think that even this is a good answer to our question. For it does not 
necessarily follow from the truth of the counterfactual that the other-regarding motive is 
the stronger motive in the actual case. Furthermore, we have already seen that no matter 
how strong the other-regarding motive may be, some self-regarding motives are so bad as 
to leave the agent irrevocably blameworthy. 
At the very least, then, the overdetermination solution needs to say more about 
both the nature of self-regarding motives and about the explanatory force of the truth of 
the counterfactuals. I don't mean to suggest that these problems cannot be overcome, but 
only that the overdetermination solution is not as neat as it may seem. My main worry is 
that it may be the case that the counterfactual does no work at all, but that what really 
does the work of explaining away the moral worry is the very nature of the self-regarding 
motive itself The worry, then, is that when the self-regarding motive is blameworthy at 
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all, the truth of the counterfactual will be impotent. But when the self-regarding motive 
is not blameworthy, then the truth of the counterfactual will be unnecessary. 
This brings us to the constitutive solution, which I think is by far the most exotic 
and the most demanding solution. It is this feature of it that is its main drawback. It is so 
demanding because it basically requires single-soulhood between two people (in the case 
of friends i 56, as explained in Chapter III, and otherwise requires of an agent that he or 
she be an Aristotelianphronimos (in the case of non-friends), as explained in Chapter IV. 
As I mentioned earlier in this section, there are not too many people like that. And there 
are certainly not many people with whom we have single-soulhood. Here it is necessary 
to distinguish between our friends and those who are not our friends, for the constitutive 
solution works differently for each. Single-soulhood is only possible among friends, and 
it makes the We-Attitude possible. In the case of non-friends, we perform those other-
regarding virtuous actions on their behalf because of what virtue essentially is. Here we 
act both for the sake of actualizing our own capacities (self-regarding) and because 
someone is in need (other-regarding), but in a way that is not quite the same as the 
overdetermination solution (see Chapter IV). As I mentioned at the very end of Chapter 
IV, not everyone will find that the moral worry is assuaged by the constitutive solution in 
the case of non-friends. 
But what is so philosophically neat about the constitutive solution is that it makes 
the self-regarding and other-regarding motives converge into a single motive. I'll do 
what my friend needs because insofar as he needs it, we need it. I'll act virtuously 
because that is what my well-being is all about. Now the conditions that need to be met 
256 Remember that I have said that the account of the single-soul can be thought of as providing a needed 
foundation for the constitutive solution. It is that account that shows that the constitutive solution does not 
have the morally troubling implication that friends do not properly value each other. 
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in order for that to happen may indeed be very demanding. It takes a lot for it to really be 
true that my friend's well-being is constitutive of my own well-being (and vice versa), 
and it takes a lot for someone to develop the Aristotelian virtues of character. But when 
those conditions are met, something pretty extraordinary happens, something to which I 
think is worth aspiring. And Aristotle's ethics is, as one venerable scholar once noted, an 
ethics of aspiration.257 
257 See Richard Taylor's Virtue Ethics (2002). 
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